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“Culture is a forbidding word. I have to use it, knowing of none better, to describe the
various beautiful and interesting objects which men have made in the past, and handed
down to use, and which some of us are hoping to hand on.”
E.M. Forster, “Does Culture Matter?”

Introduction: Education and the Pursuit of Culture

“Culture,” according to Matthew Arnold, is the “pursuit of our total perfection by
means of getting to know, on all the matters which most concern us, the best which has
been thought and said in the world.”1 Arnold claimed this pursuit involved his ubiquitous
“sweetness and light,” the beauty and intellect that represent “the best” of human thought
and behavior. He believed that careful study of classical traditions of learning, such as
Greek philosophy, could influence contemporary behavior by imparting morality and a
passion for doing good works.2 The pursuit of sweetness and light was an inward process
that would encourage people to act at their own personal best. Culture for Arnold was a
process of learning aimed at influencing social conduct, which led him to claim in
Culture and Anarchy (1869) that culture offered “a long-term programme for the reform
of Britain’s entire intellectual life.” 3 Arnold argued that if everyone pursued culture by
living this “intellectual life,” they would be brought into social harmony through a shared
understanding of the lessons from culture’s venerated past.
Since he believed in the possibility of the widespread adoption of culture, Arnold
had to conceive of culture in transmissible terms. His version of culture, like the one in
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1

Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, ed. Ian Gregor (Indianapolis & New York: The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, Inc., 1971), 5.

2

Arnold found in the Greeks an intellectual flexibility he would call “Hellenism.” Hellenism in Culture and
Anarchy refers to “spontaneity of consciousness”: “Hellenism, and human life in the hands of Hellenism, is
invested with a kind of aerial ease, clearness, and radiancy; they are full of what we call sweetness and
light” (112). Arnold contrasts Hellenism to Hebraism, the mechanical obedience of Christianity: “As
Hellenism speaks of thinking clearly, seeing things in their essence and beauty, as a grand and precious fear
for man to achieve, so Hebraism speaks of becoming conscious of sin, of awakening to a sense of sin, as a
feat of this kind” (113).

3

Chris Baldick, The Social Mission of English Criticism, 1848-1932 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 22.
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this project’s epigraph, inherently depended on being “handed down,” on the preservation
and propagation of the intellectual and artistic traditions of the past. The transmission of
Arnoldian culture required institutional support, “an ideal centre of correct information,
taste, and intelligence.”4 Arnold found such a centre in the ancient, exclusive institutions
of Oxford and Cambridge: “Yet we in Oxford, brought up amidst the beauty and
sweetness of that beautiful place, have not failed to seize one truth: the truth that beauty
and sweetness are essential characters of a complete human perfection.”5 Culture was a
way of thinking modeled at the Oxbridge of his day, where thought and philosophy
formed the core of the curriculum. Oxbridge embodied culture’s transmissibility, since it
institutionalized and taught the classical tradition of learning so central to Arnold’s idea
of culture.
Arnold’s formulation of the university as cultural epicenter endured at least into
the middle of the twentieth century: F.R. Leavis claimed in his Education and the
University (1948) that universities “are recognized symbols of cultural tradition,” a
position he maintained in English Literature in our Time and the University (1969).6
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Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, 91.

5

Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, 49.
In “The Literary Influence of Academies” (1865), Arnold considered the possibility of an intellectual
academy along the lines of the French Académie Franҁaise. Such an academy would provide a central
authority for regulating matters of intellectual life. Arnold eventually decides against such an academy for
the English in favor of the inner process of culture he outlines in Culture and Anarchy, and limits his
intellectual centers of authority to the already established Oxford and Cambridge. Chris Baldick believes
Arnold based that decision on a fear that this academy would eventually be overrun by the “philistines”: “It
was one thing to revere an already established academy sanctified by centuries of tradition, quite another
to brave the stormy currents of contemporary English controversy and embark upon the messy practical
work of constructing an academy anew” (Baldick 45).

6

F.R. Leavis, Education and the University: A Sketch for an “English School.” (New York: George W.
Stewart, 1948), 16.
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Leavis upheld a version of culture consistent with Arnold’s: “the future must lie in the
cultural realm,” he insisted, and “in the performance of this function the universities have
an essential part.”7 Both Culture and Anarchy and Education and the University reinforce
the position of the university as protector and transmitter of culture because Arnold and
Leavis feared culture faced a particular threat. To put it in its most general terms, this
threat was utilitarianism. A social theory made popular in the nineteenth century, the
utilitarian movement advocated Jeremy Bentham’s dictum, “the greatest happiness for
the greatest number.”8 “A good society,” utilitarian John Stuart Mill suggested, “is one
that maximizes everyone’s pleasure, whatever its source.”9 With that premise,
utilitarianism encouraged an association of education with economic advancement rather
than with Arnold’s cultural program. The pragmatic utilitarian wanted an education that
had practical use or provided specific training, not Arnold’s passionate morality.10

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
The rapid expansion of universities that came about in the early twentieth century (on which I comment
later in this introduction and in Chapter 4) encouraged Leavis to look for culture in universities beyond
Oxford and Cambridge.
7

Leavis, Education and the University, 11.

8

For additional discussions of utilitarian influence on Victorian life, see Michalina Vaughan’s and
Margaret Scotford Archer’s, Social Conflict and Educational Change in England and France 1789-1848
(1971), Alan Rauch’s Useful Knowledge (2001), R.E. Pritchard’s Dickens’ England: Life in Victorian
Times (2003), and Catherine Gallagher’s The Industrial Reformation of English Fiction (1985).

9

J.B. Schneewind, introduction to The Basic Writings of John Stuart Mill: On Liberty, The Subjection of
Women & Utilitarianism, by John Stuart Mill (New York: Modern Library, 2002), xiii.

10

For criticism of utilitarianism contemporary to Arnold, see Benjamin Disraeli’s “Utilitarian Follies.” In
the essay, Disraeli takes exception to utility as the paramount value because he believes it interprets “the
greatest happiness” in starkly material and formulaic terms. The real inadequacy of utilitarian thought, he
claimed, is that it conceives of humankind as fundamentally tyrannical and violently selfish. A limiting
construction, utilitarianism ignores a multitude of more positive possibilities for human motives.
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For Leavis, utilitarian philosophy began a century-long assault on a moral or
humane tradition; it ignited a shift toward scientific approaches to social thought that he
maintained had led to the “social and cultural disintegration that has accompanied the
development of the inhumanely complex machinery” characteristic of his version of
modern society.11 The university, in his view, could succeed against utilitarianism if it
remained based in a “cultural tradition” similar to the one Arnold advocated. Culture
according to Leavis “is a directing force, representing a wisdom older than modern
civilization,” a wisdom with the “authority” to “check and control the blind drive onward
of material and mechanical development, with its human consequences.”12 The “blind
drive onward” of utilitarian thought could only be counteracted if education ensured the
continuation of culture’s vaulted tradition. Even if utility were to creep into the university
in ways Leavis believed to be detrimental to society, he remained confident that, because
of the strength of its humanist tradition, the university would prevail and successfully
transmit culture for generations to come.
In this dissertation, however, I argue that writers across the era associated with
modernism questioned the transmissibility of culture. In particular, they resisted the
institutional forms of cultural transmission and preservation supported by Arnold and
Leavis. Oxford and Cambridge, ancient institutions themselves, were vital to Arnold and
Leavis because they protected important traditions from the past. Modernism’s
characteristic break with literary and cultural tradition, however, stemmed from a belief
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F.R. Leavis, Education and the University, 23.
See also Leavis’s introduction to his Mill on Bentham and Coleridge (1950).

12

Leavis, Education and the University, 16.

5
	
  

in the impossibility and undesirability of replicating that past. In “Tradition and the
Individual Talent” (1921), T.S. Eliot attends to the emergent tension in modernism’s
approach to culture. If culture is based on a tradition of learning and art that spans
centuries, he asks, then to what degree is modernist innovation actually completely new?
Eliot considers especially the particular cultural tradition, or “handing down,” outlined by
Arnold—a long-standing intellectual and artistic heritage. In order to, as Ezra Pound put
it, “make it new,” Eliot “challenged tradition and attempted to reconstruct it out of the
contributions of the individual talent.”13 The high modernism that Eliot represents, in
other words, needed a culture to set modernism against; modernist writers could not pull
away altogether from the traditions of their intellectual past, since one must receive
culture in order to know how to manipulate and change it. Modernist writers could,
however, refigure these traditions in innovative and fragmented ways, which Eliot does in
his landmark poem, The Waste Land (1922). The poem’s “heap of broken images”
imaginatively pieces together the “cunning passages” and “contrived corridors” of history
Eliot considered earlier in Gerontion (1920).14
History and tradition in The Waste Land are notoriously complicated matters. As
Michael Levenson argues, Eliot’s engagement with history is not some “consistent or
continuous” inheritance; rather, the poem constructs a history “whose unity can be no
more assumed than the unity of personality. The poem expands its historical view and
just when it seems to have established a coherent temporal standpoint, it expands
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Malcolm Bradbury, The Modern British Novel (London: Penguin Books, 2001), xv.

14

T.S. Eliot, The Waste Land and Other Poems (New York & London: Penguin Books, 1998), 32; 55..
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again.”15 An unstable “temporal standpoint” indicates Eliot’s ground-breaking
engagement with tradition and history more generally, but it also, I suggest, has
implications for conceptions of culture as transmissible—as a tradition from the past
being preserved as it is brought into the present and handed down to the future. To
rethink one’s engagement with a cultural past is also to consider how this past can be
passed on. In this project, I revise Eliot’s question from “Tradition and the Individual
Talent” in terms of a tension between culture and specifically the institutions that had
historically been tasked with transmitting it: what does the modernist drive for innovation
mean for the university that preserved and propagated an old tradition of culture? Culture
for the modernists relied upon the well-trained elite brought up in the halls of Oxford or
Cambridge, but it simultaneously rejected the idea that culture could be transmitted as the
particular knowledge or values that had been long associated with the university.16 At
stake in my argument is the possibility of institutional cultural transmission, as
modernists begin to doubt whether the experience of education accurately reflects a
transmissible culture at all.
I suggest that modernist-era writers articulate the difficulty in transmitting culture
by turning to unforgiving depictions of the figure historically tasked with cultural
preservation: the mentor. Encouraging personal achievement through the affirmation of
particular cultural values and traditions, mentors effectively represent the culture they are
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Levenson, A Genealogy of Modernism: A study of English literary doctrine 1908-1922 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 199; 204.

16

For overviews of the complicated relationship between modernism and its longer literary tradition, see
Harold Bloom’s The Anxiety of Influence (1973) (a fairly direct refutation of Eliot), Malcolm Bradbury’s
The Modern British Novel (1993), Michael Levenson’s A Genealogy of Modernism (1984), and Perry
Meisel’s The Myth of the Modern (1987).
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intended to pass on. The incremental failure of fictional mentorship across the period I
describe thus indicates modernist-era writers' sense of a culture that can no longer be
sustained or transmitted. In the novels I discuss in the following chapters—Thomas
Hardy’s Jude the Obscure (1895), E.M. Forster’s Howards End (1910), Virginia Woolf’s
To the Lighthouse (1927), and Muriel Spark’s The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie (1961)—
mentorship is figured in a negative way, either as a stumbling block to the attainment of
culture or as rendering culture inaccessible to those who seek it. In particular, these
authors associate failed mentorship with the institutions of education charged with the
task of cultural transmission. Through depictions of failed mentorship, they express a
growing fear that culture and education have become progressively distinct. Despite so
many of its Bloomsbury group constituents having come through the Cambridge
corridors, English modernism had difficulty locating in those halls a usable model for the
continued transmission of culture. Celebrations of Oxford and Cambridge in Hardy’s and
Forster’s novels are celebrations of a memory, of a treasured past as Arnold may have
had it, but they are not the future Leavis envisioned. Rather than use the university to pit
culture against utilitarianism in the ways that Arnold and Leavis did, modernist-era
writers question whether culture can remain an institutionally transmissible entity at all.
Essentially, institutional education cannot offer a viable mentorship in which culture as
those writers understood it remained the subject of meaningful and sustained
transmission.17

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
17

Because this project considers education reform that occurred on the outer edges of the period associated
with modernism, I use the more expansive terms “age of modernism'” and “modernist era.” Further, while
Hardy and Forster are not canonical high modernists, I situate them in relation to the high modernist
concern for cultural preservation—a concern I examine from the perspective of specifically culture’s
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My argument speaks to two particular trends in current modernist criticism.
Firstly, I consider studies of how the propagation of culture became necessary for
modernist writers wanting to project an image of cultivated taste. Lois Cucullu, Melba
Cuddy-Keane, and Sean Latham, for example, conduct scholarly inquiries of “matters of
production, dissemination, and reception” of both high art and popular forms of culture
across the period.18 Secondly, modernist studies in the past two decades has begun to read
further into the institutional and cultural contexts of the period. These contexts have been
particularly well explained by Lawrence Rainey, Michael Levenson, and Michael North,
who have argued that the modernist involvement in the production of high art could not
be completely separate from simultaneous developments in mass culture.19 While these
studies illustrate well how the modernist preoccupation with high culture was enmeshed
in other concerns of the period, none consider at length the role of institutions of
education. In finally considering the role of institutional higher education in modernism, I
ask especially how these institutions offer a yet unstudied narrative of the problems
modernist-era writers had with the dissemination of culture; the problems of cultural

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
transmissibility. By looking more carefully into the politics of education reform taking place contemporary
to modernism, Hardy and Foster help to illustrate the particular problem of cultural transmission Eliot
alludes to in “Tradition and the Individual Talent” and addresses explicitly in Notes towards a Definition of
Culture. Spark, although an early postmodernist, is an appropriate ending point for a project about
modernism because she refigures the modernist question about cultural transmission in light of increased
anxiety over cultural transmission after World War II.
18

Douglas Mao and Rebecca Walkowitz “The New Modernist Studies,” PMLA 123.3 (2008): 738.
For other work addressing the production and dissemination of culture, see Lois Cucullu’s Expert
Modernists, Matricde, and Modern Culture (2004) and Melba Cuddy-Keane’s Virginia Woolf, the
Intellectual, and The Public Sphere (2003).

19

See Michael Levenson’s A Genealogy of Modernism: A study of English literary doctrine 1908-1922
(1984); Lawrence Rainey’s Institutions of Modernism: Literary Elites and Public Culture (1998);and
Michael North’s Reading 1922: A Return to the Scene of the Modern (1999).
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transmission were manifested in the educational advancements thought to be inimical to
cultural preservation.
My particular concern is with how cultural transmission in the age of modernism
came to be influenced by matters of educational policy. While Victorian studies has long
considered the impact of education reform on the development of the Victorian novel,
modernist studies lacks a comparable perspective.20 By focusing on mentorship and
institutions of education, I hope to add to the recent critical discussions of the cultural
institutions involved in the production of literary modernism to include the important
legislative changes made to education during the period. The policy changes and
educational debates that took place in the late nineteenth century and the first half of the
twentieth affected class accessibility to education, contributed to the credentializing
function of schooling, and resulted in a significant increase in the amount and variety of
universities. Education reform radically changed who attended schools and universities,
and what they learned while there. For the modernists, this refigured the content of what
these institutions of education were passing on as something separate from culture. The
novelists I study here further conclude that if the university, at one point a cultural
touchstone, can no longer transmit culture, it is because has ceased to be a transmissible
entity. Mentorship is the appropriate framework for this type of study because mentors
are part of a longer tradition of cultural preservation and propagation; where mentorship
breaks down, so do the cultural values that the mentor had preserved.
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See Richard Altick’s Victorian People and Ideas: A Companion for the Modern Reader of Victorian
Literature (1973) and The Presence of the Present: Topics of the Day in the Victorian Novel (1991),
Herbert Tucker’s A Companion to Victorian Literature and Culture (1999), Dinah Birch’s Our Victorian
Education (2008), and Alan Rauch’s Useful Knowledge: The Victorians, Morality, and the March of
Intellect (2001).
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I argue that the modernist-era interest in culture reached beyond “culture” qua
high art and extended into the vibrant social debates about education that were occurring
in the period. Where Arnold and Leavis responded to utilitarianism’s dismissal of
culture’s value by reaffirming the value and transmissibility of culture, however,
modernist-era texts express a more deep-seated anxiety over culture’s fate. Their
response is to remove culture from institutional forms of education altogether, calling
into question whether culture could ever be properly handed down. The historical period I
consider begins with the 1870 Forster Education Act, arguably the single most important
piece of education legislation in Britain. The Act mandated education for all of Britain’s
children of ages five through twelve within their home districts and under the oversight of
Inspectors and School Boards. My study follows British educational reform through to
the nationalization of education in the immediately postwar period, the early years of
Britain's modern welfare state. My intent is to move the narrative of education out of the
confines of the nineteenth century and into current critical discussions of the cultural
institutions that shaped modernism. In doing so, I hope to add another layer of definition
to culture as the modernists may have considered it. When contextualized in its longestablished affiliation with the university, culture refers to more than simply the artifacts
of high art or intellectualism and includes a particular tradition that was conceived of in
terms of transmissibility. Investigating the contemporary debates the changes to
education elicited offers a new way of looking at the difficulty the writers of the period
confronted in conceiving of culture as a valuable entity that, as my epigraph from Forster
implies, can be “handed” on.
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I. Education Reform and the Victorian Novel
Before I demonstrate how these writers considered education reform in their
identification of a breakdown in cultural transmission at the university, I offer by way of
prologue an outline of the most significant efforts at education reform that took place in
the nineteenth century. Education became an area of particular concern in the nineteenth
century given the rapid social changes attendant on the industrial revolution.21 Innovative
forms of technology in the previous century made possible diverse types of labor, which
opened up paths for economic advancement and social mobility. Newly available wealth
helped establish a rising middle class, while increased scrutiny of industrial work also
began to expose the vast injustices and abysmal conditions of an underprivileged working
class. Although it would not be the subject of far- reaching legislation until 1870,
education reform was precipitated by this social upheaval and consequential calls for
reform. The Reform Act of 1832 responded to a newly industrialized Britain’s early
attempts to recognize the middle class and to provide more representation for the poor
and working classes.22 Even if education was not part of the language of the actual 1832
Reform Bill, the Act’s passage reflected a growing insistence upon legislative change that
would increase governmental representation of the middle and lower classes, an
insistence on equality that would further develop into the eventual education mandates.
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Continuing the reforms put in place by the 1832 Reform Bill, the 1867
Representation of the People Act, which Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli famously
called the “leap into the dark,” nearly “doubled the number of parliamentary voters, and
in particular gave the vote to great numbers of working-class men in the large towns.” 23
The Act’s passage indicated a particularly striking shift—hence Disraeli’s dramatic
phrase— in the power granted to the working class, and intensified conversations
regarding the accessibility of education. H.C. Dent uses the example of Robert Lowe of
the Conservative Party, who “had fought the Bill furiously from first to last,” to illustrate
the bill’s implications for education reform:
In a memorable speech, which in quotation is usually telescoped into five words,
‘We must educate our masters’, he [Lowe] said: It appears to me that before we
had intrusted the masses—the great bulk of whom are uneducated—with the
whole power of this country we should have taught them a little more how to use
it, and not having done so, this rash and abrupt measure having been forced upon
them, the only thing we can do is as far as possible to remedy the evil by the most
universal measures of education that can be devised. I believe it will be absolutely
necessary that you should prevail on our future masters to learn their letters…
From the moment that you intrust the masses with power their education becomes
an absolute necessity.24
Lowe’s speech implies that with the enfranchisement of the middle and working classes
came the obligation to educate them so that they might make informed choices.25 All
classes should have at least some access to education so that all citizens could learn to act
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responsibly. If education fosters social responsibility, then educational reform must
accompany any increase in rights for the working class.
What education for the lower classes might look like, however, was not clear.
England lacked a nationalized system of education that would see to the widespread and
standardized education of the country’s youth: “The early part of the century,” R.E.
Pritchard suggests, “showed little of an educational system: a few ‘public’ schools, dame
schools, a scattering of private, voluntary schools and governesses.”26 Up until the 1870
Forster Education Act, education had been largely haphazard and inconsistent; formal
schooling was unregulated and not widely available. Lowe’s claim in his 1867 speech
that “future masters” needed “to learn their letters” was not wholly an oversimplification,
as even basic literacy was scarcely attainable to the lower classes. At the turn of the
nineteenth century, the working class had an appallingly low literacy rate of
approximately 33%; even the general population had a literacy rate “scarcely higher than
in the Elizabethan period.”27 In 1851 “fewer than half the school-age children attended
school.”28 Lowe’s call for universal education would require significant reform to the
country’s educational infrastructure, since access to education had been widely restricted
for so long.
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How to go about systemizing education was an exceptionally complicated matter
given the varying needs of a diverse population. Considering the different career paths
made possible by the industrial revolution, there was no single curriculum that could
provide universally relevant training. Gregory Castle suggests that education reform was
considered as part of the larger issue of social reform that came about after the industrial
revolution: “The creation of new routes for social mobility necessitated a change in the
function and nature of education, insofar as new job opportunities required new modes of
training or former credentials.”29 There came to be new forms of instruction, with statesponsored education expanding to include “modes of modern apprenticeship,
certification, and on-the-job training that accompanied many occupations, especially
those involving skilled office work and general literacy.”30 Expounding further on the
development of new types of education accessible to the working class, David Vincent
writes that “informal mechanisms of training and recruitment were gradually being
challenged by more structured, meritocratic, and bureaucratically mediated routes into the
labour market.”31 These developments in education speak especially to the utilitarian
movement, which asked for educational programs to include specifically technical and
scientific curricula. Interpreting Lowe’s call for social responsibility in terms of
economic success, utilitarian thinkers argued that such programs would teach practical
skill and result in economic gain.
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The changing scope of education indicates a corresponding change in perceptions
of the value of a more traditional “gentleman’s education”; utilitarian reforms uprooted
preconceived notions of education previously tied to the upper class. The aristocracy and
gentry had access to public schools, which provided “training in the classics and in
gentlemanly manners and principles.”32 From roughly the eighteen forties, more and
more young men from the professional and business classes became potential candidates
for such an education, seemingly on the principle that a gentleman’s education could turn
them into gentlemen, or at least provide a gentleman’s income.33 Rather than providing
purely economic gain, this education was intended to, as John Ruskin maintained, create
a refined, honorable, and ordered society: “There is only one cure for public distress—
and that is public education, directed to make men thoughtful, merciful, and just.”34 The
gentleman’s education, anchored in a liberal, humane tradition, offered another way of
promoting social responsibility. Ruskin believed that education should have lasting
ethical, social, and political implications; it should provide a sensibility, a moral
backbone that supports the interworking of all society’s limbs.35
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Both utilitarian reformers and proponents of a traditional curriculum agreed that
cross-class education was a burgeoning necessity. The debates leading up to and
following from the Forster Education Act stemmed from disagreements over what the
content of education should include and who should have access to certain types of
education.36 Those same debates play out in the Victorian novels of education, which
clarify the stakes of Victorian educational reform, putting their characters in often
untenable situations that highlight both the pressing need for reform and the potential
complications of change. Access to education is a central issue for many of these novels;
social inequality prompts further consideration of who should receive an education of
culture. My argument that modernist-era writers found education to be illustrative of the
of the impossibility of cultural transmission is an extension of the Victorian novelists’
examinations of whether cultural transmission should occur across class lines. The
modernist complication to the Victorian question of “who should have culture” is the
additional question, “is culture something that can be given?”
George Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss (1860) is an especially notable example of
how the English novel critically examined different approaches to middle class education,
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In addition to providing increased educational opportunities to the poor, reformers also often proposed
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particularly the contrast between utilitarian and traditional curricula. When Mr. Tulliver
proclaims “What I want, you know…what I want, is to give Tom a good eddication: an
eddication as’ll be a bread to him,” he means he wants to give his son the opportunities
he himself had not been afforded in his youth.37 Representative of the burgeoning middle
class, Mr. Tulliver is situated in a moment that had no precedent, no clear educational
path for training Tom for a life of business. Mr. Tulliver knows his son needs education
in order to advance to a life of business, but he does not know what that education should
entail: “Education was almost entirely a matter of luck—usually of ill-luck—in those
distant days,” Eliot reminds her readers, “The state of mind in which you take a billiardcue or a dice-box in your hand is one of sober certainty compared with that of oldfashioned fathers, like Mr Tulliver, when they selected a school or a tutor for their sons”
(176). Mr. Tulliver’s confusion about what an appropriate education looks like is put into
a more directly political context a few years later in Eliot’s Felix Holt, the Radical
(1866), which, like The Mill on the Floss, takes place around the Reform Act of 1832.
Felix Holt engages much more forcefully with overtly political themes, as Eliot asks for a
kind of civic accountability in the wake of social reform. As workers are bribed for their
votes and political rallies result in physical violence, she asks if there might be types of
knowledge that are dangerous for the working class to have if they are not fully and
properly—according to her definition— educated. Novels such as Elizabeth Gaskell’s
North and South (1855) and Charles Kingsley’s Alton Locke (1850) also explore the
social injustices suffered by the working classes, confronting the question of what forms
of knowledge could bring them real benefit.
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
37

George Eliot, The Mill on the Floss (London: Penguin Books, 1979), 11. Hereafter cited parenthetically.

18
	
  

These novels illustrate Lowe’s point that new access to education would invite
increasing questions about how to use that education responsibly. Part of that
responsibility included a consideration of which types of education would be best suited
to the middle and lower classes. The most obvious conflict in The Mill on the Floss is
between education as a humane pursuit and as a utilitarian program. Tom’s existing
knowledge is useful and sensible: “He knew all about worms and fish and those things;
and what birds were mischievous and how padlocks opened, and which way the handles
of the gates were to be lifted” (43). But the novel’s young protagonist, the spirited and
impetuous Maggie Tulliver, searches for a knowledge different in kind from that of her
brother: she demonstrates a markedly different intellectual capacity that is founded on
curiosity and creativity, “remembering what was in the books” and comparing the
injustices of her own daily life to the rich, imaginative world offered in literature (43).
This contrast in learning styles is echoed in Charles Dickens’s Hard Times, which
criticizes utility taken too seriously. Dickens highlights the pressures of a fully utilitarian
lifestyle, as the harsh and overly pragmatic Thomas Gradgrind sees his daughter, Louisa,
suffer as she learns the limits of such dry factuality. Sissy Jupe’s free spirit, on the other
hand, compensates for her lack of academic success. Culture in these novels is contrasted
starkly to the terms of a utilitarian program. Eliot, Dickens, Kingsley, and Gaskell all
continue to support culture, advocating an educational program that teaches the values
that inspire their own literary craft.
When it appears in these novels, mentorship generally affirms the value of
culture, often indicating the shortcomings of overly rigid approaches to utility. Sissy
Jupe, for example, becomes a positive mentor to the Gradgrind children, while Mr.
19
	
  

McChoakumchild is a detrimental one, a caricature of utilitarianism at the cost of
creativity. Eleanor in Alton Locke tutors the poor tailor in theology, eventually
encouraging Locke to become a poet, so he can “help to infuse some new blood into the
aged veins of English literature” and “bring home fresh conceptions of beauty, fresh
spiritual and physical laws.”38 In The Mill on the Floss, however, mentorship is an
elusive and conflicted resource. Maggie feels stifled, held back from the opportunity to
learn because she is unable to find a mentor, while Tom is forced into Mr. Stelling’s
mentorship, which he does not want. Stelling’s Oxbridge degree may be useful,
according to Eliot, but it may not be useful for everybody. Eliot’s portrayal of Maggie
and Tom’s conflicting experiences of mentorship encourages the reader to consider that
there may be different curricula appropriate for different students. Tom’s “worms and
fish” calls for discussion about whether education should be overtly useful to someone
like him, or more traditional, as in the liberal or humane practice of culture better suited
to Maggie’s intellectualism and curiosity.
Through her depiction of conflicts in mentorship, Eliot questions whether the
newly educated are being transmitted an education appropriate to their needs. She uses
mentorship to depict the particular frustrations in acquiring a meaningful education, but
she also finds no resolution to the problem of mentorship she outlines. Mr. Stelling’s
attempts to mentor Tom prove futile and Philip Wakem’s mentorship of Maggie does not
actually bring her any lasting benefit. Philip’s mentorship offers Maggie very little; the
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natural conclusion to their relationship is his marriage proposal. Like Rachel Vinrace in
Virginia Woolf’s The Voyage Out, Maggie dies before her mentor could become her
husband, indicating that marriage is not really a viable solution to a wider problem of
access to education. While Woolf, I will argue, revisits mentorship in more complicated
ways in her later novels, Eliot cuts off any sustained examination of mentorship as soon
as Maggie drowns. Still, her treatment of mentorship in The Mill on the Floss grants an
expansive view of culture that highlights its attempts as a program of social welfare.
Mentorship in the novel is not aimed at validating the worth of Mr. Stelling’s Oxford
culture as much as it represents the enormous difficulty of making such culture benefit
everyone. In my next section, I elaborate on a specific conception of Oxford and
Cambridge culture as having precisely such value. In my examination of how mentorship
fails in twentieth-century fiction, I argue that these later authors are able to denounce
mentorship more radically than Eliot does because they resist more forcefully this
particular notion of culture as a larger social curriculum.

II. Education as Culture: the Gentleman’s Education and the University
In a practical sense, education in the nineteenth-century English novel is clearly
wrapped up with Victorian debates about class. Many of these novels ask how the state
should systematize education so that more may receive it. As reformers called for
increasing and systematized access to education among all classes, there remained those
who wanted to preserve education’s relationship to the cultivation of what might be
called upper class sensibilities. According to these arguments, even though an education
21
	
  

based on culture had typically prepared a student only for a life of leisure or purely
intellectual pursuit, this education could be made suitable for people of a wider range of
class backgrounds. One of the most vocal proponents of such an education was Arnold,
whose writings went on to inspire an entire century of critics committed to what Chris
Baldick calls “the social mission of English criticism.” In tracing the foundation of
English studies in its modern institutional aspect, Baldick drawn a line from Arnold to
Leavis; he explores the development of literary criticism as “practical criticism” in that it
“seeks a real practical effect upon society, directly or indirectly.”39 Arnold was as much
concerned with the creation of a healthy society as the reform and utilitarian movements
had been. Just as such movements responded to class disparity, Arnold’s arguments in
favor of culture were rooted in his own formulas regarding class. When he
“recommend[ed] culture as the great help out of our present difficulties,” he intended
culture to unite a society divided among the “Barbarians” (upper classes), “Philistines”
(middle classes), and “Populace” (working classes).40 The cultural program he proposed
was centered on the humane learning associated with the academy—a learning that he did
not feel needed to be made immediately accessible to all in order to bring benefit.
In his introduction to Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy, Ian Gregor paraphrases
Arnold’s point as “In Victorian England, we have a society in which the aristocracy is no
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
39

Chris Baldick, The Social Mission of English Criticism, 4.
Baldick also notes that Arnold himself was opposed to the term “practical criticism,” associating it with the
overly mechanical or short-sighted engagement with only economic concerns. “As part of his withdrawal
from the sphere of practice, it is to be noted that the term ‘practical criticism’ appears in Arnold’s writing
as a description of the worst kind of criticism, an interested criticism tied to one or another class or political
faction in society” (23).

40

Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, 5.

22
	
  

longer in effective control of a nation destined to be ruled by the populace, a nation
which has been checked in its true development by the selfishness and commercialism of
a complacent middle class.”41 So in Culture and Anarchy, Arnold proposes a resurgence
of upper class values even though the tradition the upper class enjoyed had lost its former
dominance. The “aristocratic class,” as Arnold called it, had a “well-known politeness, a
kind of image or shadow of sweetness.” 42 As part of its decline, the aristocratic class had
been “lured off from following light by those mighty and eternal seducers of our race
which weave for this class their most irresistible charms—by worldly splendour, security,
power, and pleasure.”43 Even if members of the aristocratic class use their wealth to
procure items of luxury, Arnold maintains that at one time they were able to use their
class position to further their interest in beauty and intellect. It is that lifestyle—one in
which free time was devoted to learning and the appreciation of art—that Arnold wishes
to revive.
He believes, however, that these aristocratic values, with proper training, can
emerge from members of any class. These “aliens” will pass on to others only the best of
what the aristocratic class has to offer.44 Culture can potentially belong to anyone, and, in
turn, support a society in which all classes exist in harmony. The aristocratic class (albeit
of his own construction) offers a useful model for all society since the type of knowledge
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it has is oriented not toward—as Arnold would have it— the fleeting and short-sighted
motives of utilitarian reform, but toward a long and rich English history that Arnold
thinks can mediate present social unrest. Arnold locates in utilitarianism an economic
motive that subverts a nobler social mission: “In his school reports and in the public
debates about state funding of education [Arnold] deplored the Gradgrindery of crammed
instruction and the Liberals’ short-sighted educational policy of ‘payment by results’.”45
Even (or perhaps especially) in the absence of a ruling aristocracy, Arnold proposed a
concerted effort to continue to disseminate the particular aristocratic values that could
reassert virtue, or the “shadow of sweetness,” and work against what he saw as an
alarming educational trend that he believed would result in the social unrest he termed
“anarchy,” the danger of “doing as one likes.”
Arnold maintained that the kinds of knowledge to which the aristocratic class had
previously received exclusive access could actually serve a social mission of universal
benefit. His goal is social harmony and class transcendence, a “quest for a principle of
authority in a democratic society” that “[brings] into one harmonious and truly humane
life… the whole body of English society.”46 Arnold’s ubiquitous “sweetness and light”
may seem to be at first blush a “disengagement from practical politics,” but they are
actually long-range planning tools: “He intends to have an effect upon the world, but an
effect that is necessarily delayed by its detour through history.”47 Arnold’s formula is a
sustained theory of social reform meant to change the future for all classes by advocating
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Gregor, introduction to Culture and Anarchy, xiv.
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the sustained cultivation of a particular history of humane thought that had hitherto been
characteristic of or accessible to only one class.
For Arnold, culture had two defining characteristics: first, even though it had the
ability to reform future society for all, it uniquely and historically belonged to members
of the aristocratic class who had access to generations of criticism and philosophy so as
to inform their own understanding of the world; and, second, it was a dynamic process
that relied on an active engagement with one’s own present and past. Arnold maintained
that the process of culture could bring people out of their class, making their
distinguishing characteristic humanity. Culture could “make the best that has been
thought and known in the world current everywhere”; it removed the bounds of class by
bringing “sweetness and light” to all.48 Arnold’s argument about culture culminated in his
claim that education should be tasked with disseminating culture. For all his memorable
poetry and criticism, Arnold focused much of his work on education as an institution: in
1851 he became part of an inspectorate that was part of a highly controversial
government department that looked at the connections among Government, Church, and
“Dissent over the minds of the rising generations.”49 In 1875, he told the Royal Academy,
“My life is not that of a man of letters but of an Inspector of Schools.”50 Indeed,
education as an institution offers Arnold a useful metaphor for society as a whole. Dr.
Arnold of Rugby, Matthew Arnold’s father, famously viewed schools as microcosms of
society, and, according to Baldick, his son “often seems to envisage society as a large
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school in which the exemplary conduct of teachers and monitors is decisive.”51 Arnold’s
version of education, like his version of culture, relied on the knowledge of the few to be
spread to the many. Education and culture both work through a system of thoughtmodeling, and serve the same function as the antidote to anarchy.
Thus Arnold conceived of education “as a civilizing agent rather than just a
transfer of information.”52 To that end, he proposed a model for education that went
beyond simply reproducing information and actually transmitted it through mentorship.
He encouraged personal role models capable of training other individuals to become their
own “best selves.” In order to ensure the transmission of culture—a transmission
necessary for social preservation—Arnold offered an education premised on the idea of
formative training. If people could be brought into contact with good literary models,
then there might emerge a newly trained corps of teachers who could be brought “into
intellectual sympathy with the educated of the upper classes.”53 Arnold was looking “for
an example to lead the multitude now that priesthoods and aristocracies were losing their
power,” and makes culture and education, at one point the intellectual capital of the
aristocracy, stand in for the aristocracy itself. 54 In his attempt to transmit these values to
the middle class, Arnold appealed to “their duty as the ‘natural educators’ of the eager
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stocks could be trusted to grow up properly without having a priesthood and an aristocracy to act as their
schoolmasters at some time or other of their national existence” (33).
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and irrepressible working masses,” even though he feared that the middle classes would
likely not succeed in this endeavor. “The middle classes,” Baldick continues, “ must
embrace state education, not just to assimilate the masses, but to cure their own lack of
exemplary governing qualities, otherwise ‘a great opportunity is missed of fusing all the
upper and middle classes into one powerful whole’.”55 The harmony of that “whole” was
Arnold’s main imperative; it was the primary task of culture.
Culture for Arnold moved away from the ordinary or the mechanical and toward
transcendence of one’s limited class or other experience. Arnold was comfortable
prescribing this system of culture with limited admission as an antidote to “anarchy”
among all the classes because he felt confident that his select group could adequately
disseminate this culture by modeling the appropriate behavior for those unable to get
more direct access:
Therefore the true business of the friends of culture now is…to spread the belief
in right reason and in a firm intelligible law of things, and to get men to try, in
preference to staunchly acting with imperfect knowledge, to obtain some sounder
basis of knowledge on which to act.56
Culture was not only something that one has, but a subject that could be taught; culture
lent itself to his mentorship model since it was intended to be passed on through a
combination of dutiful study and personal reflection. Furthering his argument that culture
could be spread through education, Arnold labeled his cultured elite the “sovereign
educators,” whose task was to work “decisively and certainly for the immediate future.”
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This work required the development of their “best selves,” through which “we are united,
impersonal, at harmony.”57 Culture was an inward operation involving personal behavior
rather than state regulation, encouraging one to live in harmony with the state: “Everyone
of us has the idea of the country, as a sentiment; hardly anyone of us has the idea of the
State, as a working power. And why? Because we habitually live in our ordinary selves,
which do not carry us beyond the ideas and wishes of the class to which we happen to
belong.”58 Here Arnold asks for social responsibility and encourages people to move
outside of their class and consider how to enact actual social change; mentorship was his
version of legitimate social reform. His sovereign educators, then, operate in line with the
traditional obligations of mentorship, intended to pass on an agreed-upon standard of
values. As they promote the “best self,” the sovereign educators reproduce shared social
and national values in those around them, encouraging other individuals to become their
own “best self,” continuing the cycle of acculturation.
Culture for Arnold cannot be separated from the institution that fosters it; the
university is a kind of hallowed ground for the cultivation of the mind that he believes,
with the help of mentorship, can eventually cultivate the nation. The university was, as it
would become later for Leavis, Arnold’s last and only hope. Because of its wellrecognized association with the upper classes, the only ones granted access to the expense
and unpaid leisure of Oxbridge, the university had a longtime association with the
allegedly upper-class sensibilities that Arnold hoped to disseminate among the entire
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population. Castle identifies the university during Arnold’s time as relatively immune
from the pragmatism coming to dominate schooling at lower levels: “intellectual
discourse remained committed to the goals of humanistic education. This was true
especially in the ancient universities of Oxford and Cambridge, which continued to offer
a curriculum grounded in [transmitting] the humanist ideal…to a middle- and upperclass clientele.”59 Mill, too, would claim that the university “is not a place of professional
education.”60 As it was for Leavis, the university was for Arnold the bastion of the
tradition of humane learning, and so the only institution appropriate for transmitting the
culture that he believed this tradition could promote.61
Writing a century later, Leavis reiterated Arnold’s argument that Oxbridge not
only promoted culture, but constituted it. Though criticized for his often overzealous
defense of the moral value of English literature, Leavis believed in a version of culture
that has endured for centuries. Leavis argued in Education and the University that
specialization at universities overshadowed liberal education; he offered a model for a
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Arnold’s contemporary Cardinal John Henry Newman likewise charged the university with the task of
cultural preservation, arguing in his The Idea of a University (1852) that knowledge is its own end, a
valuable pursuit even if it does not satisfy more overtly pragmatic goals. While Newman’s ultimate vision
would require Church assistance, the fundamentals of his argument coordinate nicely with Arnold’s belief
that education and culture share a particular relationship when brought together in the university. The
university, Newman maintains, “is a place of teaching universal knowledge,” not the scientific
advancement advocated in a utilitarian curriculum (Newman 3). To the extent that it has a function, it is
that liberal education “brings the mind into form” (Arnold 7). As for Arnold, there is a real benefit in an
institution that is a “seat of universal learning” because it brings together bright minds and academic
debate. It fosters, Newman claims, an environment of “pure and clear” thought, “which the student also
breathes,” and that in turn “A habit of mind is formed which lasts through life, of which the attributes are,
freedom, equitableness, calmness, moderation, and wisdom” (Arnold 77). 	
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“University English School” based on a liberal studies curriculum designed to bring
together various disciplines. Leavis believed a university education had the potential to
offer experiences that could not be matched elsewhere:
I assume that the attempt to establish a real liberal education in this country—to
restore in relation to the modern world the idea of liberal education—is worth
making because, in spite of all our talk about disintegration and decay, and in
spite of what we feel with so much excuse in our many despondent moments, we
still have a positive cultural tradition. Its persistence is such that we can, in
attempting at an ancient university an experiment in liberal education, count on a
sufficient measure of agreement, overt and implicit, about the essential values to
make it unnecessary to discuss ultimate sanctions, or provide a philosophy, before
starting to work.62
Here, Leavis explains that the assumption behind his entire argument is that liberal
education restores a “positive cultural tradition,” and this tradition is still seen as valuable
even in his own day. If the universities focus on what he calls the “cultural realm,” they
can work against modern society’s “decay.” It seems significant that Leavis felt the need
to defend the relationship between “positive cultural tradition” and the university in ways
that Arnold did not feel necessary—likely because Arnold could take that relationship as
a given.63 His halting prose, replete with qualifying clauses, reveals that Leavis wanted to
remind the reader that this relationship still exists. While the first few lines of the passage
could almost belong to Arnold himself, Leavis’s “we still have” implies that he may have
perceived the relationship between culture and the university to be increasingly
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Leavis, Education and the University 18.
English literature, however, was not specifically part of the centuries-long tradition of education that Leavis
celebrated; it did not become a subject of study at Oxford and Cambridge until the end of the nineteenth
century.
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Lord Alfred North Whitehead offers in “The Aims of Education” an interesting formula that combines
Arnoldian and utilitarian thought. His calls for specialization ask for a knowledge base built by general
versions of culture, which is then accompanied by an education focused on utilization, or a specific skill. It
is worth noting that Whitehead’s version of culture and education had religious overtones, as well, although
his version of religion is hardly equivalent to Newman’s. Whitehead does make it clear, however, that his
definitions of culture and education are indebted to the nineteenth century.
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precarious as the twentieth century progressed. He even defends culture itself by
supplementing “cultural tradition” with the term “positive,” a qualifier Arnold would not
have needed, having assumed that culture is inherently good. Leavis felt that the
specializations of the modern day curriculum threatened to unseat the university as a
keeper of positive cultural traditions. For Arnold, the university and the “sovereign
educator” worked in tandem, but as the university moves away from liberal education and
culture, mentorship, I will show, characterizes an increasingly pervasive concern for the
loss of cultural transmission Leavis so vocally feared.

III. The Social Uses of Mentorship: Bildung and Habitus
Greek in origin, “Mentor” appears in The Odyssey as the man into whose care
Odysseus places his son, Telemakhos. Encouraging Telemakhos to search for his father,
Mentor initiates the boy’s quest for “identity and adulthood,” as Thomas Simmons puts
it. Mentor “identifies and nurtures the traits that most distinguish Telemakhos: …faith in
self, trust in the gods. Mentor draws Telemakhos further into his own Ithakan tradition by
giving him a chance to prove himself.”64 According to this foundational model, a mentor
promotes personal, individual achievement while also encouraging awareness and
acceptance of a set of shared social values. A mentor in this classical sense is a guide
rather than an imitable subject; the mentor makes possible a journey in which the mentee
comes into his own while also becoming the embodiment of a tradition. This process,
Simmons clarifies, depends on active, livable experience as a means of transmitting
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Thomas Simmons, Erotic Reckonings: Mastery and Apprenticeship in the Work of Poets and Lovers
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 4.
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culture: “Mentor does not teach abstract values, or lecture about the gods… [He] invokes
a cultural tradition that cannot be passed along in abstract or philosophical speculations.
It must be achieved through living.”65 Mentorship, according to its original principles,
facilitates the acquisition and transmission of culture by joining the process of individual
human maturation and experience with the continuation of shared cultural traditions and
values. Through mentoring the individual, the mentor preserves key social principles and
ideals.
Mentorship in these terms is not far removed from a literary tradition especially
popular in the nineteenth century: the Bildungsroman, loosely translated as a novel of
development. The Bildungsroman illustrates fully mentorship’s task of cultural
preservation and transmission from the perspective of the mentee. As Bildungsroman
protagonists become more conflicted across the nineteenth century and into the twentieth,
they anticipate the more dramatic failings of mentorship that I highlight in the novels of
Hardy, Forster, Woolf, and Spark. While its roots are in eighteenth-century Germany
(Goethe’s Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre is considered the archetype of European
Bildungsroman), the Bildungsroman was popular among the Victorians because it offered
a model of social order or harmony through the establishment of a shared set of cultural
values. Typically, a mentor would facilitate this process for the protagonist through what
Castle calls “a mystical apprenticeship and induction.”66 Similar to the primary task of
the classical mentor, the Bildungsroman traces the development of a self that matures in
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the context of prescribed social norms.67 In its most traditional form, Bildungsroman sees
no conflict between Bildung and culture: Bildung translates to “education” or “training,”
and through such education or training the protagonist finds resolution with the cultural
values of his society.
This resolution is complicated, however, as the nineteenth century progresses.
Franco Moretti’s influential The Way of the World: The Bildungsroman in European
Culture (1987) argues that by the eighteen thirties, the self began to be brought into
conflict with society in increasingly irresolvable ways.68 Todd Kontje elaborates, “Youth
acquired new significance during this period as individuals could no longer expect to
mature into the stable world of their parents…the evolving protagonists of the new
Bildungsroman do more than reflect the uncertainties of the age; they also help to shape
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Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister’s Lehrjahre (1795-6), gained popularity following Carlyle’s 1824 English
translation (see Todd Kontje’s The German Bildungsroman: History of a National Genre for more
information about Goethe’s contribution to the form in Germany and England, and Martin Swales’s The
German Bildungsroman from Wieland to Hesse for an additional overview of the traditional
Bildungsroman).
Wilhelm Dilthey, who coined the term “Bildungsroman” in 1870, claims that a leading characteristic of the
form is the way it portrays the individual internalizing society: Bildungsroman maintains “the emphasis on
the uniqueness of the protagonist and the primacy of his private life and thoughts” while considering
“whose age and culture these inner thoughts reflect”(Castle 8). Similarly, Mikhail Bakhtin identifies the
two characteristic features of the genre as the depiction of a character “in the process of becoming,” and
that it is possible to trace historical change by tracing the development of the Bildungsheld (protagonist)
(Kontje 111).
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Moretti argues that the ascendency of the Bildungsroman was a response to sweeping historical changes
in eighteenth-century Europe, and that Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice is one of the best representations
of English Bildungsroman. According to Moretti, the “miracle, or mirage perhaps” of Bildungsroman is the
“beautiful balance” it portrays “between the constraints of modern socialization, and its benefits” (vi).
“Modern socialization” in these novels “is a process,” Moretti contends. This process first encourages
“dynamic, youthful,” and “subjective” individualism, then later emphasizes that such individualism is mere
“irresolute wandering” (59). As he undergoes that process, the individual learns to subject his individual
desires to the will of society.
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an understanding of the events that produced them and to which they respond.”69 In
novels such as Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss, Dickens’s David Copperfield and Great
Expectations, and Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre, protagonists undergo the process of
socialization only with great difficulty; this leads Moretti to claim that these novels
critique particular social norms and values as oppressive or interfering with one’s
individuality.70 Moretti identifies the Industrial Revolution and Chartism as the specific
political revolutions that shaped these novels and brought about the tensions between
personal satisfaction and social imperatives one finds there. In light of such social
upheaval, he believes, Bildungsroman protagonists could not locate a stable or desirable
system of social values.
In response to those same political movements, however, Arnold only tried to
reaffirm his belief that the self and society could be brought into harmony. Fearing a
breakdown into violence or “anarchy” after the Hyde Park demonstrations of the eighteen
sixties, Arnold turns to culture as restorative Bildung.71 As Baldick notes, Arnold
considered “culture” to be a translation of Bildung; the “sweetness and light” of Arnold’s
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The protagonist of English Bildungsroman “is certainly not expected to establish a moral universe that
already exists, eternal and unchangeable, and even less to question that universe. His most typical function
lies rather in making that world recognizable for any and all readers” (Moretti 189). In other words, the
nineteenth-century English Bildungsroman does not seek to establish the tenets of a moral code, but to
demonstrate the difficulty a protagonist might have in achieving morality given particular social unrest.
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In Culture and Society, Raymond Williams is quick to point out the fallacy of Arnold’s assumptions of
violence: “But now the Hyde Park railings were down, and it was not Arnold’s best self which rose at the
sight of them. Certainly he feared a general breakdown, into violence and anarchy, but the most remarkable
facts about the British working-class movement, since its origin in the Industrial Revolution, are its
conscious and deliberate abstention from general violence, and its firm faith in other methods of advance”
(125).
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culture come from a specific education or training rooted in classical texts.72 Arnold’s
culture included, as I have outlined, a literal education, and he believed it could
accomplish what Bildung could accomplish in the classical Bildungsroman: encourage
individuals to work toward a peaceful and harmonious social State. Arnold’s sovereign
educators are, like traditional mentors, charged with the perpetuation of cultural values,
only they transmit a specific version of culture. While the protagonist of the midnineteenth-century Bildungsroman lacks a clear sense of how to reconcile himself with
possibly evolving cultural values, Arnold maintained that his specific program of culture
fostered at Oxbridge was the only truly restorative version of Bildung.
In my argument that mentorship fails in the novels of the twentieth century, I
identify a developing belief in the ultimate inadequacy of culture, specifically in the form
of Bildung Arnold had envisioned. Moretti also examines a crisis in Bildung, arguing that
the Bildungsroman as a form collapsed in the modernist age. Seeing that the tension
between self and society reached a climax in the years leading up to World War I,
Moretti identifies modernism’s particular failure to conform to the demands of the
traditional Bildungsroman.73 He looks to the modernist difficulty with the Bildungsroman
in order “to discover how this failure signals a successful resistance to the
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Moretti uses James Joyce as representative of the modernist Bildungsroman. The “decentered
subjectivity” and “more developed form of bourgeois identity” of Leopold Bloom, for example, “sets the
pattern for twentieth-century socialization” (244). In his reading of Portrait of the Artist, Moretti argues
that the novel’s merit “lies in its being an unmistakable failure”; Joyce intentionally follows the discovery
of Stephen Dedalus’s artist’s “soul” with a “strikingly blank and pointless” final chapter to illustrate the
irresolvable conflict between “meaningless everyday” and “meaningful revelations” (241-3).
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institutionalization of self-cultivation (Bildung).”74 The modernist Bildungsroman, Castle
finds, ultimately cannot get around a contradiction between Bildung in its traditional
sense and the tenets of modernism: the type of self-cultivation Bildung requires relies on
an acceptance of social parameters that modernists would resist in favor of a more
radically asserted and experimental selfhood. Developing these arguments about the
irresolvable conflict of Bildung, I show in the following chapters that the ready
association between Bildung and cultural transmission also comes to an end. Selfdevelopment and education may still be possible in the twentieth century, but they can no
longer occur in tandem with the acquisition of a socially agreed upon culture. This, in
turn, complicates the preservation and propagation of culture.
The self-development and education that had once been part of Bildung are part of
a larger and more complex system of value dictated by one’s social class and experience.
In place of Bildung, I contend the novels I study more accurately align culture with Pierre
Bourdieu’s “habitus.” Bourdieu’s habitus refers to “dispositions,” or the social values
that have been passed on in a particular group.75 Related more to social performance than
personal feeling or behavior, habitus is a disposition, an attitude or preference shaped by
exposure to the everyday experiences typical of one’s social group. Habitus addresses
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
74

Castle, The Modernist Bildungsroman, 1.

75

Pierre Bourdieu, Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998),
6.
Bourdieu calls habitus a “generative and unifying principle which retranslates the intrinsic and relational
characteristics of a position into a unitary lifestyle, that is, a unitary set of choices of persons, goods,
practices” (Practical Reason 8). In Outline of a Theory of Practice, he qualifies this “generative principle”
as being “durably installed” and tasked with “regulat[ing] improvisations” and “produc[ing] practices
which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their
generative principle” (78).

36
	
  

one of the questions Bourdieu asks in his In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive
Sociology: “how can behavior be regulated without being the product of obedience to
rules?”76 Habitus does not rely on obedience, but emphasizes the reconciliation of
individual agency with social structure in ways that consider the interworking of one’s
class, background, family and other diverse elements of what Bourdieu calls “social
field.” The question I ask is how might one aspire to Bildung if doing so goes against the
expectations of one’s social field? If habitus formulates the social self as helping shape
the “inner” self, what happens if these two selves are brought into conflict? In particular,
I ask how studying cultural transmission from the perspective of habitus makes
impossible the type of cultural transmission Arnold envisioned as part of Bildung.
Habitus requires a more careful consideration of class and experience than Arnold may
have been willing to account for, and it opens the possibility that matters of class and
educational policy impact the viability of a Bildung spread among all classes. The authors
I study consider culture in the context of the whole of their protagonists’ life experiences,
and this exposes the vulnerabilities of cultural transmission in an age replete with social
conflict.
Mentorship is particularly appropriate to such a study since, as I have shown, it
unites cultural transmission with the harmonizing of self and society. How can the mentor
transmit culture if he cannot bring an individual into harmony with social values? If, as
Moretti implies, shared cultural values are increasingly more difficult to establish in the
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modernist period, and, as Bourdieu implies, cultural values are largely determined by an
evolving habitus that reflects class-based expectations, then the modern mentor and the
modern mentee may be placed in an impossible position. Like Moretti and Bourdieu, I
believe the conflicts of Bildung and habitus are expressed most clearly in institutions of
education. Moretti senses the beginnings of this conflict in his analysis of the
representations of schools in the late Bildungsroman: “school…teaches this and that,
stressing the objective side of socialization—functional integration of individuals in the
social system. But in doing so it neglects the subjective side of the process: the
legitimation of the social system inside the mind of individuals, which had been a great
achievement of the Bildungsroman.”77 Values are replaced by coercion; students must
learn facts but need not believe their truth. Schools, Moretti claims, depict a stifled
individuality; the institution encourages social order without regard for the individual—
an untenable imbalance in Bildungsroman.
Similarly, Bourdieu’s observations of the French school system in the 1930s led
him to believe education was a “mechanism for consolidating social separation…The
pedagogy and the curriculum were of a piece with this controlling ethos.”78 While
education had been intended as a means of achieving an inclusive society, Bourdieu
instead found that it “imbibed a cognitive culture which procured him ‘distinction’,
potentially elevating him above the process of mass democratization.”79 Bourdieu felt
that the effects of formal education are reproductive in that those who benefit from it the
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most are already in possession of economic advantage and social standing. Rather than
promote solidarity, education encourages division. Bourdieu’s observation identifies the
ultimate failure of Arnold’s vision for education and mentorship: Arnold depended on the
transmission of culture through Bildung, with the assumption that differences in habitus
would become irrelevant. In practice, though, as education reforms met middle class
demand for expanded economic opportunities, culture became increasingly defined in the
context of one’s habitus, as social performance fitting to one’s economic status. In the
novels I examine, Bildung can be encouraged through mentorship, but habitus cannot.
That mentorship fails for these protagonists, I argue, points to modernist-era authors’
sense that culture could not be transmitted across classes in the ways that Arnold had
imagined.

IV. The Incremental Failure of the Modernist Mentor
Even as they famously identified failures of institutional education, Victorian
novels could typically still find the successful transmission of culture for their
protagonists, especially with the help of a mentor. But in the later novels I analyze in this
dissertation, mentors seem to subvert rather than promote both social harmony and
individual advancement. Mentorship acts as an impediment to cultural transmission,
rather than a facilitator. I suggest that these novels contextualize mentorship’s inability to
transmit culture in a meaningful way within a greater framework of institutional
education. These novels do not point to the specific failures of educational institutions
themselves, but to the very assumption that culture could be transmitted by any
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institution. Each of the following chapters is aligned with a particular landmark moment
in the history of education reform as I trace the incremental failures of mentorship in
these novels to the incremental nationalization of education that took place in the first
half of the twentieth century, culminating in the arrival of the British welfare state. This
does not imply a relationship of direct causation, but demonstrates that both the
nationalization of education and the modernist-era concern over the transmission of
culture are symptoms of a widening gap between education and culture that these writers
attempted to address.
The tenets of education reform highlight the particular challenges to cultural
transmission that Hardy, Forster, Woolf, and Spark identify; culture’s foundations in
education mean that problems of cultural transmission cannot be far removed from
evolutions of education’s parameters. As education reform considered especially classbased differences in educational experiences, modernist-era writers could locate similar
challenges to transmitting Arnold’s celebrated Oxbridge culture, while also arguing more
radically that cultural transmission is an increasing impossibility. Therefore, when
speaking of the institutional and cultural contexts surrounding literary modernism, one
should also consider education—especially the university.80 A consideration of the
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university as I present it also allows us to consider a more nuanced version of what
“culture” meant to modernist-era writers. Not only a term encapsulating the artifacts of
high art and intellectualism, “culture” for these writers also referred to a particular
tradition that had been defined by its very transmissibility in historical institutions. Even
as they insisted on the preservation of art, these writers would question the institutions of
its production as they endeavored to “make it new.”
I begin my analysis with Thomas Hardy’s Jude the Obscure, a novel published in
1895, twenty five years after the Forster Education Act. At this point, it had become
obvious that the Act had been only marginally successful in creating opportunities for
educational advancement among the lower classes. J.F.C. Harrison calls the Forster Act
“wretchedly inadequate,” in part because it was incomplete.81 The 1870 Act had made
education compulsory only at the primary level, which resulted in rates of illiteracy
dropping sharply, but prompted very little reform at the secondary school level.82 As a
result, while the government finally extended grants to university colleges (including
technical schools) in 1889, “even the small number of students fluctuated up and down in
a disconcerting way.”83 By the 1890s, in other words, it had become apparent that the
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of Charles Newman” (3). Newman argued in The Postmodern Aura that in “the twentieth century…
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educational opportunities given to the country’s youth had not sustained them all the way
to the university.
Jude Fawley of Jude the Obscure seems to have taken to heart Ruskin’s dicta
about the benefits of educating the masses, but he suffers as a result of reform’s
shortcomings. Published two decades after the Act’s passage, he is a symbol of its
inability to enact any real change, especially with respect to university-level education.
He dreams of attending Christminster, Hardy’s version of Oxford, despite his humble
origins. While the sweeping changes to education made in the latter half of the nineteenth
century seemed poised to allow students like Jude further educational access, these were
ultimately only surface reforms: “Opportunities for ambitious ‘poor students’ like Jude
Fawley were not uncommon in the nineteenth century, though resistance to the
‘overeducation’ of the working classes defined the nature of education available to those
classes.”84 As a result, education reform only increased lower-class access to education at
the secondary and vocational levels, while “access to the ancient universities remained
foreclosed.”85 Educational reform may have, in theory, encouraged personal growth, but
only to the extent that it did not lead a student too far outside his class, and left Oxbridge
as the ultimate and exclusive educational triumph.
In the aftermath of the 1870 Education Act and the realization in the early 1890s
that the poor were still unable to advance to the universities, Jude the Obscure diagnoses
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a disparity, I believe, between two accounts of culture. On the one hand, culture is the
Arnoldian ideal achievement of a “best self,” a process of humane development. On the
other hand, culture refers to the acquisition of a particular type of education, namely an
Oxbridge degree. The downfall of Hardy’s protagonist is that mentorship grants him
access only to the first kind of culture; his lower-class status shuts him out of a classstratified institutional reality. My reading of the novel is premised on Raymond
Williams’s definitions of “culture” in Keywords and Culture and Society. He identifies
two separate definitions of culture, one that is related to a process, “the tending of natural
growth,” while the other refers to a specific acquisition: “But this later use, which had
usually been a culture of something, was changed, in the nineteenth century, to culture as
such, a thing in itself.”86 Williams places this shift in the nineteenth century, and I
suggest that this modification in meaning is the first step toward identifying culture as, to
use Bourdieu’s term, cultural capital.
Education in the novel is used to depict defining moments in Jude’s development
as his needs come into conflict with social expectation; education as a formalized system
of knowledge fails to account for an institution that is inherently rife with inequalities and
that often cannot provide knowledge even to those who seek it. Mentorship fails Jude at
every turn, especially in the shape of his teacher, Phillotson. While Phillotson and even
Sue Bridehead can help arm Jude with specific forms of knowledge, they cannot grant
him access to the institution that would provide him with cultural capital. Mentorship, in
fact, becomes harmful as it leaves Jude in a kind of cultural no-man’s-land: he lacks the
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ability to find social acceptance anywhere and is left both impoverished and alienated.
Because Jude the Obscure is often read as a precursor to the modernist novel, the failures
of mentorship in the novel effectively lay the groundwork for the eventual denunciation
of mentorship that I explore in later chapters.87
My second chapter, a reading of E.M. Forster’s Howards End, also explores the
ways in which access to culture is class bound. Despite their best efforts at mentoring the
working-class Leonard Bast, the intellectual Schlegel sisters succeed only in enabling his
death. Bast, a clerk, has aspirations of cultural acquisition, reading Ruskin and attending
the Queens Hall concerts. When the Schlegel sisters attempt to imbue him with their own
version of upper-class culture, however, it becomes apparent that he will never be able to
attain it. Mentorship in the novel is set against heritage, a lived experience. The
mentorship the Schlegel sisters offer Bast is nothing but a false piety, since they cannot
also give him heritage, which proves to be intransmissible.
In particular, the Schlegels’ mentorship of Bast evokes the motivation behind the
Working Men’s College and other adult education programs. F.D. Maurice, one of the
founders of the Working Men’s College, attempted a “more spiritual analysis of
education” than had been offered at more technical-type programs, such as the
Mechanics’ Institutes.88 Alongside the rise of the University Extension Movement from
Cambridge, the Working Men’s College was part of a wider movement for adult
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education that, as Ruskin had, often sought to extend some of the cultured lessons of
Oxbridge to laboring men. Additionally, the Education Act of 1902 abolished the old
School Boards and contained a provision for secondary schools. Rapid educational
expansion at all levels soon followed, including higher education, as there appeared a
marked increase in new universities that had offered a variety of different types of
programs.89 Forster’s critical presentation of the Schlegels’ mentorship calls to mind the
Liberal landslide of 1906, where increased Liberal political successes was accompanied
by greater scrutiny of liberal programs, as well as a loss of working class support.
Universities extended the amount and variety of programming available to working men,
but the education they offered remained distinct from the Cambridge experience Forster
enjoyed. The question Forster asks in response to these developments is not whether the
curriculum of working class students should overlap in places with those of Oxford and
Cambridge. The question he asks, in fact, is whether what is transmitted to these
students—even if the content is the same—is actually culture at all, or whether culture
remains dependent on the particular heritage he associates with Oxbridge.
In the end, Bast is mentored by the Schlegels according to certain Cambridge
principles, but without the benefit of institutional heritage— all Helen can reproduce
through her mentorship comes in the form of Bast’s illegitimate child. Culture, Forster
argues, is increasingly wrapped up with a very specific kind of lived experience; it cannot
be duplicated. This is not a condemnation of adult education or the Working Men’s
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College; rather, Forster acknowledges that the state of higher education has changed in
irreversible ways, and to go on with culture as before is disingenuous. Forster’s
ambivalent resignation in Howards End leads him to reflect much later in “The Challenge
of Our Time” that while he experienced at Cambridge a wonderfully “humane and
intellectually curious” education, it was blind to economic disparity. With the spread of
parliamentary reforms, “[t]he poor have kicked…and more power to their boots.”90 He
develops the argument he began in Howards End, where Bast was not yet poised to
“kick” since he is merely a passive object of the Schlegels’ own interest. Ignoring Bast’s
economic status is a mistake because it leads the Schlegels to think he should be grateful
for any sort of crumbs of culture being tossed his way. So when Forster later reflects,
“life has become less comfortable for the Victorian liberal,” it “has lost the basis of
golden sovereigns upon which it originally rose, and now hangs over the abyss,” he is
looking back at the liberal programs that the Schlegel sisters evoke.91 The “abyss,” a
loaded term in Howards End, is where Bast ends up as a result of an education that was
more of a charity. Ultimately, the Schlegel sisters represent a culture that Forster enjoyed
but does not think can or should be reproduced exactly, a conclusion he comes to in part
because of his own engagement with working-class education programs.
Virginia Woolf, the subject of my third chapter, changes Forster’s sovereigns for
guineas but draws a conclusion no less concerned with Oxbridge inaccessibility. Woolf’s
criticisms, though, are gender based, linking Oxbridge exclusivity to tyrannical
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patriarchy. My argument begins with her late pacifist manifesto Three Guineas, in which
I argue she uses mentorship to characterize the relationship between higher education and
war that she elucidates in the text. Woolf identifies male exclusivity as the cultural value
transmitted to the sons of educated men, the transmitted material of an outmoded
mentorship. She incriminates Oxbridge for a reproduced patriarchal and exclusionary
male discourse that shuts out from education the “daughters of educated men” identified
in Three Guineas. Oxbridge comes to symbolize for Woolf the absence of a viable,
transmissible entity, a culture worth passing on.
For Woolf, the prime historic motivating factor was not a specific reform act or
even institutionalized higher education for women (although she delivered addresses on
these topics on several occasions).92 Instead, she uses mentorship as a means of
criticizing what she believes were the social values that led to the Great War and were
liable to result in World War II. War informs her view on the tangible danger presented
by the transmission of a gender-bound culture. To help explicate the links among
mentorship, patriarchy, and war, I first examine male education in Jacob’s Room, where
Jacob Flanders’s walk through the Cambridge corridors seems to lead him straight to
Flanders Field. In To the Lighthouse, Woolf reveals a more complete argument regarding
education and the transmission of patriarchy and tyranny as she links Mr. Ramsay’s
oppressiveness and Charles Tansley’s blind worship to the university that encourages
such behavior among male mentors and mentees. In this novel Woolf further defines
mentorship as a masculine tradition that is also overly concerned with materiality. She
depicts mentorship in To the Lighthouse as both male-based and thing-based, as the
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educated men of the novel transmit only objects that will decay with time. Theirs is not a
lasting mentorship, but a self-eroding one; as such it is not a viable or lasting cultural
tradition.
I think Woolf struggles, though, in defining this cultural tradition. Castle reads
Mrs. Dalloway as a Bildungsroman and believes that the novel “embrace[s] the core
value of Bildung” and “retrieves it from a recent history of institutionalization within
state educational systems.”93 I am not so convinced, however, that Woolf is able to reach
back to a completely desirable version of culture or education. In To the Lighthouse,
Woolf berates the exclusivity that was fostered at institutions of higher education long
before any “state” or truly standardized educational system came into play. So while her
novel is a sharp critique of Oxbridge’s relationship to war, an implied militarism that she
believes is the result of an inherently masculine type of transmission, she also poses the
possibility of a mentorship that would belong exclusively to women and produce its own
model of a transmissible culture predicated on feeling and lasting emotion. The
relationship between Lily Briscoe and Mrs. Ramsay seems poised to offer a viable
alternative of cultural transmission, only to be ambiguously cut short at the end as Lily
asserts her own selfhood. Woolf concludes To the Lighthouse with the eventual
condemnation of mentorship altogether, seeming finally to do away with any system of
cultural transmission at all.
Notwithstanding Woolf’s pronouncement that mentorship is effectively dead,
mentorship remains a topic of inquiry in later novels concerned with cultural
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transmission. I turn in my last chapter to Muriel Spark’s The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie,
published in 1961, to see her look back at a century’s worth of national and political
reform that had completely re-imagined the role of education in the state. Spark’s novel
marks the end of the journey for the 1870 Forster Education Act, having been taken all
the way to its possible conclusion. Spark, who is often viewed either in relation
to France's late modernist "nouveau roman" or as an early postmodernist, demonstrates
the early twentieth-century anxiety about cultural transmission that developed after
World War II and the relative democratization of education in the United Kingdom. If
Woolf saw in World War I the end of a culture that could be transmitted through
institutions of education, then she may, had she lived, seen late in World War II an even
more radical separation of the two than she even began to imagine in “The Leaning
Tower,” where she suggested that the war left the writers of the thirties with feelings of
guilt over their own privilege, which they depict in critical self-reflections of their
educational experiences.
Spark’s novel is set in the early thirties, just a few years before the outbreak of
World War II and the subsequent reform legislation. Spark reminisces over the vestiges
of an unregulated education, the lingering rebellion Miss Brodie represents at the Marcia
Blaine School. The novel is set in a primary school, the particular division brought under
mandate back in 1870. The school’s stern headmistress Miss Mackay, attempts to shape
the students into a nationally approved version of the proper young lady, dictating their
dress and lessons and helping them map their futures. But Miss Jean Brodie, whose
culture is based in the perceived superiority of her own taste, offers her own approved
version with her visions for her girls’ futures. Education and culture divided, the Marcia
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Blaine School and Miss Jean Brodie battle it out to see whose version of social value will
prevail. The character who emerges in a pyrrhic victory is Sandy Stranger—Miss
Brodie’s mentee who had betrayed her to Miss Mackay. Sandy, who had at one point
sympathized with and admired Miss Brodie, becomes famous for writing The
Transfiguration of the Commonplace, a title that seems to reflect decisive change.
Through Sandy, Spark finally advocates a “transfiguration” of culture, where culture
moves out of the institution altogether.
Such decisive change also characterizes the sweeping educational reform
movements of the nineteen forties. One of the most significant pieces of education
legislation since the 1870 Forster Education Act, the 1944 Education Act mandated a
number of noteworthy reforms. Its fundamental changes included a mandate for
secondary education, newly defined as beginning at age eleven and lasting until fifteen or
sixteen. Additionally, free secondary education would be extended to all children in
schools maintained by the public authorities.94 The act was designed to overcome the
noticeable lack of students enrolled in secondary education, a lingering problem of the
Forster Education Act. As social historian Angus Calder notes in his post-war history
The People’s War, even as late as in 1938 “the proportion of children eligible by age for
secondary education who had actually obtained admission to secondary schools had been
only fourteen per cent.”95
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H.C. Dent, A Century of Growth, 116.
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Angus Calder, The People’s War: Britain 1939-1945 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969), 541.
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But one of the most significant parts of the bill was based on a recommendation
of the 1926 Hadow report, which had, “[urged] the reorganization of the elementary
schools into junior (or primary) and senior (or modern) schools, with a break at eleven.”
In a response to the findings of the report, the 1944 Butler Education Act instituted the
“eleven plus” examination. The results of a student’s eleven plus exam would dictate his
or her track in the tripartite secondary school system, which divided students into either
academic, technical, or functional programs.96 The eleven plus system, Calder chides,
“ensured that privilege was perpetuated behind a façade of democratic advance.”97	
  Here,
the Education Act of 1944 moves beyond earlier reforms which had focused on providing
access to students of all classes and expanding higher education to the working class. The
Act also solidified a progressive system of levels that would lead to increased scrutiny
regarding what was taught at each level and also how it would be measured.
Miss Brodie approaches the primary school with the same task of cultural
preservation that had once belonged to Arnold’s sovereign educator; only it is not clear
why her version of culture is worth having. Miss Brodie teaches her six girls, the “Brodie
Set,” that only her version of culture is education, and only she understands how to
transmit and measure this culture. While Miss Brodie believes she is mentoring her girls
in order to ensure the continuation of an appreciation for the high arts, her mentorship
actually devolves into a culture too much removed from social welfare, as what Miss
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Part II Section 7 of the bill reads: “The statutory system of public education shall be organized in three
progressive stages to be known as primary education, secondary education, and further education; and it
shall be the duty of the local education authority for every area, so far as their powers extend, to contribute
towards the spiritual, mental, and physical development of the community by securing that efficient
education throughout those stages shall be available to meet the needs of the population of their area.” (Qtd.
in Richmond, Education in Britain since 1944, 169).
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Brodie passes on to her protégés is essentially fascism. I argue that Spark points to the
educational policies of the mid-century as indicative of the final break between
educational institutions and culture; these institutions transmit a version of a culture no
longer worth preserving. If education had, at one point, signified individual cultural
achievement, it now refers to an abstracted elitism that cannot be transmitted in any
relevant way. Mentorship, a once viable demonstration of the link between education and
culture, is finally rendered obsolete—even laughable.

	
  

52
	
  

Chapter One
Culture’s Anarchy: Mentorship and Cultural Capital in Jude the Obscure
“‘Let me only get there,’ he had said with the fatuousness of Crusoe over his big
boat, ‘and the rest is but a matter of time and energy.’”
-Thomas Hardy, Jude the Obscure
Thomas Hardy makes it clear on the first page of Jude the Obscure that Jude
Fawley is meant to suffer. The novel opens with the loss of Jude’s teacher, Mr.
Phillotson: “The schoolmaster was leaving the village, and everybody seemed sorry.”1
No student, however, is more unhappy than Jude. When Phillotson asks, “Sorry I am
going, Jude,” the young boy responds only with tears (10). Phillotson, too, is sorry to
leave his eager pupil and gives the boy a book as a parting gift. Jude, however, wants to
know where his teacher is going. Despite his protestations that Jude “wouldn’t
understand my reasons,” Phillotson shares with his student his own plans to attend
Christminster, the Wessex incarnation of Oxford: “Well—don’t speak of this anywhere.
You know what a university is, and a university degree? It is the necessary hall-mark of a
man who wants to do anything in teaching. My scheme, or dream, is to be a university
graduate” (10). In a final goodbye, Phillotson urges Jude to continue his studies and
smilingly asks his pupil to come visit him should he ever come to Christminster.
In this simple exchange between a student and his teacher, Hardy sets in motion a
string of heartbreaking events that are the unintended consequences of Jude’s attempts to
follow his teacher to Christminster. Jude’s working-class origins prevent him from ever
gaining admission to the university and he pays a steep price for having even tried. His

1

Thomas Hardy, Jude the Obscure, ed. Norman Page (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company,
1978), 9. Hereafter cited parenthetically.
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failures at Christminster lead him to a life of wandering and poverty, unable to find
happiness in love or career. Upon embarking for Christminster, Jude reconnects with
Phillotson, but his former mentor—who never made it to the university— is now his
romantic rival. At the end of the novel, Phillotson is married to Jude’s love, Sue
Bridehead, while Jude dies alone and impoverished, having already outlived all of his
children. While the mentorship between Phillotson and Jude begins in the novel as a
teacher’s inspiring gesture toward an education evocative of Arnoldian culture, their
relationship eventually becomes the source of Jude’s social isolation and personal
alienation.
As a result of mentorship, Jude is encouraged to seek a higher level of education,
but he is given no real way to achieve it on account of his class. The educational
aspirations of Bildung fail to bring Jude any socially recognized capital. In this chapter, I
argue that this failure points to a contradiction inherent to cultural transmission: Hardy
uses the problematized mentorship among Sue, Phillotson, and Jude to depict the tension
that exists between culture as a process of self-cultivation and culture as Bourdieu’s
cultural capital, a set of definitive knowledge marked only by acquiring a socially
recognized asset, in this case a Christminster degree. Phillotson initiates Jude’s quest
toward academic learning, but this learning cannot grant him access to Christminster, an
institution outside his class. Reflective of this irresolvable conflict, mentorship in the
novel is ultimately useless in the face of deep-seated class distinctions that consistently
fail to grant the lower classes full educational admission. In a damning critique of the cost
of culture’s inaccessibility and the consequences of that inaccessibility, Little Father
Time, Jude’s supposed protégé, commits murder-suicide as a result of his father’s
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misfortunes; Little Father Time abolishes any likelihood of mentorship’s espousing
Arnold’s “harmonious expansion of human nature” as he illustrates the unsustainability
of this conflicted account of culture.2 Hardy’s protagonist fails as both apprentice and
mentor, unable to develop either as an individual or as a member of a social group. When
Jude dies sick and alone at the novel’s end among the sounds of the Christminster
Remembrance Day celebration, he warns of the impossibility of Arnold’s celebrated
institutional culture and the mentorship tasked with transmitting it.

I. An Evolving Definition of Culture
Raymond Williams argues that we can find in the nineteenth century a moment at
which the definition of culture was in flux. In one connotation stemming from eighteenthcentury usage, culture in the nineteenth century referred to an Arnoldian-type process of
humane development with its “intellectual, spiritual, and aesthetic” associations. With an
emphasis on culture as a progressive improvement, culture was “the tending of a natural
growth, and then, by analogy, a process of human training.”3 Moving into the twentieth
century, however, culture assumed a newly dominant definition as finite and productoriented. Williams suggests that this second definition emphasized measurable or readily
identifiable cultural artifacts, referring to “the works and practices of intellectual and

2

Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, ed. Ian Gregor (Indianapolis & New York: The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, Inc., 1971), 38.

3

Raymond Williams, Culture and Society: 1780-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), xvi.
Chris Vanden Bossche agrees with Williams that the nineteenth century saw “culture,” in part, as
“broadened to comprehend the general process of individual development…this development was a
gradual, ‘natural’ process” (“Moving Out: Adolescence” 83). Vanden Bossche and Williams also explain
that this definition of culture was, specifically, a continuation of the eighteenth-century reformers’
depictions of education as the cultivation of a plant.
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especially artistic activity.”4 Mentorship in Jude the Obscure, I argue, brings these two
models into conflict. Whereas the promises of mentorship early in the novel point to
culture as a process, the novel’s subsequent failures of mentorship can be attributed to
this additional late nineteenth-century model of culture, a model Hardy identifies as
inimical to the first. As culture comes also to mean “the independent and abstract noun,
which describes the works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity,”
Jude’s learning cannot constitute culture unless it leads to a tangible outcome.5
Associated with human maturation or classical Bildung, mentorship initiates Jude’s
journey toward Christminster, but as the novel progresses, this mentorship model is no
longer sustainable as Jude learns he would have needed to have been mentored his entire
life to succeed at Christminster and struggles to find guidance in Christminster city.
Ultimately, Christminster betrays both mentor and apprentice, drawing them near only to
deny them entry and guard a culture which, despite its earlier apparent egalitarianism,
shows itself as distinctly class-bound.
In the beginning of the novel, education is tied to mentorship in ways that evoke
Arnold’s sovereign educator. Arnold advocated cultural transmission through the
personal pursuit of study and the adoption of a best self that would later promote other
best selves; Hardy positions Phillotson as such a potential mentor through his aspirations
4

Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (New York: Oxford UP, 1976), 80.
Williams does not imply—nor do I—a linear progression from one understanding of the word to another.
Instead, he traces when different senses of the word came into play; the nineteenth century, in particular,
experienced multiple perspectives on the definition of “culture,” largely due to a preoccupation with the
topic.

5

Williams, Keywords, 80.
Williams goes on to say that this sense of culture as product is now the most pervasive: “This seems often
now the most widespread use: culture is music, literature, painting and sculpture, theatre and film…this use
is in fact relatively late… The decisive development of [this last sense] into English was in 1C19 [the last
third of the nineteenth century] and eC20 [the first part of the twentieth century].”
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toward intellectual growth and his inspiring Jude to reach beyond his small Marygreen
village. Jude and Phillotson have enjoyed a close relationship since Jude “was not among
the regular day scholars, who came unromantically close to the schoolmaster’s life, but
one who had attended the night school only during the present teacher’s term of office”
(10). Jude remembers their closeness and his dreams of Christminster are tied directly to
his desire to imitate Phillotson: “the city acquired a…hold on his life, mainly from the
one nucleus of fact that the man for whose knowledge and purposes he had so much
reverence was actually living there; not only so, but living among the more thoughtful
and mentally shining ones there” (20). In Jude’s vision, Phillotson is a “best self,” a
model worth duplicating. Phillotson and Christminster are inseparable in Jude’s mind;
even the wind that blows from Christminster refreshes Jude because he believes that it is
the same breeze that “touch[ed] Mr. Phillotson’s face, being breathed by him” (21). “And
now,” Jude reflects, “you are here, breathed by me—you, the very same.” Associating the
wind just as much with his teacher as with Christminster, Jude phrases his educational
aspirations as an extension of his desire to be like Phillotson.
Illustrative of the type of culture that Arnold promoted, the education Phillotson
encourages includes a code of behavior.6 Phillotson’s departing words to Jude, “Be a
good boy, remember; and be kind to animals and birds, and read all you can,” are geared
towards fostering moral adult behavior (10). Jude tries to live by his teacher’s words,
showing sympathy to the birds while acting as a scarecrow for Farmer Troutham since
“Mr. Phillotson said I was to be kind to ‘em” (15). Even though he does not apply
Phillotson’s teachings reflectively, this brief display of compassion effectively shows
6

This also references Mentor’s focus on developing Telemakhos’s personal characteristics. Having
assumed Mentor’s form, Athena tells Telemakhos to “lack neither courage nor sense from this day on”
(Book II, line 203).
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Jude’s early steps in the process of self-cultivation. It does not matter if he necessarily
interprets all of Phillotson’s teachings properly at the outset; Hardy calls to mind here the
slow and careful process of a young Bildungsroman protagonist just beginning his
journey. Phillotson, it appears, has set Jude on the right path toward possible cultural
acquisition, emphasizing the importance of moral behavior (“be kind”) and continued,
self-motivated learning (“and read all you can”).
The education Phillotson initiates is a “private study,” paralleling the “inward
operation” characteristic of Arnold’s culture (28). Jude commits himself to his studies
even and especially in the absence of his teacher and requests Phillotson send him Greek
and Latin grammars. Jude receives the grammars and studies them carefully, imagining
his mentor is beside him: he “covered up the marginal readings [in his Grammars], and
used them merely on points of construction, as he would have used a comrade or tutor”
(28). Jude’s studies are marked by hard work and determination. His task is “a herculean
performance... The mountain-weight of material under which the ideas lay in those dusty
volumes called the classics piqued him into a dogged, mouselike subtlety of attempt to
move it piecemeal” (27). Although immeasurably difficult, Jude’s self-directed lessons
are successful since he learns not only to translate Caesar, Virgil, and Horace, but also
comes to a personal understanding of the material: “the boy…[would] plunge into the
simpler passages…in his purblind stumbling way, and with an expenditure of labour that
would have made a tender-hearted pedagogue shed tears; yet somehow getting at the
meaning of what he read” (28). By emphasizing the tirelessness and difficulty of Jude’s
studies alongside his eventual success in learning the material, Hardy seems to celebrate a
socially transformative mentorship. Mentorship is credited with having put Jude on the
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proper path toward self-cultivation, and because of his hard work in meeting the tasks
transmitted to him, Jude appears poised to enter his revered Christminster.
Phillotson is a mentor because he fosters humane behavior and educational
motivation by promoting a personal journey for Jude towards Christminster; that he
encourages specifically the pursuit of an intellectual and moral best self—as illustrated by
his aiding Jude in Greek and Latin and encouraging him to read and behave well—
indicates that these criteria constitute, at this point in the novel, “culture,” the acquisition
of which is a mentor’s goal for his apprentice. This mentored culture of Bildung, Arnold
maintained, was best upheld at Oxbridge, institutions dedicated to the preservation and
transmission of that culture. It follows that Jude believes his own cultural endeavors have
sufficiently prepared him to enter an institution with a similar emphasis on a learned
tradition. When Jude imagines himself at Christminster, he sees himself as “her beloved
son,” as a natural extension of the tradition of learning in which he has engaged himself
(33). “Would it be a spot,” he wonders, “in which, without fear of farmers, or hindrance,
or ridicule, he could watch and wait, and set himself to some mighty undertaking like the
men of old of whom he had heard?” (23). Believing he is finally free from the difficulties
of life at Marygreen, Jude now associates himself with the “men of old.” When he arrives
at Christminster, Jude wanders the streets alone while imagining conversations with
various “sons of the university,” one of whom is Arnold himself. Although Hardy does
not name the “spectre,” Jude “hears” bits from the preface to Arnold’s Essays in
Criticism: First Series (1865): “Beautiful city! So venerable, so lovely, so unravaged by
the fierce intellectual life of our century, so serene!...Her ineffable charm keeps calling us
to the true goal of all of us, to the ideal, to perfection” (66). Jude believes he can be part
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of that “venerable” tradition; mentorship, he thinks, transmits to him culture at its fullest
potential.
In a passing parenthetical phrase, however, Hardy reveals that the same “spectre”
that called Christminster a “beautiful city” would later “mourn” Christminster as “the
home of lost causes” (66). Hardy here makes ironic the tribute to Oxford that Arnold had
intended in his preface to Essays in Criticism. Hardy borrowed a small part of Arnold’s
reference to Oxford’s commitment to “the ideal, to perfection” even in the face of a
rapidly changing society: in “an epoch of disillusion and transformation,” Oxford was the
“home of lost causes, and forsaken beliefs, and unpopular names, and impossible
loyalties!”7 Only Oxford could resist the Philistines, Arnold believed, even if to do so
was unpopular. But if Oxford was a haven for “lost causes,” Christminster makes Jude a
lost cause himself; Christminster becomes the home that Jude, named for the patron saint
of lost causes, will never be able to claim as his own. Literalizing Arnold in a way Arnold
would never have imagined, Hardy begins to undercut Jude’s notion of Christminster as
accessible to those who desire and appreciate its vaulted tradition.
The depiction of Christminster itself, I maintain, puts Williams’s two definitions
of culture in competition with each other, and illustrates the resulting limitations of
Jude’s studies. When Phillotson explains Christminster to Jude, he frames the university
as facilitating the acquisition of Williams’s second sense of culture: “You know what a
university is, and a university degree? It is the necessary hall-mark of a man who wants
to do anything in teaching. My scheme, or dream, is to be a university graduate, and then
to be ordained. By going to live at Christminster, or near it, I shall be at headquarters…I
consider that being on the spot will afford me a better chance of carrying it out than I
7

Matthew Arnold, Essays in Criticism (London and Cambridge: MacMillan & Company, 1865), xv- xix.
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should have had elsewhere” (10). Here, Phillotson implies that culture is tied in to a
specific place. Only a Christminster degree will make him able “to do anything in
teaching.” Even to become a member of the clergy, he implies, requires a “hall-mark”
degree. The division Phillotson makes between “a university” and a “university degree”
is telling: a university experience may point to learning itself, but it is the attainment of
the degree, specifically, that will allow him to move toward his goal of being ordained.
He specifies his wish to be a “graduate” rather than simply a “student,” foreshadowing
the insufficiency of his simplistic advice to Jude to behave properly and study hard.
Jude’s interpretation of Phillotson’s account of Christminster is a hybrid of the
two forms of culture Williams identifies, although Jude continues to emphasize the
importance of earnestness and self-development. He envisions Christminster education as
the inward, humane process of Arnold’s culture and also as bringing him toward finite
and tangible indicators of having received culture:
Hence I must next concentrate all my energies on settling in Christminster. Once
there I shall so advance[…]that my present knowledge will appear to me but as
childish ignorance[…]And then he continued to dream, and thought he might
become even a bishop by leading a pure, energetic, wise, Christian life. And what
an example he would set! If his income were £5000 a year, he would give away
£4500 in one form or another […] Well, on second thoughts, a bishop was absurd.
He would draw the line at an archdeacon. Perhaps a man could be as good and as
learned and as useful in the capacity of an archdeacon as in that of a bishop […] ‘I
can work hard. I have staying power in abundance, thank God! And it is that
which tells…Yes, Christminster shall be my Alma Mater!’ (32-3)
Jude’s vision is one of Christian morality and economic success. He hopes to continue his
process of self-development to the point that he can reflect back proudly on his journey,
and he believes that simply living a “Christian life” will be enough to make him a
Bishop. This endeavor, though, cannot be separated from economic gain, as Jude’s mind
quickly goes to the specific titles he can receive and how much money he can earn as a
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result of his education. To the young and eager Jude, the education of the “university”
and the “university degree” are one and the same, so he sees no reason to think that
anything other than hard work and thoughtful study will be necessary to get him to
Christminster. Jude has “staying power in abundance” and he thinks this is enough to
take him to Christminster; he believes that engaging in the process of culture, in other
words, is enough to grant him the tangible indicators of culture described in Williams’s
second sense of culture (32). His future seems deceptively bright: his mentor teaches him
that culture is a process of growth, of intellectual development, and to be cultured is to
use education to promote such growth among others. Working toward such culture can
bring one to Christminster, where a degree will set him on the path toward monetary
recognition of his cultural acquisition. Had Jude succeeded, he would have been the
ultimate success story of the 1870 Forster Education Act, having worked earnestly to
achieve social mobility.
Jude does not, of course, live out that dream in any capacity. As soon as he arrives
at Christminster city, he “found himself actually on the spot of his enthusiasm,” only to
perceive “how far away from the object of that enthusiasm he really was. Only a wall
divided him from those happy young contemporaries of his with whom he shared a
common mental life…Only a wall—but what a wall!” (70). Jude shares with the
Christminster students a “common mental life,” but he does not know how to get to
where they are. Jude’s self-development and independent study are the products of
Phillotson’s mentorship and have brought him to Christminster, but having that shared
“mental life” with the undergraduates is not enough to actually make him part of their
cohort. As Part Second unfolds, Christminster education itself becomes the definitive best
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self, the actual embodiment of intellectual and artistic activity—and Jude is shut out from
it by virtue of his class.

II. Christminster as Cultural Capital
If mentorship’s inspiration brought Jude to Christminster in the first place, its
disappointment foreshadows Jude’s impending frustration. Shortly after arriving at
Christminster, Jude learns that Phillotson never made it to the university. When Jude pays
a visit to the man who inspired him to go to Christminster, he is saddened to see a sallowlooking Phillotson, who had grown “thin and careworn since Jude last set eyes on him”
(83). In an instant, Jude’s optimism is shattered, as “this homely complexion destroyed at
one stroke the halo which had surrounded the schoolmaster’s figure in Jude’s imagination
ever since they parted.” In Jude’s mind, his mentor’s failure predicts his own: “Jude’s
countenance fell, for how could he succeed in an enterprise wherein the great Phillotson
had failed? ...he had visions of how Phillotson’s failure in the grand University scheme
would depress him…” (82). Jude’s binary language of success and failure, of wholesale
acquisition or outright lack, indicates that culture here is not a process of development,
but a specific accomplishment—the university degree Phillotson set out to achieve. Jude
does not consider the possibility that Phillotson could be successful even without the
degree, even though Phillotson has contentedly settled into a career as a schoolmaster.8

8

That Phillotson could be considered a “failure” despite his other notable accomplishments simply because
he did not attend Christminster is supported in part by Hardy’s own biography: in The Country and the
City, Williams quotes a British Council member who refers to Hardy—as well as George Eliot and D.H.
Lawrence—as “our three great autodidacts,” despite their having achieved high levels of formal education.
Williams concludes, “So the flat patronage of ‘autodidact’ can be related to only one fact: that none of the
three was in the pattern of boarding school and Oxbridge which by the end of the century was being
regarded not simply as a kind of education but as education itself: to have missed that circuit was to have
missed being ‘educated’ at all,” just as Jude sees Phillotson as an educational failure, despite his success as
a schoolmaster (171).
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Phillotson’s failure transforms Jude’s dream into the “fatuousness of Crusoe over his big
boat” as he recognizes that “to move among the churches and halls” of Christminster, to
be “imbued with the genius loci,” is but a symptom of “his dreaming youth” rather than
an appreciable reality (94).
Ultimately, Jude concludes that the knowledge taught in these institutions does
not constitute “education” and “culture”; rather, the institution itself is culture. If culture
progresses, as Williams suggests, in the direction of absolute, identifiable markers, it is
scarcely surprising that the institutions of education would come to be associated with the
acquisition of culture, since they teach those texts that are readily identified as “culture.”
In this context, Christminster moves away from culture as Bildung and is more accurately
Bourdieu’s “cultural capital.” Separate from economic capital, cultural capital refers to
“the general cultural background, knowledge, disposition, and skills that are passed from
one generation to the next.”9 Bourdieu describes cultural capital as a “trajectory,” an
inherited sensibility that “functions as a sort of advance (both a head-start and a credit),”
by providing each new generation with “the example of culture incarnated in familiar
models.”10
Cultural capital represents the accumulated cultural knowledge indicative of a
particular group’s tastes and values; a Christminster or Oxbridge education would be one
particular part of the cultural capital of the upper classes, who had enjoyed fairly

9

Jay MacLeod, Ain’t No Makin’ It: Aspirations and Attainment in a Low-Income Neighborhood (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1987), 12.
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Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, Trans. Richard Nice
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 16; 70.
Value is socially assigned to specific institutions that represent the particular “disposition” of particular
classes. Robert Moore explains cultural capitalais “acquired in the systematic cultivation of a sensibility in
which principles of selection through inculcation, into principles of consciousness that translate into
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exclusive access to the universities. Such students do not consider their degree the
hallmark of having gained culture in the sense of Bildung, since a degree is the
confirmation of their having received the cultural capital particular to their class.
Given that cultural capital is transmitted by a system of values shared by a particular
group or class, the mentorship Jude receives from Phillotson is not the same type of
mentorship Christminster students receive. If Christminster is the cultural capital of the
upper class, then Jude, as a member of the lower class, will have a particularly difficult
time gaining access—just as Phillotson did. The mobility of cultural capital between
classes, Bourdieu claims, is rarely present in educational institutions. Bourdieu argues in
The State Nobility (1996) that an elite university education is necessary cultural capital
for those seeking dominant positions in socially powerful fields such as the government,
commerce, and the arts, but that class movement in education is typically restricted. That
is, Bourdieu understands education as a particular strategy that upper-class families use to
maintain or advance social position: “the educational system…tends to perpetuate the
space of the differences that separate them [the students] before they enter the system.”11
Educational institutions “pla[y] a critical role in the in the reproduction of the distribution
of cultural capital.”12 Because of this, “[t]hose highest in cultural capital in the form of
possession of ‘legitimate culture’ are those highest in educational capital.”13 Bourdieu
describes this protected cultural capital in Homo Academicus (1988), where he outlines
how a classical (i.e. public school) education, along with the support of an educated
11
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family, guarantees selective access to the universities. But the problem of educational,
and thus social, exclusivity Bourdieu identified with education in 1930s France was also
the problem of 1890s England.
Christminster education, crucially, comes to be defined as belonging to a specific
class, an institution associated with capital: “Such places be not for such as you—only for
them with plenty o’ money,” Aunt Drusilla admonishes Jude (92). Williams affirms
Drusilla’s claim, stating that only one or two percent of the population—the upper
class—were eligible for classification as educated, “all the rest were seen as ‘uneducated’
or as ‘autodidacts’.”14 Lumping together the uneducated with the autodidact, the upper
class mentality as Williams would have it has little use for lower class education of any
sort. In agreement with Bourdieu’s claim that educational institutions are closely guarded
by the upper class in order to maintain their own authority and power, Williams
maintains that the upper class took a dismissive view of lower class attempts to become
educated: motivated poor students were seen “as either comically ignorant or, when they
pretended to be learning, as awkward, over earnest, fanatical.”15 The tavern scene, in
which Jude proves his Greek and Latin capabilities amid the sneers of the Christminster
undergraduates, confirms the upper class refusal to allow lower class participation in
education. Jude is mocked into reciting Latin to entertain the Christminster men; they do
not take him seriously. Christminster for them had significance as an institution that
signifies the acquisition of cultural capital, but not necessarily the acquisition of the
actual learning necessary for Arnold’s type of culture. The Christminster students, in fact,
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“had not the slightest conception of a single word” Jude spoke, but they are able to buy
him repeated rounds of drink (99). These students did not gain admission to Christminster
through the arduous process of self-education that Jude had undergone, but by virtue of
their having the economic means to attend. As such, their class has granted them cultural
capital, a Christminster degree—that, and not necessarily the education for which the
degree was supposedly awarded.
Indeed, despite his abilities, Jude is cut off from Christminster completely
because of his class: T. Tetuphany, a Master at Biblioll College, explains to him “that you
will have a much better chance of success in life by remaining in your own sphere and
sticking to your trade than by adopting any other course” (95). By virtue of its becoming
a “hall-mark,” culture has become commodified, a means for the perpetuation of wealth,
and so available only to a few, bringing to the forefront the class distinctions which
Arnold had hoped to move beyond. By exploring the persistent class implications
associated with the evolving definition of culture, Hardy eventually resists the synonymy
of culture and mentorship laid out in the beginning, arguing against those attempts that—
like Arnold’s—present culture and cultural transmission as a way finally out of class
distinctions. Mentorship in the novel illustrates the shifting definition of culture across
the period from an inward process available to all to a version of cultural capital that
denotes a specific set of culturally referential indicators. However mentorship also
reveals Hardy’s criticism that attempts around that distinction between culture and
cultural capital, between the processes society privileges and the markers it sets to see if
those processes have been completed, are not only unrealistic, but dangerous to the social
order that they try to promote.
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If culture had become wholly equivalent to cultural capital, mentorship would be
a bit of a ruse— to learn Greek and Latin, to learn how to live, even, are irrelevant
without an accompanying Oxbridge degree. Mentorship would be largely unnecessary
when the English public school system already sends upper-class students, and only
those, to Oxford. But mentorship’s cultural significance as a way of transmitting
knowledge is still insisted upon in the novel, since Hardy maintains that mentorship still
remains necessary for the achievement of that cultural capital: Jude learns that
to qualify himself for certain open scholarships and exhibitions was the only
brilliant course. But to do this a good deal of coaching would be necessary... It
was next to impossible that a man reading on his own system, however widely
and thoroughly, even over the prolonged period of ten years, should be able to
compete with those who had passed their lives under the trained teachers and had
worked to ordained lines” (93-4; emphasis mine).16
Schooling here substantially entails mentorship. Hardy argues that the wealthy acquire
cultural capital through mentorship, but this mentorship is distinct from the mentorship
that would inspire a lower class mentee to achieve culture. The ambitious poor are then
left with a conflict between a sense of culture that implies the ability to move beyond
their class—culture as process—and the cultural capital from which they are cut off.
Jude, to his detriment, remains deluded by the earlier version of culture held out
to him by his mentor, still believing that a mentorship-type relationship would make a
difference: “He felt that he wanted a coach—a friend at his elbow to tell him in a moment
what sometimes would occupy him a weary month in extracting from unanticipative,
clumsy books” (92). But, as Tetuphany’s letter suggests, Jude cannot be expected to
16
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attain an education given his “sphere.” What is worse, even when Jude gives up his
Christminster aspirations and seeks instead the position of a lowly cleric, he is reminded
once more that real capital ultimately determines cultural capital: as he seeks a
relationship with a certain composer, he is again shut out again when the man realizes
Jude’s lack of material wealth (156). Jude, in short, has been indoctrinated with the idea
that to engage in culture is to strive towards a personal best, but is continually frustrated
by his inability to gain any actual capital—either economic or cultural— as a result of
that process. Mentorship not only provides a vocabulary for culture, but models the
problems of cultural transmission in actual practice. Jude, keenly aware of the impact his
lifelong “struggle with material things” has had on his educational aspirations, is led to a
dangerous place, “the hell of conscious failure” (101). Rather than facilitate cultural
transmission, mentorship only raises Jude’s awareness of its impossibility.
In Arnold’s text, Williams explains, the two nineteenth-century definitions or
evolutions of culture as process and product are “indistinguishable” to the author; I
maintain that Hardy, however, found the relationship between these models to be
exceedingly problematic in practice, and the primary cause of his protagonist’s downfall.
In invoking both mentorship and Bildung, Hardy, as I have suggested, recalls Arnold’s
sovereign educator and his task of encouraging everyone toward culture. When actually
put into practice in Hardy’s novel, however, the sovereign educator reveals the nonviability of the Arnoldian paradigm precisely because it refuses to acknowledge the
contradictions inherent to its arguments. For all Arnold’s emphasis on culture as an
inward pursuit and study, he assigns the academy the role of “recognized touchstone for
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the intelligence of society.”17 It is that “generally recognized touchstone” that makes the
implementation of his model so difficult, as this education was unavailable to people of
the lower classes, who were, as Castle puts it “effectively barred from higher
education.”18 Jude’s insistence that “I can do without what it [Christminster] confers” is
made only grudgingly because he actually does require a degree to achieve the capital
that would promote social mobility (121). His declaration that he does not “care for social
success” is the only way out of this problem; he realizes that social success without a
Christminster degree is unattainable, so he can only reject social success outright. Jude
sets out, in all earnest, to achieve a best self, to learn exactly what Arnold would have
him learn, but for all the language around educational reform—from Ruskin, Arnold,
Mill, even Eliot— encouraging personal growth, in practice education stopped short of
leading a student outside his class. Jude had been, as Sue puts it, “elbowed off the
pavement by the millionaires’ sons” (121).
Baldick explains that Oxford was the object of Arnold’s “extremes of adulation…
a particularly clear example of the lengths to which he went in creating an imaginary
spiritual and intellectual ‘centre’ for English culture.”19 But it is this very idea of a
“centre” that frustrates Hardy because Arnold’s ambitions really required a stronger
17
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social mandate in order to be realized—and the State, as it had demonstrated in the
educational reform movements of the 1870s and beyond, had stopped far short of
granting access to this hallmark of educational cultural capital to all of its classes. And
while Arnold, as an Inspector of Schools, was keenly aware of the politics surrounding
education, he could not set up a tangible system for enacting the mentorship he
advocated. Arnold relied on institutions already recognized for their cultural
association—affirming the idea that to be cultured, one requires an Oxbridge education.
Williams, sympathetic to Arnold in many ways, admits the “ambiguity” in Arnold’s
position:
For it is not merely the influence of the best individuals that Arnold is
recommending; it is the embodiment of this influence in the creation of a State…
as a ‘centre of authority and light’…Yet the existing State, loaded with such an
agency, is in fact, on Arnold’s showing, subject to the deadlock of the existing
and inadequate social classes. The aristocracy uses the power and dignity of the
State as a means to protect its own privileges. The middle class, reacting against
this, seeks only to diminish State power, and to leave perfection to those ‘simple
natural laws’ which somehow arise out of unregulated individual activity.20
Arnold’s mentorship model fails because it tries to have culture in both ways: mentorship
encourages personal development but then holds individuals to a class-bound standard
that recognizes such growth only selectively. Although Arnold would see culture as
ideally bringing people out of their class (by paradoxically promoting cross-class
privileging of upper class values), he infamously could not get around stock notions of
class. His model collapses in on itself because it is bound to institutions while pretending
to be beyond institutions. Abstract to the point that it cannot be reproduced, culture is not
a model that a mentor realistically can transmit across class lines.
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III. Mentorship and Anarchy
Williams links the failure of Arnold’s vision to a State that was ill-suited to such a
program of culture, lacking the structures and power to implement his vision. “It scarcely
seems likely,” Williams concludes, “if Arnold is right about these classes, that any actual
State, expressing the power of one or other of them, or a deadlocked compromise, could
undertake the all-important function which he proposes.”21 Arnold’s culture depended on
an inward process that still needed State regulation, which created real confusion for
Arnold, Williams suggests, because he was unable to “find the material” of the process of
culture “in the society of his own day, or, fully, in a recognition of an order that
transcended human society.”22 Williams emphasizes here the ways in which the State
undercuts cultural transmission. Hardy’s response to this is to test a mentorship that
reacts against the State.23 If the mentorship between Phillotson and Jude shows the
persistent disparity between culture and cultural capital, then the mentorship between Sue
and Jude tries to offer an alternative cultural transmission that disregards the conventions
of a State that has frustrated Jude. Culture in this context is not separate from anarchy,
but a possible cause of it. As a result of his failures, Jude is led to a form of anarchy; he
must do as he likes because he has no longer has a social group to reference. Anarchy
becomes Jude’s only viable option, since his indoctrination with a culture only available
21
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to the upper classes has left him with a conflicted habitus that renders him unable to
identify with the members of any class.
Mentorship in this incarnation is antagonistic, a reaction against society rather
than a means of harmonizing with it. As a response to his unavoidable failure at
Christminster, Sue tries to transmit culture to Jude in a form that lacks the constraints of
cultural capital, yet the result, I argue, is an anarchy that leads Jude only to further
conflict and alienation and illustrates Hardy’s ultimate denunciation of cultural
transmission. Sue mentors Jude with values distinct from those transmitted by Phillotson.
After running away from her training school at Melchester, she cries to Jude, “I wish I
had a friend here to support me; but nobody is ever on my side” (122). Jude, Sue
believes, is against her because he retains his religious beliefs and refuses to share her ill
opinion of Christminster. While she does not want to “disturb” Jude’s “convictions,” she
“did want and long to ennoble some man to high aims,” and she believed that person was
Jude: “when I saw you, and knew you wanted to be my comrade, I—shall I confess it? –
thought that man might be you. But you take so much tradition on trust that I don’t know
what to say” (122-3). Sue wants to mentor Jude away from Christminster, “an ignorant
place,” on the grounds that it no longer promotes intellectualism, but only “new wine in
old bottles” (120). She opposes the “traditions of the old faith” and wants “the
medievalism of Christminster…[to] be sloughed off” (120). For Sue, mentorship offers
the possibility of a break from tradition, rather than its continuation. Christminster,
according to her argument, should not be seen as the “hall-mark” of culture precisely
because it shuts out men like Jude: “You are one of the very men Christminster was
intended for when the colleges were founded: a man with a passion for learning, but no
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money, or opportunities” (120-1). Sue recognizes that Christminster has become a
privileged cultural capital, so she rejects institutions outright, calling herself an
“Ishmaelite” who prefers to live “outside all laws except gravitation and germination”
(111).
Sue hopes to pass on to Jude a version of culture that supports his commitment to
learning but removes it from the rigid and medieval confines of Christminster. Sue
herself had been mentored in this way by a Christminster graduate, “the most irreligious
man I knew, and the most moral” (120). Like Maggie Tulliver and Rachel Vinrace, Sue is
intended to receive an educated man’s mentorship alongside a romantic commitment, as
the graduate “wanted me to be his mistress” (118). Whereas Maggie and Rachel die in
lieu of reconciling mentorship and marriage, however, Sue simply rejects the latter. The
graduate dies instead, left brokenhearted. Sue and the graduate offer a refigured
mentorship: he uses his traditional Christminster knowledge to mentor Sue, but at the
moment his mentorship would only reinforce a social institution (here, marriage), Sue
resists and turns down his proposal.24 Thoroughly “unconventional,” Sue manipulates the
terms of mentorship to reflect how cultural transmission could occur in a society that she
believes has lost touch with culture’s fundamentally humane purposes. The graduate
taught her a great deal of Greek and Latin classics (though through translation), among
others: “Lemprière, Catallus, Martial, Juvenal, Lucian, Beaumont and Fletcher,
Boccaccio, Scarron, De Brantôme, Sterne, De Foe, Smollett, Fielding, Shakespeare, the
Bible, and other such” (118). While this bizarre mix of texts casts Sue as forward-
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thinking (Oxford was not, at the time, considering seriously English novelists), it reflects
a mentorship that is entirely premised on personal taste, an eclectic mix that hardly
reflects any agreed upon notion of cultural value. Christminster here still has value, but
only as one possible means of transmitting culture; Sue thinks herself just as qualified to
teach Jude as her boyfriend was to teach her. Culture here is separate from the State, and
so is finally exempt from the conflict between culture and cultural capital.
Under Sue’s guidance, Jude ultimately rejects the narrative of cultured selfimprovement that had guided him for so long precisely because it has led him away from
society itself: “It had been his standing desire to become a prophet, however humble, to
his struggling fellow-creatures, without any thought of personal gain. Yet with a wife
living away from him with another husband, and himself in love erratically… he had
sunk to be barely respectable according to regulation views” (173). Upon denouncing
such “regulation views,” Jude throws into the fire the books that had marked his
ministerial pursuits: “leaves, covers, and binding of Jeremy Taylor, Butler, Doddridge,
Paley, Pusey, Newman and the rest had gone to ashes.” And here he finds comfort, “as he
turned and turned the paper to shreds with the fork, the sense of being no longer a
hypocrite to himself afforded his mind a relief which gave him calm. He might go on
believing as before, but he professed nothing, and no longer owned and exhibited engines
of faith” (173). When Sue and Jude live together unmarried and finally reject the
conventions of the social order the State was to preserve, she believes she has finally
reclaimed the Hellenism so central to Arnold’s philosophy: “I feel that we have returned
to Greek joyousness, and have blinded ourselves to sickness and sorrow, and have
forgotten what twenty-five centuries have taught the race since their time, as one of your
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Christminster luminaries says” (235). Culture, Sue teaches, can only be transmitted when
social order is disregarded.
The problem, however, is that Sue’s version of culture is intertwined with the
force Arnold places in opposition to culture: anarchy. And while Sue may disregard the
problem of “doing as one likes” initially, even she cannot get past the eventual isolation
she suffers. Whereas Arnold’s culture and mentorship had been intended to bring
together people from all classes and also unite members of an individual class, Jude’s
attempts at culture have led him to become a social pariah who struggles to find work and
even basic lodgings. The novel’s pessimism is obvious given the amount of corpses that
collect by the end, so it is unlikely that Hardy found Sue’s mentorship any more viable
than Phillotson’s. Instead, Hardy illustrates a moment of paralysis, unable to find a way
to reconcile the individual who is, Dale Kramer explains, “struggling in the context of
both universal and temporal forces that work in tandem to restrict happiness and
freedom.”25 Jude, Kramer maintains, suffers “unfocused despair” that “could have been
avoided had someone come along to give comfort and sound advice at the time Jude
realizes there is no system of transmutation between languages.” 26 Mentorship has failed
Jude at every turn. When the narrator reflects, “But nobody did come, because nobody
does,” Hardy resigns his protagonist to isolation and suffering. Mentorship and culture
have put individual achievement and social harmony at odds—an unintended
consequence that leaves the pursuit of culture uncomfortably similar to the effects of
anarchy that Arnold feared.
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Sue’s attempts at a cultural transmission that exists outside the realm of social
propriety lead her only deeper into anarchy. The joy of her Hellenism is false; after the
fleeting happiness brought about by “doing as one likes,” she falls into what Arnold
called Hebraism, meaning an overly strict view of moral conduct, and returns to
Phillotson, her husband, out of a sense of religious guilt. Once described as his “protégée
and betrothed,” Sue— like Maggie Tulliver and Rachel Vinrace— must now face the
possibility of marriage to her mentor (121). Trying to circumvent the clash between
society and cultural transmission, Sue is led back to the same impossibility Jude faced in
his attempt toward Christminster; her attempts to break free from social expectation have
brought her only intense pain. When she finally submits herself to Phillotson physically,
she does so out of a sense that she “ought to do this,” and swears her fidelity to her
husband on the New Testament. Reverting to convention and religion, Sue “must drink to
the dregs” and immerse herself in the lifestyle she had fought so desperately to escape
(314). Mentorship, it seems, lacks the power to transmit a meaningful culture in the face
of a repressive social system.
To return to Williams’s critique of Arnold, “sweetness and light” had been for
Arnold an attempt at ordering society other than the divine:
Human thought ‘makes’ and ‘saps’ all institutions, yet must rest, finally, in
something ‘absolute and eternal’: that is to say, by his own argument, in
something above and beyond ‘institutions’. In Newman, this position might make
sense; he could at least have said clearly what the ‘absolute and eternal’ was.
Arnold, however, was caught between two worlds. He had admitted reason—
‘human thought’—as the maker of institutions, and thus could not see the
progress of civil society as the working of a divine intervention.27
Although a critique of Arnold, Williams’s insightful reading into the ordering principle
behind “all institutions” provides a clue as to why Jude finally rejects religion—and why
27
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Sue later embraces it. For Jude to believe in a divine system of ordering society is to
believe that his society actually is ordered, that even if he cannot understand its principles
or prejudices, that they do serve some higher purpose. But, Hardy claims, they do not. It
is a particularly harsh blow to mentorship, as it removes it from the type of ameliorative
and harmonious work accomplished by Mentor and in the Bildungsroman. Instead,
mentorship only offers Jude indoctrination into values that lack absolute significance or
even moral aims—mentorship only perpetuates the “artificial system of things.” Jude
turns to religion when his Christminster hopes were originally dashed, because
mentorship had failed him. Sue turns to religion when her belief in Hellenist liberty is
crushed, because mentorship had failed her. In the absence of an “absolute and eternal”
value that culture can reasonably transmit, Hardy’s characters cannot move beyond the
conflicts created by their attempts to gain culture.
But the kind of isolation that Jude experiences at the hand of Phillotson’s and
Sue’s mentorships is of a particular kind—the result of a habitus that cannot find a means
of reconciling opposing social and personal forces. Although he does not use Bourdieu’s
terms, Williams does share with Bourdieu the belief that “We see and learn from the
ways our families live and get their living; a world of work and of place, and of beliefs so
deeply dissolved into everyday actions that we don’t at first even know they are beliefs,
subject to change and challenge. Our education, quite often, gives us a way of looking at
that life which can see other values beyond it: as Jude saw them when he looked across
the land to the towers of Christminster.”28 This is the constitution of habitus, of learning
tastes and values from one’s own class. “But…again and again,” Williams continues,
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“comes another idea: that the world of everyday work and of ordinary families is inferior,
distant; that now we know this world of the mind we can have no respect—and of course
no affection—for that other and still familiar world. If we retain an affection,
Christminster has a name for it: nostalgia. If we retain respect, Christminster has another
name: politics or the even more dreaded ‘sociology.’”29 Williams here alludes to the
conflict between culture and cultural capital I have outlined—Jude has been taught to
pursue an education that will either reject him for his class, or, if it allows him in, will
require him to change to the point that he no longer shares tastes or values with his earlier
life. Because of the conflict between culture and cultural capital, Jude’s habitus cannot
reconcile his personal values with his social field. Cultural capital and habitus are both
related to a transmitted background, and together present a system for understanding the
long and constant process in which an individual may come to acquire and develop his or
her own personal taste in the context of his or her own class. If, as I have argued, culture
and cultural capital are at odds in the novel, then Jude, who develops tastes outside of his
own class, is put into an interminable position.
Mentorship has put Jude in an untenable situation, since the “sovereign educator”
who could unite individual study and the advancement of social harmony among classes
now puts those very missions at odds instead. Since mentorship is predicated on harmony
and social acceptance, the conflict caused by attempts to integrate culture into a habitus
shaped by working-class experience is particularly problematic because it greatly limits

29

Williams, The Country and the City, 197.

79

the possibilities for cultural transmission.30 In light of the conflict between culture and
cultural capital— and the conflicts I describe in later chapters among culture, educational
experience, and gender— mentorship certainly espouses feelings such as the “general
crisis of relations between education and class” that Williams identifies, but also connects
this crisis to cultural transmission.31 Jude, with a habitus so oddly constructed and selfconflicted, has no idea how to go about transmitting the values of that habitus to the next
generation, to his son Little Father Time.

IV. Little Father Time and the Crisis of Mentorship
At its core, mentorship involves transmission, the “invocation of the father” as
Simmons puts it, and this invocation, as articulated earlier, “cannot be passed along in
abstract or philosophical speculations.”32 But mentorship as the invocation of the father
does not bode well for Little Father Time, the enigmatic “Age masquerading as
Juvenility” (218). Upon the boy’s arrival, Jude immediately projects onto him his own
aspirations: “We’ll educate and train him with a view to the University. What I couldn’t
accomplish in my own person perhaps I can carry out through him?” (220). Hardy
establishes here a kind of cyclicality, setting up a system in which culture—or dreams of
it—are passed down. It is, Bourdieu would say, the propagation of suffering or “symbolic
violence,” as “contemporary social hierarchies and social inequality, as well as the
suffering that they cause, are produced and maintained less by physical force than by
30
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forms of symbolic domination.”33 This “symbolic domination” is formed by “specific
organizational structures and mechanisms, and in the mental structures adapted to
them.”34 Bourdieu’s symbolic violence is especially important in his work on education,
since he sees education, as I explained above, as a particularly notable site for the
preservation of class dominance. So when Jude attempts to mentor Little Father Time
with his own ideals of education, he will also transmit that same conflict between
“organizational” and “mental” structures, between those same conflicting cultural models
that caused him so much pain. The result in the novel is literal violence. In a perversion
of Arnold’s call for a “stock-taking of our assumptions,” Little Father Time notoriously
reflects too well on society’s assumptions and their ramifications when he decides to
hang his siblings and then himself. 35 After taking stock of his family’s poverty, Little
Father Time writes a suicide note that reads simply, “Done because we are too menny”
(266).
Jude’s “They are making it easier for poor students now, you know” is vague at
best and naïve at worst, because education had not actually gotten substantially easier for
poor students (220). Taking his family to see the graduates’ processional on
Christminster Remembrance Day, Jude gathers a small crowd and tells them his only
fault was “It takes two or three generations to do what I tried to do in one” (257). Jude’s
optimism becomes frightfully naïve in light of Little Father Time extreme action at the
end of the novel. Jude mentors Little Father Time in a world of unachievable aims, just as
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Jude himself had been mentored by Phillotson. Jude accepts that he has suffered “mental
and social restlessness” and “a chaos of principles,” but he fails to see that he transmits
these signs of a conflicted habitus down to his child in ways that make it impossible for
Little Father Time to even imagine a life in which he can be free of such complaints. As
Jude and Sue reproduce, they only propagate their awkward social position, no longer
fitting the mold of the lower class because of their extensive academic knowledge and
dedication to the personal growth Arnold associates with Bildung.36 Little Father Time,
eventually christened “Jude,” looks onto their situation with the dire urgency at which
Arnold looks at his own. But since the enigmatic boy is “Age masquerading as
Juvenility,” he might also be seen as the grim consequence of forcing opposites together.
While embracing a life of learning and intellectual discussion, Jude and Sue are forced to
live in anarchy; they bring their children up in a conflicted environment that is somehow
both culture and anarchy, and there is no clear way to transmit culture out of that conflict.
Just as culture in Arnold’s paradigm is not a religious or social “body of belief,”
but a way of looking at anarchy, “a way of responding to the world in which we live,”
Little Father Time is the embodiment of the conflicted culture that fills the previous
pages; he is the response to anarchy, and the response is deeply troubling.37 Little Father
Time’s corpse reflects “the whole tale of their situation”:
On that little shape had converged all the inauspiciousness and shadow which had
darkened the first union of Jude, and all the accidents, mistakes, fears, errors of
the last. He was their nodal point, their focus, their expression in a single term.
36
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For the rashness of those parents he had groaned, for their ill-assortment he had
quaked, and for the misfortunes of these he had died. (266)
Little Father Time’s death is the result of Jude’s entire journey. Hardy here exposes the
risk of smoothing over class ruptures with acts of parliament that do not ultimately
change class attitudes, as he takes that prejudice to its furthest possible conclusion.
Arnold dismisses anarchy too quickly, preventing the necessary consideration of the
impact of disparities in access to education. The conflicted habitus that arises from the
tension between culture and cultural capital invites a more sympathetic response to
anarchy than Arnold is willing to give. Arnold sees anarchy only in opposition to culture,
failing to see the ways that it also points to the tensions that emerge from within culture
itself. The actual offspring of a couple who lives in anarchy, Little Father Time represents
the unsustainability of a society that fails to recognize the ways in which anarchy and
culture can be brought together to reflect fundamental tensions in habitus. If kept
confined to institutions of privilege and the cultural capital of the wealthy, culture will
continue to create irresolvable conflict.
When he kills his siblings and then himself, Little Father Time dramatically cuts
off any possibility of mentorship and reveals a kind of paralysis: attempts at culture breed
only more anarchy, but the resulting culture sees no way out of present difficulties other
than personal annihilation. Indeed, Hardy’s response to anarchy is unsatisfying as he has
no solution, nor any seeming optimism, as illustrated by Sue’s unsure response to Little
Father Time: “I couldn’t bear deceiving him as to the facts of life. And yet I wasn’t
truthful, for with a false delicacy I told him too obscurely…Why didn’t I tell him pleasant
untruths, instead of half realities?” (267-8). Inherent in Sue’s lament is not that Little
Father Time’s suicide was unwarranted or that he misconstrued reality, only that she was
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not able to lie better. Mentorship in this last act has taken to misrepresenting society in
order to ensure its survival. Sue has no viable alternative to offer Little Father Time; the
ultimate tragedy of Jude the Obscure is its inability to locate any kind of knowledge
which a mentor might pass down.
Hardy’s strange compounding of orphaning is in many ways even more sad than
the figure of the orphan would typically suggest, as he creates an “orphaned parent” in
Jude who, in addition to having no parents, sees visions of his own familial continuance
literally dangling lifelessly before his eyes. Because he articulates the cultural
circumstances that made the advent of a new kind of literary protagonist a necessity,
Hardy’s text resists an overly pessimistic or optimistic reading and instead evokes the
“the ache of modernism” so beautifully articulated in Tess of the D’Urbervilles. Hardy
asks his audience to consider the “human consequences of living out the modernist
premises” and “harbored a certain concept for, and distrust of, the optimistic ideal of a
modern secular and rational culture.”38 That is to say, Hardy focuses on the implantation
of ideals, and so his model of mentorship senses the impending need for a more fully
heightened awareness of what culture has come to mean. What is culture’s power? What
else might culture symbolize? Looking to the chapters ahead, Hardy’s preoccupation with
what the present generation can transmit to the next lays the foundation for continued
analyses of how culture becomes increasingly difficult to pass on.
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Chapter Two
“An Instinct Which May be Wrong”: Cross-Class Education in Howards End
O Cambridge! Cambridge! small the need
Of plighted faith to honour thee;
Thine is the hand that sowed the seed,
The gathered fruit thy guerdon be;
‘Twere wasted breath to bid thee take
The creature though thyself didst make.
-Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, 1887
Written three years after his 1884 graduation from Cambridge, Goldsworthy
Lowes Dickinson’s exalted ode to his college days credits his alma mater with molding
him into the person he had become. The poem is certainly true at the literal level: funded
by a scholarship, Dickinson’s years at Cambridge eventually turned into a career, as he
returned there as a lecturer in 1886 and served for over thirty years. Figuratively, though,
the sentiment behind the short poem is that to matriculate at Cambridge is, as Jude
Fawley always dreamed, to be afforded unique intellectual opportunities that have
tangible rewards—“gathered fruit.” The poem’s traditional, agricultural motif is wellsuited to a celebration of education: the “cultivation” of young, promising minds that are
eager to be shaped under the guidance of esteemed scholars so they can one day thrive on
their own. While the poem may seem overdramatic or sentimental in its praise of
Cambridge, the feelings behind it were shared by Dickinson’s longtime friend and
biographer, E.M. Forster. In his 1934 biography of Dickinson, Forster muses that
Cambridge “seems too good to be real.”1 While Forster wrote Dickinson’s biography as a
farewell salute to an old friend, his sympathy for Dickinson, an unremarkable character
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with a conservative academic past, reveals Forster’s own nostalgia for the Cambridge of
his youth, “the magic years,” and his cherished memory of his time there.2 For Forster,
the Cambridge experience is education par excellence; the strongest, most admirable
qualities in his dear friend had been cultivated at the institution they both revered.
One mark of the Cambridge man’s cultivation, Forster muses later in Dickinson’s
biography, is his happily made claim on some kind of emotional and intellectual
birthright bequeathed to him through the Cambridge corridors: “He was often to be
exquisitely happy. He was always to have a choice before him which alleviated his
miseries. To be a man was, in itself, a satisfaction to him, and he set himself to occupy,
so far as he could, our heritage.”3 While speaking about Dickinson, specifically, Forster
implies more generally that Cambridge education frees up young men’s minds, opening
conduits to this idea of “heritage,” some continuously and generationally communicable
kind of cultural knowledge. Indeed, this heritage seems to be a transmissible entity that
can affect even those outside the grand halls of the Cambridge tradition: Goldie, Forster
continues, “seems not only to epitomize Cambridge but to amplify it, and to make it the
heritage of many who will never go there in the flesh.”4 Forster construes heritage as a
type or subset of culture to which Cambridge grants both direct and indirect access.
Heritage is, on the one hand, a state which can be “occupied,” a present-tense
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involvement with certain cultural pursuits; on the other, it is future possibility, a prospect
that can be passed down. Despite the term’s vagueness here, it is clear from his
description of Dickinson’s “occupation” that Forster figures heritage as intertwined with
the Cambridge experience, part of its inherent value, and a necessary precursor to
obtaining “gathered fruit.”
Given how closely the Dickinson biography links heritage to higher education, it
seems odd that in his novels Forster typically separates heritage from Cambridge or
institutional education of any sort: while his plots make frequent references to culture,
inheritance, and tradition—all conceivably linked to the notion of heritage briefly
sketched in Dickinson’s biography—he takes on few university men as serious
characters. The notable exception to this is Rickie Elliot, the ill-fated Cambridge graduate
in The Longest Journey (1907). Certainly not one of Forster’s most popular or critically
admired, the novel pits the traditional Cambridge education against a rapidly reforming
English landscape where the traditions to which Rickie clings no longer seem relevant or
sufficient. The novel was met with harsh reviews by Forster’s contemporaries, who saw it
as a “dreary fandango” rife with “terrible faults” (although Desmond MacCarthy gives
Forster credit for being able to “hit off those miserable muffs the Cambridge Apostles
pretty well”). 5 Part of the difficulty of The Longest Journey is that Rickie Elliot is simply
a judgmental snob. For all his embracing Cambridge and its associated heritage, and for
all his growth throughout the novel when he comes to realize the limits of that heritage,
Rickie remains an unsympathetic character whose unexpected death is tragic, yet
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uncomfortably melodramatic. His legs are crushed beneath a moving train, but he
manages to eke out a dying whisper to the wealthy Mrs. Failing that confirms her
suspicion that he “has failed in all he undertook” (319). Despite his time at Cambridge,
he is “one of the thousands whose dust returns to the dust, accomplishing nothing in the
interval.” While the beginning of the novel manifestly argues that heritage and
Cambridge are both worth having, by the end it is not obvious why, or what one must do
to realize the potential of this heritage.
Part of this ambiguity may originate in Forster’s own complicated relationship to
that very heritage he valued at Cambridge. Rickie’s snobbishness—the root of his disdain
for Stewart Ansell, a Cambridge colleague of humble birth— is of the kind that Forster
also detected in his friend Goldie Dickinson. While a well-received teacher at Cambridge,
Dickinson struggled in his lectures for the University Extension program, an outreach
series designed to spread some of the “cultural heritage” of Cambridge to the lower
classes. “His idea,” Forster says critically of Dickinson, “was that he should reveal their
beauties to enthusiastic working men, who would be grateful for any crumbs from the
academic banquet.”6 Like Rickie Elliot and his brother-in-law, Herbert Pembroke,
Dickinson’s love for heritage and tradition is short-sighted, too wrapped up in its own
preservation to be of any real use outside of the institution itself. Having himself lectured
for the Working Men’s College for twenty years, Forster may have felt conflicted: how
can one pass on the knowledge of Cambridge to those not actually there if the “gathered
fruit” of the Cambridge experience is so entwined with the institution itself?
This question is met head-on in one of Forster’s most celebrated novels, Howards
End (1910). Whereas Stewart Ansell is used to probe the implications of working class
6
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men physically present at Cambridge, the characterization of Leonard Bast asks the
reader to consider more carefully what exactly it is that a Cambridge-type education can
bring to those less privileged. How is it that someone like Dickinson could make
Cambridge “the heritage of many who will never go there in the flesh”? Forster creates a
cast of characters outside of Cambridge who seem, as the Schlegels do, to somehow
reside in its heritage, and he sets them against one family that has no use for such cultural
knowledge, and one man who is desperate to learn, but gets no easy path. As the
business-like Wilcox and culture-minded Schlegel families battle to see whose way of
life is more viable or more worthy, poor Leonard Bast, an autodidactic clerk, gets caught
in the crossfire, becoming more destitute as a result of the efforts of both families. While
the universities are notably almost completely absent from the novel (save for the vapid
Tibby Schlegel’s matriculation at Oxford), the culture it protects—seemingly a tradition
of high art and intellectualism— is studied by both the Schlegel sisters and Bast. As in
The Longest Journey, questions of cultural value and preservation remain paramount to
the plot as the Schlegel sisters unsuccessfully attempt to take Bast under their wing. Due
to their interference (as well as a misguided career move made at the advice of Henry
Wilcox), Bast loses the meager job that he has and, after a tryst with Helen Schlegel that
results in her pregnancy, dies at the hand of Charles Wilcox, Henry’s son.
Bast is a complete anomaly in Forster’s corpus. Not only is he the sole workingclass character Forster ever undertakes with seriousness in any of his novels, but even his
rudimentary familiarity with art and literature (he attends the Queen’s Hall concerts and
is an avid reader of Ruskin) make him a most unusual case study for the working-class
student. Poised to gain access to some type of heritage with the help of the Schlegels, the

89

underprivileged Bast complicates Forster’s own observation in “Liberty in England”:
“The hungry and the homeless don’t care about liberty any more than they care about
cultural heritage. To pretend that they do is cant.”7 While Bast might not be so destitute
as to be hungry or homeless in the beginning of the novel, it seems Forster is positing an
inverse relation between cultural heritage and economic means. Given his obviously
paltry income, Bast seems an unlikely candidate for a sustained study of cultural heritage.
What, then, if anything, prevents Howards End from becoming “cant”? Is Bast’s meager
existence somehow just comfortable enough to facilitate the acquisition of cultural
heritage?
The answer, I contend, comes from an important distinction: the relationship
explored in the novel between culture and class is not rooted in the amount of wealth Bast
does or does not have, but in a more sustained analysis of heritage. Bast pursues that
same heritage problematized in The Longest Journey far more actively than he pursues
material gain, and that heritage eludes him while simultaneously making him both tragic
in his death and ultimately unrealistic in his depiction. Even though heritage in Howards
End is associated with cultural preservation—a relationship that has already been wellargued by critics ranging from Malcolm Bradbury to, more recently, Lois Cucullu—
heritage in the novel is distinctly not mentorship. I argue that Forster pits the cultural
transmission of heritage against the failed type of transmission offered by mentorship.
The reason that mentorship becomes a kind of false piety in the novel is precisely
because it is not equivalent to the transmission of a heritage, nor can it ever be so. The
mentorship that the Schlegel sisters attempt to offer must fail because part of
Cambridge’s value comes from a heritage that is, ultimately, not transmissible in the form
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of mentorship. Not a negation of Forster’s claim that Goldie makes Cambridge “the
heritage of many who will never go there in the flesh,” Howards End is actually a
resigned confirmation: heritage must necessarily be transmitted by Goldie and men like
him because he experienced heritage in the flesh. Forster’s veneration of the kind of
educational experience afforded by Cambridge confounds him as he tries to confer this
type of education to Leonard Bast, who is mentored by the Schlegels according to
Cambridge principles, but without the benefit of heritage. As a privilege of their class, the
Schlegels received a first-hand acculturation from their father (a university professor),
who brought up his daughters in the tradition of passionate intellectualism that he thought
the university, at its best, had also promoted. Heritage here becomes an integral part of
one’s habitus; it relates to a particular lived experience that shapes one’s disposition. The
Schlegels can encourage Bast’s self-cultivation, but they ultimately cannot reshape the
life experience afforded to him by his class. The lack of heritage, not simply the lack of
wealth or access to learning, is what perpetually complicates Bast’s attainment of the
cultural tradition he studies.
This chapter argues that Howards End offers the conflict between heritage and
mentorship as a criticism of a long history of educational reform that sought to mentor
the working classes according to upper class principles, but then denied them the rights of
that privileged heritage. For Hardy, as I argued, mentorship is an ideal, a rite of passage
or key to Oxbridge. For Forster, I argue that mentorship is a kind of mediocre and
ineffectual replacement for the heritage offered by Oxbridge. Whereas Hardy
characterizes mentorship as the education of the upper classes, Forster characterizes it as
the education of the lower classes. Yet for both it symbolizes something fundamental that
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is denied to those for whose benefit the reform measures were enacted. Margaret Schlegel
mirrors the efforts of the Mechanics’ Institutes and University Extension programs that
eventually led to the Working Men’s College in which Forster was involved, as her
conversations with Helen and Henry re-enact decades’ worth of debates regarding what
and how to teach a motivated and growing segment of the population. While Margaret
clings to the humanist traditions of the universities, she seeks to align this culture with
more profound forms of human sympathy of the liberal spirit, and to mentor Bast with the
former, and Henry Wilcox with the latter. That she fails miserably in both regards—Bast
ends up dead, crushed beneath a bookcase, while Henry becomes a weakened invalid
incapable of much independent activity or thought—speaks to the problems of
transmitting heritage via surrogacy, since heritage cannot be separated from lived
experience. Like Jude, Bast is taught to appreciate a culture that will forever deny him
any kind of meaningful access. But where Forster advances the debate is in his
questioning of the very motivations behind these reform movements as he ushers out the
Victorian and Edwardian liberalism that had shaped his own writing and experience, and
ushers in a period of political and intellectual uncertainty that would remove his own
beloved Cambridge heritage to a place that is decidedly more past than passed down.

I. The Case for Heritage
Malcolm Bradbury’s 1966 collection of essays in celebration of Forster includes
his own reading of Howards End. In an argument that has now become critically
axiomatic, Bradbury claims that the novel grasps toward unity and harmony while
navigating morality in a complicated society: “Howards End is…about the circumstances
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in which the moral life, which is also the full life of the imagination, can be led in
society, about the compromises which it must effect with itself if it is to do so, and about
the moral imaginative value of making such compromises.”8 In a corresponding claim,
Bradbury continues, “[t]he Wilcoxes are associated with a practical English heritage, the
Schlegels with an intellectual, deraciné one.” 9 Bradbury’s latter statement, on the
surface, is a simple illustration of the type of compromise he locates in the novel: the
“practical English heritage” of society is a concession for which the “intellectual,
deraciné” heritage of the imagination must allow. This reading assumes a ready
connection between “heritage” and the novel’s overt engagement with culture more
generally, as heritage here is only part of the novel’s more general self-proclaimed
staging of the battle between “Intellectualism” and “Materialism.”10
Andrea Zemgulys, however, proposes in Modernism and the Locations of Literary
Heritage a different possibility for heritage. Her argument rightly emphasizes heritage as
a particular relationship that characterizes a fraught relationship between the present and
past. “Heritage,” she argues, “is the creation of a past that is patently ideological and
(thus) nostalgic, defining of collective and individuated subjects and rationalizing of
unsettling social change. It is a past entirely fitted to the present.”11 With its orientation
towards nostalgia and pastness, this heritage seems distinctly anti-modernist; Zemgulys
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associates it with the uniquely Victorian and Edwardian fascination with history and
memoriam.12 With an emphasis on landscape and architecture, she argues that modernists
must write against this “visibly and even ostentatiously mediated past,” and that this
process is proof of modernism’s necessary and continual engagement with its Victorian
predecessor even as it seeks to turn away from it.13 Modernism, as it breaks from the past,
must simultaneously “retell” the past “in ways transformative of the present,” forming an
account of the past that resists the traditional Victorian heritage narrative of nostalgia and
rationalization and instead can actually alter how one understands the present.14
According to Zemgulys’s framework, heritage is useful to the modernist even as he or
she rejects it, as it frames new ways to examine how the present reshapes the past, and
how the past has shaped the present.
Zemgulys’s reading of Howards End, an Edwardian novel only on the cusp of
modernism, identifies Forster’s farewell to heritage. She believes that for him “it
represented a memorialized past best superseded,” a gesture away from what she
considers Victorian nostalgia. “Howards End,” she argues, “strains to represent life in
new and better ways, to be modernist, in short.”15 Like Bradbury, Zemgulys reads with an
eye toward unity and argues that the novel positions art and the appropriate appreciation
of it by an acculturated public as ameliorative forces finally able to supersede heritage. In
her extended reading of the Chelsea Embankment, Zemgulys identifies Forster “with
liberal, even utopian modernist ambitions: the scene projects an author who, like nearly
12
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every major modernist of the early twentieth century, imagines that art can make a better
world (democratically ‘open’) if that art has a public which can meet it (who use it
‘rightly’).”16 The elite space of the Chelsea Embankment is, in her argument, an oasis
away from the noisy and crowded Queen’s Hall, a space depicted as fraught with
reminders of disparities in class and culture.
While Zemgulys is correct to argue that Howards End is about moving past a
heritage that is passé or outdated, she puts heritage and culture too much at odds. In her
emphasis on art and art appreciation, Zemgulys dismisses the means through which such
appreciation is cultivated and transmitted. Although she mentions public works projects,
she pays little notice to education reform movements, those efforts that addressed the
divided society that she claims spurned the Victorian and Edwardian reliance on heritage
narratives, and also to spread the kind of cultivation that she argues is necessary to
Forster’s enduring vision of art. Zemgulys addresses a heritage that is based on the need
for stability in the wake of reform and she sees the novel as envisioning an open and
liberal space that emerges on the other side of such movements, but she misses that it is
Forster’s nostalgic Cambridge—his own heritage—that reflects his first model of such an
open and liberal space.
This particular heritage, I maintain, is the subject of its own sustained inquiry in
the novel, and the preservation of such a space would depend on more than just the
enduring vision of art that satisfies Bradbury and Zemgulys. Just as Forster sought a “past
best superseded,” he also mourns in Howards End the loss of a specific heritage
associated with lived experience. He questions in the novel how to transmit a specific
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heritage of one’s past, one that for him marked the “gathered fruit” so necessary to a
cultivated and humane life. Finding this heritage impossible to transmit, he wonders if it
is ultimately best superseded, as well.

II. Constructing Heritage at Cambridge
If this heritage is mourned in Howards End, it is created in his earlier novel The
Longest Journey, where Forster sentimentalizes Cambridge and, ultimately, turns it into a
nostalgic heritage of the type Zemgulys identifies. The Longest Journey is the only novel
in which Forster takes on outright the value of the education that Cambridge offers,
outlining his contemporary vision of what his “magic years” had brought him. As such, it
is the best place to locate what exactly it is about the Cambridge education and
experience that Forster thought worth having and that he would want future generations
to have as well. In the novel, Forster articulates a version of Cambridge that combines his
nostalgic memories of a venerated past with questions of how that same memory can be
refigured in the present and, in a crucial addition to Zemgulys’s framework for thinking
about heritage, passed on into the future.
The Longest Journey famously opens with a group of young Cambridge
undergraduates in a dormitory, engaged in a polarizing and intense discussion about
cows. Despite the mundane subject matter, their conversation is important: “It was
philosophy. They were discussing the existence of objects” (11). Given that the topic is
presented as inane, the value of the discussion must stem from the very nature of debate
itself. In pondering whether or not cows have “a real existence of their own,” Ansell and
Tilliard are involved in a process that Forster positions as unique to university life, for “at
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Oxford, just at the same time, one was asking, ‘What do our rooms look like in the vac.?”
Forster makes the subject matter seem obviously irrelevant; what matters is that the
young men have the luxury to “honestly think the matter out,” to test the limits of their
philosophical abilities and ponder the abstract, fundamental questions of existence (12).17
Whether Tilliard or Ansell prevails is irrelevant—indeed, neither is claimed the victor—
yet both feel triumphant by virtue of having gone through the steps of the mental
exercise: “I have proved it to myself,” claims Ansell, to which Tilliard retorts that he has
proved to himself the exact opposite conclusion (11). From the outset, Cambridge is
revealed as a kind of gymnasium for the mind, a forum for open thought and selfunderstanding. As he does later with Dickinson, Forster casts these men as “exquisitely
happy” because they have the freedom to choose a perspective and work with it until they
reach whatever conclusions they deem satisfactory.
During this debate, Rickie Elliot, the novel’s protagonist, remains silent. A
passive receiver, he absorbs information, taking in the conversation as part of his physical
environment. On the one hand, this reflects his perceived limited abilities—“It was too
difficult for him… If he spoke, he should simply make himself a fool” (12). On the other,
though, it is a confirmation of Cambridge’s value as a space hospitable to heritage. Even
as a quiet observer, Rickie is taking part in a rich tradition of open discourse simply by
virtue of his presence. It is his room in which the debate takes place, and in his later
reflections on the discussion that had unfolded, he has the chance to begin to draw his
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own conclusions about the cow, to test both hypotheses. His very lack of conclusion is
itself an accomplishment: he, too, shares Dickinson’s freedom to “have a choice before
him which alleviated his miseries.” Rickie here does not need a mentor; he only needs to
live at Cambridge.
Indeed, Rickie—like Dickinson—finds Cambridge a welcome academic oasis.
His picture of university life is in sharp contrast to that of, as Forster would have it,
public school humiliation and drudgery.18 Forster’s distinction between public schooling
and higher education centers on a distinction between isolation and companionship:
A year ago he had known none of these joys. He had crept cold and friendless and
ignorant out of a great public school, preparing for a silent and solitary journey,
and praying as a highest favour that he might be left alone. Cambridge had not
answered his prayer. She had taken and soothed him and warmed him, and had
laughed at him a little, saying that he must not be so tragic yet awhile, for his
boyhood had been but a dusty corridor that led to the spacious halls of youth. In
one year he had made many friends and learnt much, and he might learn even
more if he could but concentrate his attention on that cow. (14)
Sociality and warmth personified, Cambridge wraps together young men in the embrace
of her spacious, commodious halls.19 Public schooling is dull and lifeless by virtue of its
emphasis on the individual, solitary journey, whereas Cambridge is vivacious and
comforting because it both provides social activity and allows one to engage in selfreflective activity (i.e. debates and philosophical discussions) in the company of others.
18
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Inherent to Forster’s claim here is that to gain knowledge about oneself, one must interact
with friends. As had been true of the debate between Ansell and Tilliard, the lively and
social manner in which that subject matter is discussed is more important than the subject
matter itself.20 Forster, as would the writers of the 1930’s campus and varsity novels,
ignores the transfer of book-knowledge from professor to student in the Cambridge
classrooms, celebrating instead the exchange of meaningful reflections among gathered
friends in the dormitory. The essence of the Cambridge experience is, as the Schlegel
sisters will later offer Leonard Bast through mentorship, intelligent conversation.
The centrality of these relationships to the Cambridge experience is further
demonstrated in Sarah Cole’s Modernism, Male Friendship, and the First World War,
where she analyzes “normative ideas of masculinity” in late-Victorian cultural politics as
espoused by public schools and universities.21 Cole’s study of male friendship leads her
to conclude that public schools and universities are “crucial sites of male community and
identity.”22 The fellowship that Cambridge allows for is, in her argument, an ideal
relationship, one that Rickie will try unsuccessfully to recreate: Rickie “and his peers will
pursue the idea of creating new social forms for men, with their own symbolic repertoire,
into post-Cambridge life. If the university offers a humane and compassionate alternative
to the public school, what looms after the men go down is a kind of aporia: the dreariness

20

Lois Cucullu acknowledges the “social space of the university,” although her focus is on “the aesthetic
pairing of the sexual and affective from the Classical Studies that socialized him at Cambridge” and his
application of that Hellenized model to the domestic novel in Howards End: “He effectively traduces the
romanticized social contract of institutionalized monogamy and the domestic woman’s power over it with a
same-sex amative and affective alliance” (28).

21

Sarah Cole, Modernism, Male Friendship, and the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003),
31.

22

Cole, Modernism, Male Friendship, and the First World War, 23.

99

of marriage, the meaninglessness of many forms of middle-class labor, the slow
dissolution of the friendships that alone had been accorded value in the novel.”23 The
starting point of Cole’s argument is the end of one’s time at Cambridge; Cambridge is a
kind of preparation for adulthood, where the fellowship Forster enjoyed would be also an
ideal model for post-Cambridge life. The tension central to The Longest Journey, Cole
argues, stems from the fact that Cambridge friendship is incompatible with other social
norms. Cambridge is an idealistic or utopian model unsustainable outside of its own
context.
Cole’s argument is, in many ways, a refutation of Herbert Pembroke’s claim that
“school is the world in miniature” (182). As Rickie claims, Cambridge “is wonderful,
but—but it’s so tiny,” and so he fears that once he and his peers go out into the world,
they will forget one another (76). Rickie’s fears come true, as Cole reads each subsequent
relationship in the novel as a failed attempt to recreate the ones forged at Cambridge. The
rest of the world simply does not measure up: Rickie continues to grasp for a society that
is not capable of or suited to Cambridge’s youthful idealism, nor does it allow for the
luxury of fraternal philosophical musings. As Rickie’s marriage fails, his career sputters,
and he avoids his lone living relative, he consistently fails to regain the pleasure of his
time at Cambridge. Cole’s point is that educational institutions operate under a social
code that is distinct from middle-class values, so their values are not applicable to society
at large. Her argument is very present and future tense: she is concerned with men who
attend Cambridge and how their lives after graduation are unable to reclaim the
fellowship they formerly enjoyed.
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What, then, is the long term value of attending Cambridge? To answer this
question, Forster does not look forward in the way Cole imagines, but backward. Forster
has only ambivalence about the future in The Longest Journey, yet there he greatly
venerates the past, and I argue that we can look at the ways in which Forster does so in
order to see how Cambridge fellowship is both a literal experience and part of a greater
tradition that extends far back into the past. In the novel, he associates the university with
a long tradition. The heritage Cambridge provides is structured from the careful selection
of choice parts from that tradition; Cambridge’s lasting value cannot come from the
duplicability of the experience, but from a nostalgically formed memory. Cambridge is
celebrated distinctly as a place that must always evoke versions of the past in meaningful
ways that will help one make sense of—or find solace in— the present. Forster begins to
make the case in The Longest Journey that even the memory of Cambridge is worthwhile.
With a nod to its long-held position as a revered institution of higher learning, the
ancient Cambridge is, from the start of the novel, steeped in images of pastness. Even the
trees “had for generations fooled the college statutes by their residence in the haunts of
youth” (12). In one day, Rickie can have conversations with intellectual masters both past
and present: a typical morning consists of reading “Theocritus, whom he believed to be
the greatest of Greek poets” and “[lunch] with a merry don…” (14). The philosophical
bovine has grown old, the subject of discussion for many years: “As for the cow, she was
still going strong, though turning a little academic as the years passed over her” (76). At
Cambridge, as Forster’s biographer Nicola Beauman observes, “the past, the classical
past, revived and the resurrected authors—Sophocles, Virgil, Theocritus—stayed with
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him for life.”24 The present is never far removed from the very past that helped create and
shape the curriculum and camaraderie Rickie and his friends enjoy. In their lively debates
and philosophical discussions, the Cambridge youth not only engage in meaningful
fellowship, but participate in a centuries-old tradition that in turn keeps alive the voices
of even the earliest great thinkers and grants them contemporary relevance.
Rickie, a “classical enthusiast,” learned at Cambridge to make the past live, which
is precisely why he is never fully comfortable at Sawston, Pembroke’s secondary school.
Pembroke is ashamed of Sawston’s past as a school for the underprivileged and works to
project an image that directly refutes the school’s own history. Under Pembroke’s
direction, Sawston educates only rich boys, imbuing them with the values more
traditionally ascribed to the education and culture of the ancient Greek thinkers:
“patriotism, athletics, learning, and religion.”25 Sawston has no vaulted past of its own; to
increase its standing (and surely funding) it must engage with classical values of the past
so that it may become in the present a revered institution. Through schoolmaster Herbert
Pembroke’s lamentation that the school never can quite achieve the glorious traditions
that an older school with a tradition of greatness could, the novel makes the case for why
heritage matters—why it is important to have a longstanding tradition that remains at the
forefront of one’s memory. “Tradition,” Pembroke claims, “is of incalculable value”
(183). The tradition of which Pembroke speaks is connected deeply to institutions of
learning—“I envy,” Pembroke bemoans, “those schools that have a natural connection
with the past” (183). Sawston, as a secondary school rather than a university, will
24
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necessarily lack the “esprit de corps,” as Pembroke calls it, of Cambridge, but Forster
emphasizes equally that it suffers from a lack of tradition, a history that grants it
contemporary worth.26
With its deeply rooted historical ties, Cambridge has value simply because of its
connection to a rich past. Pembroke believes that regardless of present day activities,
Cambridge will always have an edge over other educational institutions because it
emerged from a glorified intellectual tradition—this past will stay with it and exalt it, just
as, contrastingly, Sawston’s lower class origins will always impede its being seen as a
vaulted institution of learning. The value of heritage, though, is not limited to just this
tradition of grand intellectual narratives of civilization; it applies also to an individual’s
own learning. So, in his analysis of what Cambridge offers to its students, Forster asks his
readers to consider that the value of Cambridge learning also stems from its becoming
part of a student’s personal past. A young man’s mere association with such a tradition is
enough to somehow elevate him later. Rickie shares with his wife, Agnes—who had been
engaged to Rickie’s university peer, Gerald Crich, until his untimely death—that
fellowship is what he took away from his university years:
You see, the notion of good-fellowship develops late: you can just see its
beginning here among the prefects: up at Cambridge it flourishes amazingly.
That’s why I pity people who don’t go up to Cambridge: not because a University
is smart, but because those are the magic years and—with luck—you see up there
what you couldn’t see before and mayn’t ever see again. (195)
Most obviously, Rickie’s observation supports Cole’s claim that the Cambridge years are
an irreproducible ideal. If we consider, however, that this revelation does not come until
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the halfway point of the novel, just past the end of the “Cambridge” section, then it
becomes clear that Rickie’s memory of the experience is idealized. He is unable to fully
appreciate fellowship in the moment; instead it “develops late” and is satisfying to him in
memory. As such, it shows that fellowship becomes the essence of Cambridge in
nostalgia—it is the strongest memory of one’s time there, what one must cling to while
embarking into an adult life that may be rife with uncertainty.
So when Forster speaks of heritage in Dickinson’s biography, or emphasizes his
“personal relations” credo in the later essay “What I Believe,” he refers to that lasting
memory of fellowship he emphasizes in The Longest Journey; it is the root of the “magic
years” that offers the privileged perspective Rickie attempts to articulate to Agnes. The
memory of Cambridge, the strength of the heritage of fellowship—these do for Rickie
what Phillotson’s mentorship had done for Jude early on. Heritage is supposed to be
enough to guide one through the future, even if the actual experiences cannot be
duplicated; it is a solace for the kind of loss Cole studies. Yet part of the novel’s tragic
and problematic ending is that heritage is not enough; memory is too fleeting. Rickie,
anxious about leaving Cambridge, knows that the bonds he has forged will not last,
because even the mere memory of them will fade: “‘We know and like each other; we
shan’t forget.’ But they did forget, for man is so made that he cannot remember long
without a symbol; he wished there was a society, a kind of friendship office, where the
marriage of true minds could be registered” (78). Not only does Rickie fear the end of his
“magic years,” but he also fears that he will lose the mere memory of them, and that such
a loss is somehow even more poignant.
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My point is that Forster knew attempts to recreate Cambridge were destined to be
futile, and so he posits the value of a mediated memory. Because applying Cambridge
ideals to the real world is so difficult, living in the memory or heritage that he acquired at
Cambridge becomes all that Rickie can do; he tries to apply his past to his present, and to
use Cambridge to guide him. At the end of the novel, when Rickie is finally willing to
embrace a character from his past—his half-brother, Stephen Wonham— he tells Mrs.
Failing he is finally happy, “Because, as we used to say at Cambridge, the cow is there.
The world is real again. This is a room, that is a window, outside is the night…The day is
straight below, shining through other windows into other rooms” (313). Only back in the
comfort of the memory of Cambridge does Rickie feel confident, and it is by channeling
his memories that he is able to look beyond his own troubles. Cambridge has soothed
Rickie once again, even if it is unable to protect him once he has left; the memory itself
has a unique power in that it can bring the comfort of friendship even if it cannot
duplicate the actual relationships forged at Cambridge. For Rickie, however, even that is
insufficient: like Dickinson, Rickie has benefitted greatly from heritage, yet in his case
heritage, made up of private memory and personal experience, only reminds him of what
he has not got, and will never be able to achieve again.
If memory is where heritage’s lasting value could conceivably come from, then
the problem Rickie ultimately faces is that the memory is not transferable—or at least
Rickie has not been able to figure out how to do so until his death, at which point these
memories seem to have little benefit. And here is where The Longest Journey becomes so
unsettling: while raising the possible shortcomings of heritage, Forster continues to grant
importance to the memories of Cambridge. Unable to turn away from his heritage, yet
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simultaneously unable to use it helpfully, Rickie is practically cut in half at the novel’s
end, a fitting image in a novel dominated by unsatisfying ambivalence. The Longest
Journey lacks the harmony that would come to characterize Forster’s later Howards End,
as it fails to come to any clear position regarding heritage’s place and value. Forster does,
however, successfully raise a new question: can the heritage that he associates with
Cambridge in The Longest Journey exist outside of it? Can the experiences typical of
Cambridge—the pleasure of fellowship and discourse—in some way be enough on their
own? If the heritage offered by attending Cambridge is persistently insufficient in modern
society, can a similar set of values instead be reconfigured and transmitted outside of the
university, perhaps to greater success?

III. De-Institutionalizing Culture
In The Longest Journey, Cambridge is celebrated on two fronts: as a forum for
friendship and discussion and as a site of memory. Inherent to that juxtaposition is a
concern for the future, the propagation of those values that grow out of such camaraderie.
When Rickie worries that “[t]here isn’t any future,” he confirms his own early fear that
his personal past would inhibit him from transplanting the Cambridge experience into his
later life. Rickie is himself obviously connected to a more painful past apparent in his
very biology— he suffers from a congenital deformity, a visible limp that disgusts Agnes
at first: “This hereditary business is too awful” (18). Rickie fears that all he can pass on is
his physical lameness and the bitterness that comes from having been bullied because of
it. When his daughter is born lame, that fear is realized. When she dies (from an illness
unrelated to her lameness), it verifies for him that he has not got anything worth passing
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on: “But the lesson he had learnt so glibly at Cambridge should be heeded now; no child
should ever be born to him again” (212). His daughter represents to Rickie the
transmission of his own values, which are ultimately only cynicism and pain. And here is
where the future of Cambridge begins to break down: where Forster celebrates the
treasured past captured by heritage, he struggles to find a vision of the future where any
of it really matters.
Instead, the future in The Longest Journey belongs to Rickie’s half-brother,
Stephen Wonham, who marries Rickie’s widow and has a child with her. Unable to find a
meaningful manifestation of Cambridge fellowship in a post-Cambridge world, Forster
unsatisfyingly and abruptly turns to a clichéd version of England’s future as a whole: “he
believed that he guided the future of our race, and that, century after century, his thoughts
and his passions would triumph in England” (326). As Carola Kaplan points out, Forster
does not make clear exactly what Wonham brings to England’s future—he becomes an
honest farmer who also arranges for the posthumous publication of Rickie’s stories.
Kaplan concludes that “the narrative suggests that England’s salvation lies in the hands of
honest and right-minded businessmen such as Mr. Ansell, whose money supports his son,
and Stephen… Forster seems to place his greatest hopes in men who use their business
acumen to support and protect art and intellect.”27 But the protection of art and intellect
seems now separate from the institution that produced such talents in the first place. The
ending is unsuccessful, Kaplan continues, because the novel is caught between
criticizing “modern and industrial development” while simultaneously “applaud[ing] the
business acumen that has produced it and the worthier products of that money-making
27
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talent: the breakdown of class barriers, social amelioration, and the patronage of art and
intellect.”28 In the end, she believes, the novel “collapses upon itself,” unable to piece
together a coherent vision for the future.29 Eminently unsatisfying, the ending never
resolves why Forster went to such pains to recall a worthwhile Cambridge heritage, since
it seems so irrelevant to the future England offered by Wonham.
But biographically, Cambridge remained close to Forster for virtually his entire
life, since he spent most of his final years living at King’s College. Cambridge, John
Colmer explains, “liberated Forster from a world he despised and provided him with a
symbol of the good life.”30 In parallel, while Rickie was ultimately never “liberated,” he
remains, to the last, dedicated to thoughts of “[b]ooks and friends,” desperate for that
“good life” (318-9). Where To the Longest Journey fails is in bringing together the “good
life” of Cambridge with the “good life” that Wonham comes to experience. The world
that Forster “despised” was one in which he felt increasingly unsure, one where the role
of art seemed in flux, particularly in relation to modern industrial practices and economic
concerns, which is why his endorsement of Wonham is only half-hearted at best. The
Longest Journey leaves off with Forster wanting to harmonize the Cambridge “good life”
with the honest, simple Wonham, but that harmony never quite takes place within the
confines of that early novel.
Even though Forster never grants Rickie such liberation into the “good life,” he
does turn again to questions of the value of fellowship and discourse in one of his most
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famous novels, Howards End. In the novel, the values he associated with the university
are given another chance, as the unproductively resolved conflict at the end of The
Longest Journey between economics and cultural awareness becomes its starting point.
Kaplan’s “business acumen” belongs to the Wilcox family, and “the patronage of art and
intellect” belongs to the Schlegels. The novel’s harmony comes from the joining together
of these two families as matriarch Ruth Wilcox and intellectual Margaret Schlegel reach
out to one another. When Margaret marries Ruth’s widower, she begins a kind of uneasy
unification, some preliminary steps toward the cultivation of appreciation for both ways
of life in ways that evoke Stephen Wonham’s provisions for the sustenance of art and
intellect. This, as I mentioned above, has been the focus of the majority of critical
readings of the novel. But in an important distinction that has not yet been critically
addressed, Howards End lacks an institutionalized educational system but echoes some of
the same Cambridge ideals articulated in The Longest Journey. I believe that more
sustained attention to this point can illuminate a different side of the novel’s famous
“only connect” theme, revealing a heritage in which such connection becomes
impossible.
The university itself in Howards End takes on quite a different hue from the
earlier novel, being hardly venerated at all. At the start of the novel, sixteen-year-old
Tibby Schlegel should have all the promise that Rickie did, however instead he is “an
intelligent man… but dyspeptic and difficile.”31 Tibby is variously described as a
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tiresome hypochondriac, a poor host, and an egotist (3; 36; 56).32 As the sole son of an
intellectual father, he should presumably embrace the fellowship and learning of Oxford,
where he matriculates soon after the novel’s start. Tibby’s father, Ernst Schlegel, had left
Germany when, in a nod to the utilitarian threat Arnold faced, he began to feel that the
universities there “have learned men, who collect more facts than do the learned men of
England. They collect facts, and facts, and empires of facts. But which of them will
rekindle the light within?” Tibby is hardly one for kindling, as he is positioned in direct
opposition not only to his father, but also to the values associated with Cambridge in The
Longest Journey. He does not socialize with others, nor does he exhibit any of the
passion shown by Tilliard and Ansell in their excited debate. In fact, he does not say
much in the novel at all, and does even less.33
While Rickie admires the lush trees of Cambridge as he reflects on the many
generations who had similarly lounged in their shade, Tibby’s appreciation of the Oxford
landscape is far less reflective. Rickie’s romanticized enjoyment of nature is replaced by
a colder, overly intellectualized aesthetic appreciation:
Tibby was sensitive to beauty, the experience was new, and he gave a description
of his visit that was almost glowing. The august and mellow University, soaked
with the richness of the western counties that it has served for a thousand years,
appealed at once to the boy’s taste: it was the kind of thing he could understand,
and he understood it all the better because it was empty. Oxford is— Oxford: not
a mere receptacle for youth, like Cambridge. Perhaps it wants its inmates to love
it rather than to love one another: such at all events was to be its effect on
32
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Tibby… He made no friends. His Oxford remained Oxford empty, and he took
into life with him, not the memory of a radiance, but the memory of a colour
scheme. (89)
Oxford here is the antithesis of Cambridge in The Longest Journey as fellowship and
lively discourse are replaced by stone silence, reduced to an unemotional, dry aesthetic.
As a “mere receptacle for youth,” Cambridge seems hardly immune from the
extinguished “light within” that encouraged Ernst to abandon the German universities.
Tibby wants “civilization without activity”; he wants the exact opposite of what
Cambridge promised Rickie, which was civilization and activity in perfect harmony (94).
Forster glosses over Tibby’s time at Oxford in a mere few lines, characterizing it as
completely unremarkable.
Tibby’s lack of motivation and enthusiasm may stem from the way that
institutionalized university education in the novel is, in contrast to The Longest Journey,
removed entirely from the realm of classical philosophy and its associated discourse.
Instead, it is aligned with what Rickie struggles against in the entire second half of The
Longest Journey: an industrialized and unfeeling society.34 In Howards End, the
universities no longer produce Rickie Elliot-types at all. The fellowship that could not be
duplicated in The Longest Journey is here never generated within the university itself in
the first place. Oxford does not equip Tibby to move forward out into the world and
attempt to duplicate his experience; instead he turns to the university as a way of turning
away from meaningful engagement with the rest of society. When Helen and Margaret
agree that “money is the warp of the world,” they further concede that, for Tibby, Oxford
34
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is the woof (108). This is actually a fairly damning statement, confirming that Tibby’s
desire for “civilization without activity” leads him to a worldview that lacks the optimism
and vigor that Rickie Elliot had once had and that had motivated Ernst Schlegel to leave
Germany. The woof, Margaret explains, is “Very much what one chooses… it’s
something that isn’t money—one can’t say more.” For Helen, the woof is walking at
night; for Mrs. Wilcox, it is Howards End—for both, the woof of life is a means of
drawing closer to the world around, a meaningful and rejuvenating interaction with
nature. For Tibby, Oxford is just an interaction with himself, an exercise for the mind that
can be played alone and that only further encourages him to retract himself from society.
Together, Tibby and Oxford present an image of education that is in stark contrast
to the carefully laid out veneration of Cambridge in The Longest Journey. Whereas
Rickie’s Cambridge puts great emphasis on the ways in which the institution revitalizes
classic civilization through activity, Tibby’s Oxford is dryly aesthetic, as dead as the
authors it teaches. In Howards End, the ancient university—once a symbol of learning,
free discourse, and a great tradition carried out over many generations—is a hollow shell,
completely devoid of character. It produces no lasting and meaningful memories; Tibby
is unlikely to recollect it with great nostalgia. For Tibby, Oxford is simply a gift he
receives from his father’s money, an institution he gained rights to as a benefit of his
class.
Despite the paucity of meaningful institutionalized education, the spirit of
Cambridge still lives in the novel. Instead of young men in dormitories, we are presented
with Helen and Margaret Schlegel, sisters who seem to embody the lively discourse
exemplified in The Longest Journey. Often engaged in serious discussion both with one
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another and with anyone who will listen—“both were tremendous talkers”—the sisters
seem to live in a state of perpetual fellowship (26). “Discussion keeps a house alive,”
Margaret exclaims to Mrs. Wilcox, and the sisters prove intelligent, articulate, and lively
(65). They engage frequently in debates of the same type as Ansell and Tilliard,
questioning matters such as outer versus inner life and the mind of God. The intellectual
light that eluded their father, Ernst, in Germany seems to shine in them as they revel in
the varied aspects of a joyful intellectualism. Their father, a man dedicated to what he
saw as an enduring vision of the university’s potential, wanted to pass that heritage along
to his children, and he seems to have at least provided his daughters with an
intellectualized, argumentative spirit.
Even though Helen and Margaret are able to live a comfortable life in which they
can engage in friendship and discussion every day, they still seem to lack a heartfelt
connection to tradition or memory; these died along with their father. As with Tibby and
Oxford, they have little value for nostalgic memory. They rarely speak of the past and
feel only a passing grief over losing the house in which they were raised. “There is
nothing distinctive about it,” Margaret tells Mrs. Wilcox (70). Instead, heritage in the
form of nostalgia comes from Mrs. Wilcox, the Wilcox family matriarch, who
“worshipped” the past and has “the instinctive wisdom the past can alone bestow” (19).
Introduced as “a voice from the garden,” Mrs. Wilcox is part of her surroundings, an
institution that has taken root. So in tune with nature, with the actual property comprising
Howards End, she seems almost old-fashioned in the company of the modern and socially
conscientious Schlegel sisters who believe their ideas can flourish regardless of place.
Mrs. Wilcox’s attachment to the ancestral home echoes Rickie’s attachment to
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Cambridge—for both, the place itself bears significance, creating heritage within its very
walls so that future generations may reside there. In her contradicting Margaret’s point
that discussion could keep a house alive, it becomes readily apparent that heritage in this
novel, if it is to appear at all, is going to be rather different from Forster’s earlier novel:
this difference is marked early on by an immediate dismissal of the possibility for the
present to interact meaningfully with the past: an old cathedral, for example, “had been
ruined, absolutely ruined, by restoration; not an inch left of the original structure” (7). As
with Oxford, the cathedral is a mere shell of its former self, unable to exist in the present
as it once had in the past. With Mrs. Wilcox’s death and the subsequent shuttering of
Howards End, which she considered her ancestral home, the possibility of a past that can
speak to the present and future seems remote. The novel may open with pieces of
Cambridge heritage such as intellect, sociality, and tradition, but in separating them from
one another, heritage seems as dead as Mrs. Wilcox. Without the institution to carry it on,
there seems to be little hope of sustained relevance.
As a counterpoint to heritage, the novel proposes inheritance, an indication that
such heritage has been dismantled and is no longer passed whole in its traditional form.
Heritage uses a sentimentalized memory to shape desires for the future, while inheritance,
a different form of transmission, seeks something more straightforward, a direct bequest.
In 1943, Lionel Trilling famously claimed that Howards End asks “Who shall inherit
England?”35 Indeed, the term “inherit” has become practically a cliché in critical studies
of the novel. The subject of this inheritance, as has been well-argued, is English culture
itself: since both the Wilcoxes and Schlegels have contributed to English society, each
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has the possibility of earning the status of rightful heir.36 While heritage seems difficult
for the characters to find, inheritance fuels them all: the Schlegel siblings live off an
inheritance from their father and Charles Wilcox looks to Henry for financial support. In
the narrative of inheritance, Forster acknowledges the intertwined nature of the two
families, seeing that an economic concern cannot be overlooked in attempts to preserve
art and intellectualism. Yet, in supplanting the language of heritage from The Longest
Journey with that of inheritance, Forster also makes room for an examination of, I argue,
deinstitutionalized heritage. By removing Oxbridge as an assumed site of transmission,
relegating it to the stuff of inheritance only, he revives the question of his earlier novel:
how can the actual, treasured, educational heritage be taken out of Cambridge and into
the world itself?
Any study of inheritance in the novel must account for Forster’s general concern
with the balance between economy and culture, or the way in which money underwrites
humanistic inquiry; indeed, that is the general assumption made behind the most seminal
readings of the novel, including Trilling’s and Bradbury’s. But a myopic view of
inheritance leaves something out, failing to see the ways that the inheritance narrative is
part of Forster’s lingering concern over heritage in the novel, a concern which disappears
in the critical emphasis on the battle between the Schlegels and Wilcoxes over
inheritance. In taking heritage apart, dividing its pieces among Mrs. Wilcox and the
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Schlegel sisters while dismissing Tibby’s institutional affiliation as class-bound rather
than intellectually motivated, Forster lays plain that what I am here indentifying as his
Cambridge heritage needs to be reconfigured as time moves on. Significantly, the
character in the novel with the most heartfelt connection to the art and intellectualism that
Ernst Schlegel wanted his children to appreciate is the one who stands to inherit nothing:
Leonard Bast. Shut out by his class from questions of inheritance, Bast still keeps the
heritage narrative alive, since he appears poised to gain access to at least the part of
heritage maintained by the Schlegels, and his son will eventually occupy Howards End.
If, as Tibby illustrates, the material gain of inheritance had begun to replace heritage,
then perhaps heritage, which cannot be transmitted through inheritance alone, can instead
be transmitted through the mentorship the Schlegel sisters so enthusiastically offer Bast.
Whereas humane pursuits prove to be the prerogative of wealth in Jude the Obscure,
Forster here tries to use mentorship to separate culture from cultural capital, or to bring it
to all classes. To preserve heritage, Forster turns to mentorship to supplement the
inheritance narrative.
Under the tutelage of the Schlegel sisters, I will show, Bast is seemingly afforded
a unique educational opportunity. But unlike Goldie Dickinson or the fictional Stewart
Ansell who were granted access to Cambridge despite their being from less economically
privileged families, Bast is only mentored with the values Forster earlier associated with
Cambridge; he has neither class privilege nor institutional access. As a result, he fails in
some ways as miserably as Jude Fawley, denied full access to what the heritage once
associated with Oxbridge and class privilege could offer. Characters such as Bast and
Tibby, Forster argues, are the differently failed consequences of unsustainable cultural
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transmission, as Tibby is made blind to an intellectual heritage left to him by his father
and provided by inheritance, and Bast receives visions of a heritage he simply cannot
fully access because instead of inheritance, he has only mentorship as a paltry substitute.
Just as all the training and self-cultivation Jude undertakes are ultimately worthless in the
reality of his class, Bast is unable to apply his learning and acquire heritage, a kind of
capital from which his class is shut out. The Schlegels can share with Bast their Bildung,
but cannot change his habitus; he can benefit from being mentored through their
knowledge and conversation, but he cannot gain access to their heritage.

IV. Mentoring Bast: The Limits of Culture
Tibby’s overwrought intellectualism represents an institutional failure that indicts
Oxbridge for transmitting culture in a vacuum; Tibby is unable to use his experiences and
knowledge from his studies to understand the world around him. As John Colmer argues,
Tibby’s experience at Oxford is a commentary on the various experiences one can have
with culture: Tibby “illustrates that it is possible to be intelligent, cultured and well bred
and yet be incapable of personal warmth… he exhibits the limits of culture when not
infused with human passion.”37 “Culture” in the novel maintains its relationship to the
arts and revered intellectual tradition, but it does have “limits.” It cannot achieve its
highest potential without, Forster believes, some element of passion and connection, such
as the fellowship that fueled Goldie Dickinson and Rickie Elliot. The empty and august
outlook that Tibby has on Oxford prevents him from seeing viable ways to pass on his
university experience. Tibby shall not, to use Trilling’s phrase, “inherit England” because
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he inherits too limited a culture, one that lacks, as his sisters illustrate, liveliness and
relevance.
This is made apparent at the very beginning of the novel, when the sisters’ aunt,
Juley Munt, uses the appreciation of “Literature and Art” as a litmus test of personal
worth. Aunt Juley parrots the values she knows her nieces have, responding to Helen’s
sudden (and brief) involvement with Paul Wilcox by voicing her concern over his family
in a way that she thinks will encourage Margaret to intervene: “Are they our sort? Are
they likely people? Could they appreciate Helen, who is to my mind a very special sort of
person? Do they care about Literature and Art? That is most important when you come to
think of it. Literature and Art. Most important” (8). But against her narrow-minded view
enters Margaret, who responds, “I have it in Helen’s writing that she and a man are in
love…All the rest isn’t worth a straw…If Helen had written the same to me about a shopassistant or a penniless clerk…or if she wanted to marry the man who calls for Carter
Patterson, I should have said the same” (9). This is not a rejection of “Literature and Art”
as the stuff of culture, but Margaret’s refusal to keep culture confined to such a trite and
restricted definition. In this gesture, Forster makes it clear that Margaret and Helen enjoy
a special version of culture because it inspires them to extend their knowledge of
literature and art into a positive and liberal outlook on their world; they use culture to
lead them to a perspective that is equitable and free of prejudice. Margaret’s assertion
that she would accept any lover of Helen’s, regardless of class, reveals her assumption
that whatever it is that constitutes Aunt Juley’s separatist “our sort” is actually something
sharable, not bound by profession or background. In short, Margaret’s version of culture
attempts to bring groups together, rather than divide them from one another.
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Tibby’s and Aunt Juley’s stunted versions of culture have disallowed them the
opportunity to forge the personal connections that come to characterize the sisters, and so
neither is charged with the task of cultural transmission. Instead, that task in the novel
belongs to the two women for whom culture is still an intellectual tradition, but one that
is buttressed by empathy and eagerness. As Malcolm Bradbury summarizes, the Schlegel
sisters are “emancipated, modern, humane, thoughtful, concerned with the arts for more
or less their own sake, responsive to the plight of those less fortunate.”38 It is an
expansive view of culture, to be sure, for in Margaret and Helen, what Forster associated
with Cambridge heritage’s spirited fellowship has taken on a new social consciousness.
Their distinction from Tibby is twofold: not only do they have a genuine love of art and
learning that evokes Rickie Elliot, they are also keen to assimilate this knowledge into the
world around them, to make it relevant in ways Rickie could not. In this sense, they are
the ones poised to transmit culture in the way that most closely evokes the heritage of The
Longest Journey: they seem to want to make culture a kind of touchstone to which they
can continuously return and use to shape their daily lives.
What the Schlegel sisters make clear is that culture is more than simply an inert
body of knowledge; Aunt Juley’s “Literature and Art” is just as inadequate as Tibby’s
appreciation of Oxford for its color scheme. For the Schlegel sisters, culture is most
closely connected to what they call “personal relations.” After her brief affair with Paul
Wilcox, Helen sheepishly regrets her ever having sympathized with his stance that art and
intellectualism are mere frivolities and renews her prior allegiance, exclaiming “I know
that personal relations are the real life, forever and ever” (24). Margaret’s hardy “Amen!”
38
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affirms their alliance against what Margaret calls “the outer life,” “a life in which
telegrams and anger count. Personal relations, that we think supreme, are not supreme.
There love means marriage settlements, death, death duties” (24). The outer life, the
world of practicality to which the Wilcox family subscribes, is by no means unnecessary,
but Margaret believes in the superiority of her perspective. She acknowledges openly that
she prefers to dwell in the realm of a firm commitment to the arts and culture. Their
social consciousness, then, is the end result of a culture that bears actual significance to
the world around them:
They talked to each other and to other people, they filled the tall thin house at
Wickham Place with those whom they liked or could befriend. They even
attended public meetings. In their own fashion they cared deeply about politics,
though not as politicians would have us care; they desired that public life should
mirror whatever is good in the life within. Temperance, tolerance, and sexual
equality were intelligible cries to them; whereas they did not follow our Forward
Policy in Thibet with the keen attention that it merits, and would at times dismiss
the whole British Empire with a puzzled, if reverent, sigh… But the world being
what it is, perhaps they shine out in it like stars. (24)
Forster offers here a glimpse into the expansive view of culture that the Schlegels would
transmit, the kind that Tibby could not quite get his head around. They understand culture
as also involving human passion and interaction, and so they themselves are compelled to
act passionately and interact with varied perspectives. Their view of culture, at least on
the surface, actively seeks to bring ancient principles alive through intelligent and lively
debate. They apply intellect, literature, and art—the products of a cultivated education
provided by Ernst Schlegel—to a social context.
So, when Margaret Schlegel first meets Leonard Bast at a Beethoven concert at
the Queen’s Hall, it is readily apparent that her interest in him is in accordance with her
view of culture. She and Helen will be motivated to help him based on their belief that
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one can find in the mundane outer life manifestations of the good inner life, and they will
encourage Bast to engage in a similar process in his own life. After a brief exchange
regarding the umbrella Helen inadvertently stole from Bast, Margaret is instantly taken
with Bast: “But she found him interesting on the whole—every one interested the
Schlegels on the whole at that time—and while her lips talked culture, her heart was
planning to invite him to tea” (31). The juxtaposition of culture and tea foreshadows the
relationship the Schlegels will attempt to cultivate with Bast: the three already share an
appreciation for music, art, and literature, but the sisters will help cultivate these tastes
through mentorship, advising and guiding the young clerk in an effort to build a personal
relationship with him. Indeed, Bast appears at first only to lack the refinement and
discerning taste that belongs to the sisters. While Helen is a bit snobbish about the
Queen’s Hall’s shoddiness, Bast actually attempts to recreate the Hall in his flat, playing
Grieg and decorating his mantle with cupids, those same figures Helen scoffs at for
“inclining each to each with vapid gesture, and clad in sallow pantaloons” (28). It is
Bast’s earnest desire to capture culture for his own personal life that makes him such a
ready mentee, even if he cannot quite grasp which indicators of culture are genuine
according to the standards of an upper class.
Because Bast is poor, his early gestures toward culture have been self-initiated,
without knowing which specific texts would grant him access to culture. As Douglas Mao
maintains, “The cruel truth that Forster illuminates is that knowing which books are the
right ones is almost impossible unless one is part of a social set that credibly decides
which books fit the bill. As Londoners in the vanguard or near-vanguard of intellectual
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life, the Schlegels would have found Leonard’s reading a thoroughly mixed bag.”39
Similar to Sue Bridehead’s uniquely constructed reading list, Bast’s readings are a
questionable mix of “Literature and Art,” as he is unsure whether his selections constitute
“culture” or “common.” As with his misguided attempts at decorating his flat in a
“cultured” way, Bast only marginally and uncomfortably exists in cultured society; he
cannot piece together a coherent vision of culture, one that would fully adapt culture into
his daily life. Reading Ruskin fervently, he asks, “Was there anything to be learned from
this fine sentence? Could he adapt it to the needs of daily life? Could he introduce it, with
modifications, when he next wrote a letter to his brother, the lay-reader? … Something
told him the modifications would not do” (42). He recognizes the absurd disparity
between high-style—“the spirit of English prose”— and his shabby flat and wishes for a
“sudden conversion,” where “he would one day push his head out of the grey waters and
see the universe” (42).
Like Jude, Bast is motivated by a desire for the self-improvement characteristic of
the Bildungsroman: “I care a good deal about improving myself by means of Literature
and Art, and so getting a wider outlook” (45). Unknowingly echoing Aunt Juley’s earlier
dogma (which had been an attempt to sound like the Schlegel sisters), Bast seems to be
well on his way to the limited view of culture. But where Jude intended his selfimprovement and “Literature and Art” to gain him institutional access, Bast wants
something different—he wants only the opportunity to speak the language of culture, to
embrace it with a familiarity that will, he thinks, help him find the “good life” in his own
mundane “outer life.” His spotty knowledge of the classics, his misguided attempts at
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recreating cultured venues—these indicate Bast’s background, but they do not address
Bast’s true cultural lack, which is the ease with which the Schlegel sisters communicate
their knowledge, their comfort with culture, and their ability to apply culture to their daily
life. Margaret’s spiel on Wagner “fluttered away from the young man like birds.” “If only
he could talk like this,” Bast thinks, “he would have caught the world! Oh to acquire
culture! Oh, to pronounce foreign names correctly! Oh to be informed, discoursing at
ease on every subject that a lady started! But it would take one years” (33). It is the ease
of discussion that Bast lacks, the casual camaraderie of school-aged boys in a dormitory
discussing cows. Unlike the spirited debates there, “There had always been something to
worry him ever since he could remember, always something that distracted him in the
pursuit of beauty. For he did pursue beauty, and therefore, Margaret’s speeches did flutter
away from him like birds” (33). Bast’s discomfort here is palpable as he realizes that
Margaret is not his peer. He feels inferior, as the worries of his class prevent him from
devoting the full attention he would want to the kinds of discussion Margaret offers.
Bast’s uncertainty over how to discuss and apply his readings, in other words,
illustrates an unfamiliarity or inexperience of a more profound type: he demonstrates a
fundamental misunderstanding of how one acquires culture. He thinks his failure to focus
on beauty is a result of distraction; if only he had more focus, less worry, he would be
able to understand beauty completely. Recognizing what he lacks, he thinks he can come
to it suddenly: “Leonard…did believe in effort and in a steady preparation for the change
that he desired. But of a heritage that may expand gradually, he had no conception: he
hoped to come to Culture suddenly, much as the Revivalist hopes to come to Jesus” (423). And, once again, Forster places great weight on the idea of heritage: it is a process, an
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understanding, almost a sensibility. And that is precisely what Bast cannot understand; it
is what he cannot have, even though it is hardly his fault. He fails to recognize that there
is an undercurrent to culture, a long history, a collection of memories that inform
culture—“Those Miss Schlegels had come to it; they had done the trick; their hands were
upon the ropes, once and for all. And meanwhile his flat was dark and stuffy” (43). Bast
has some version of the “Literature and Art” kind of culture; he can envision the process
through which he might apply culture to his daily interactions, but, thinking there is a
singular “trick,” he cannot envision a way to come to heritage because there is none. Like
Jude, Bast cannot reach outside of his class to access culture. Reflecting on his time at the
Schlegel home, Bast realizes that “[t]hey had all passed up that narrow, rich staircase at
Wickham Place, to some ample room, whither he could never follow them, not if he read
for ten hours a day. Oh it was not good, this continued aspiration. Some are born
cultured; the rest had better go in for whatever comes easy” (46). Aware of the great
divide between them, Bast is at a complete loss as to how to come upon the particular
culture of his mentors.
I will explain below what is at stake in the class implications in play here, but I
think it important to first make it clear that Bast is not denied culture simply because he is
poor and so lacks time for culture because he must have gainful employment, even if that
is part of it. His class status prevents him from acquiring culture because he is shut out
specifically from a key part of the process that simply cannot be mentored: heritage.
Heritage is precisely what Jude Fawley was not able to ever gain since all the learning
and personal motivation could not grant him access to the halls of the Oxford, the locus
of heritage. So when Leonard Bast begins to follow Jude’s autodidactic footsteps,
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immersing himself in Ruskin, we can see Forster outlining a similar fate, even if
Cambridge and Oxford are removed as the sole site of cultural capital. Where Hardy sees
mentorship as a key indicator of heritage, however, Forster positions mentorship as a
kind of poor substitute. Heritage is the slow process through which Ernst Schlegel
acquired culture, and while pieces of it live on in his daughters in a deinstitutionalized
form, they cannot pass heritage on to Bast. So, instead, they attempt to offer him their
own packaged view of culture as cross-class sympathy, a mentorship that never quite gets
around its own self-righteousness. When Helen and Margaret meet Bast again, they guide
him away from conversations about his own reading and instead encourage him to talk
about his walk. They do not want to hear about E.V. Lucas’s “Open Road,” which they
think unimportant, or the Pole Star, since Helen already “know[s] its little ways”; they
want Bast to feel as inspired by walking through nature as they do, so they push him to
discuss it in the terms that they see fit, asking him questions that they deem important.
Even Tibby is made uncomfortable— “He knew that this fellow would never attain to
poetry, and did not want to hear him trying”—and he slips out while the sisters
enthusiastically continue their cultural inquest (99).
The result is the one moment in which Bast speaks with confidence to the
Schlegel sisters. Unable to speak from the place of heritage that is unfamiliar to him, he
turns to his own experience of being poor. Describing his walk, Bast surprises Helen,
answering her romanticized question, “But was the dawn wonderful?” with “an
unforgettable sincerity,” replying simply, “No” (100). The effect is profound: “Down
toppled all that had seemed ignoble or literary in his talk, down toppled the tiresome
R.L.S. and the ‘love of the earth’ and his silk top-hat. In the presence of these women
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Leonard had arrived, and he spoke with a flow, an exultation, that he had seldom known”
(100). Here, describing how miserable he felt while walking hungry, the wretchedness of
living in a single room, he finally masters the self-assured tongue of his mentors. Just as
the Schlegel sisters’ intellectual heritage informs and shapes their confident speech,
Bast’s poverty shapes his and he cannot obtain fluency.
Indeed, to illustrate the remaining chasm between the sisters and Bast, Forster
immediately follows this with Bast’s return to his literature-speak, as he tries to continue
his course of confidence by initiating a conversation about Jeffries, Borrow, and Thoreau.
He quickly falls victim to “his cramped little mind,” and the sisters quickly dismiss this
turn (100-1). Trying to mentor him, they end up reducing him to “the naïve and sweettempered boy for whom Nature had intended him,” tritely encouraging him for having
“pushed back the boundaries; I think it splendid of you” (101). The effect is rather
patronizing, as they pat Bast on the back for talking about what comes easily to him, but
discourage him from discussing the literature that he has not mastered. That literature, it
turns out, is but a murky “swamp of books” that Bast has little hope of ever navigating:
“No disrespect to these great names. The fault is ours, not theirs. They mean us to use
them for sign-posts, and are not to blame if, in our weakness, we mistake the sign-post
for the destination. And Leonard had reached the destination” (101). For Rickie Elliot, his
journey away from Cambridge may be long, but he can turn to his heritage for guidance
and hope; for Leonard Bast, he has no similar journey on which he can look back.
Without heritage, Bast cannot fit what he reads into his own experience because
his experiences, his habitus, do not allow for it. He has nowhere to go with his selfimprovement other than to Wickham Place for tea. He is passingly, almost laughingly,
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referred to repeatedly as Helen’s “protégé,” but more because she is his advocate than
because she is able to offer him any kind of meaningful advancement.40 And this is why
the Schlegels’ mentorship is utterly futile: they are enthused by his efforts, vaguely
encouraging and interested, but they cannot offer him a life in which literature and art are
more than “sign posts.” He can speak to the Schlegels, he can speak to a Cambridge
undergraduate on a train—“perhaps the keenest happiness he had ever known”—but their
destinations are not the same. The Schlegels become mentors to Bast for reasons that are
ultimately selfish: “To the Schlegels, as to the undergraduate, he was an interesting
creature, of whom they wanted to see more.” Bast feels their mentorship is pointless
because he can never advance to their place: “But they to him were the denizens of
Romance, who must keep to the corner he had assigned them, pictures that must not walk
out of their frames” (101-2). Forster is resigned to the fact that heritage and by extension
the culture it promotes are not transportable; they cannot be reached by train, fueled by
even the friendliest conversations between students and motivated clerks. Even if culture
is parceled out in different ways, separated from institutions of heritage, it cannot ever
really be fully transmissible.
While Margaret and Helen have the noblest of intentions, they cannot deliver
because heritage simply must be lived. Forster characterizes heritage as a combination of
education, inheritance, and culture. Therefore, as class-bound as the institutions that
house it, heritage will always elude Bast and others like him because there is no way to
come to culture suddenly. The voice of Ruskin, the impetus behind the free concerts at
the Queen’s Hall—the liberal encouragement toward “Effort and Self Sacrifice”—is, as
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Bast sadly realizes, “the voice of one who has never been dirty or hungry, and had not
guessed successfully what dirt and hunger are” (42). In considering class, Forster moves
away from the ambivalence over heritage and class that plays out in The Longest
Journey, and his commentary on the non-transmissibility of culture becomes much
sharper. Howards End more forcefully criticizes those who turn a blind eye to the classist
nature of heritage altogether. Hardly a reprimand of culture itself, Forster pointedly
implicates those who fail to recognize the deep-seated and exclusionary nature of the
production and preservation of cultural heritage. Indeed, the Schlegel sisters’ efforts
ultimately prove meddlesome, the direct cause of Bast’s further plunge into poverty and
subsequent death; their efforts at transmitting culture are not simply misguided, but
dangerous. Mentorship, hardly the equalizing impulse of the sovereign educator, is a kind
of inconsequential noblesse oblige, an indulgence of the mentor’s feelings.

V. Class-Bound Heritage and Forster’s Critique of Education Reform
What Howards End works out is that heritage really is class based, ultimately
coming from a place of privilege. Part of what keeps heritage class-bound is that, as
Herbert Pembroke realizes, it is gained a priori, rather than post priori; heritage is not
what you work toward, but where you come from. Bast, in my argument, is not cut off
from access to the items of culture—“Literature and Art”— but finds that his class limits
him from internalizing what he reads, or from assimilating it in ways that could allow
him to shape the present and future.
This general gesture toward class disparity is critically unsatisfying, though,
because it does not account for why Bast’s character never quite comes across as
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completely sympathetic, or even realistic. Even though he demonstrates well the nontransmissibility of culture, Bast remains an odd choice for illustrating the chasm between
classes in terms of culture given his discomfort among members of every class, including
even his common-law wife. Barbara Rosencrance finds “Forster’s relation to Leonard
Bast is at best uneasy, a mixture of compassion and condescension.”41 She accuses
Forster of the same compassion and condescension exhibited by the Schlegels.
Rosencrance’s accusation seems to me particularly misplaced given Forster’s own
criticism of Goldie for not understanding how to teach students from the lower classes.
Further, by the narrator’s own admission, Bast certainly is not even a wholly
representative member of the lower classes, many of whom are explicitly excluded from
the novel. The sixth chapter famously opens with, “We are not concerned with the very
poor…They are unthinkable, and only to be approached by the statistician or the poet.”
However Bast, while perhaps not “very poor,” is after all in bad enough circumstances to
feel the disconnect between himself and a writer such as Ruskin. But the narrator
continues, “This story deals with gentlefolk, or with those who are obliged to pretend that
they are gentlefolk” (39). And here Forster reveals that Bast’s particular brand of poverty
puts him in a position “at the extreme verge of gentility…He was not in the abyss, but he
could see it, and at times people whom he knew had dropped in, and counted no more”
(39). His vaguely lower-middle class affiliation is not defined in any monetary sense, but
from its position on the fringe of other classes. Bast does not represent a class in and of
itself, but others’ perceptions of his class; he represents what others think he can become,
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whether or not he will ultimately “count” and join the ranks of the genteel. He may not be
studied by the “statisticians and poets,” but he is certainly an object of scrutiny.
For Rosencrance, Bast becomes the object of specifically political scrutiny: “[t]he
significance of Leonard Bast is in his origin, in his pivotal position as cause celebre for
the liberal intellectuals and victim of the capitalists, and in his sentimental apotheosis into
England’s future.”42 Bast, according to such readings, is a commentary on an entire
movement geared toward pushing members of the lower and working classes closer
toward the “verge of gentility,” efforts that mirror both Helen and Margaret’s mentorship,
and especially Margaret’s endeavors at helping her husband, Henry Wilcox, turn toward
the poor with greater empathy. “This liberal attitude is at the centre of the book,” claims
Malcolm Bradbury, and his observation holds true as one of the novel’s most overt
engagements with the liberal agenda occurs early on, as soon as Bast meets the Schlegels
at the Queen’s Hall.43 It is an apt location, Zemgulys explains, “known for inexpensive
musical performances aimed at ‘improving’ a broad public.”44 Zemgulys argues that
because the incident at the Queen’s Hall sets into motion the plot that ultimately leads to
Bast’s death, “it’s plausible that such broadly appealing institutions of cultural uplift are
subtly disapproved.” For Zemgulys, this disapproval speaks to Forster’s perceived
“futility of cross-class exercises in cultural exchange,” citing Margaret’s claim that such
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exchange is termed ‘‘social intercourse’ or ‘mutual endeavor, when it’s mutual
priggishness if it’s anything.”45
Similarly, David Medalie argues in E.M. Forster’s Modernism that these cultural
exchanges demonstrate the breakdown of late-Victorian progressivism into a display of
pseudo-egalitarianism, as the novel “deal[s] with the failure to be inclusive and to carry
out the Arnoldian injunction, with its Victorian ancestry and its liberal-humanistic
cargo.”46 That “Arnoldian injunction,” which Medalie identifies as Arnold’s hope “that
the cultured would see to ‘humanise [culture], to make it efficient outside the clique of
the cultivated and learned’, thereby extending ‘sweetness and light’ to ‘the raw and
unkindled masses of humanity,’” is the task of the sovereign educator, the task that the
Schlegels sisters undertake to Bast’s detriment. For Medalie, Arnold and Ruskin are
poignant figures, “for they both, in their different ways, represent a late-Victorian
tendency to see culture in socially progressivist terms.” This progressivism was designed
to bring culture to a newly literate middle class: when Bast reads The Stones of Venice,
Medalie continues, he “deliberat[es] upon the viability of Ruskin’s project and upon the
notion of cultural consumption—in particular, the extent to which the Victorian cultural
legacy may be digested by the increasingly literate masses.” 47 So, when Bast fails,
Medalie concludes that culture itself must be “profoundly inefficient,” as well as having
“the effect of entrenching ‘the cultivated and learned’ in the seclusion of their
Bloomsbury-like coterie.”48 As does Zemgulys, Medalie reads progressivism in the novel
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as a failing project, one that only superficially accounts for the incompatibility of culture
across classes, only he goes one step further and equates this progressivism with culture
itself.
I think, though, that Forster’s optimism about culture might be salvaged if this
progressivism is understood more in context. These efforts at reading Bast as a more
generalized symbol of an unproductive liberalism leave something out, namely the
educational heritage Rickie Elliot and the Schlegel sisters enjoy. If, as I have claimed,
Forster searches in Howards End for a means of transmitting culture without class-based
heritage, then surely he has a stake in the institutions that were being created specifically
to bring culture to the lower classes, such as the University Extension Programs and the
Working Men’s College. Bast, I argue, certainly is a caricature of the supposed
beneficiary to liberalism, but he is also more specifically a caricature of exactly the
imagined beneficiary of certain specific liberal education programs. Only citing Forster’s
ambivalence to cross-class cultural interaction overlooks his ever-present concern over
what would happen to the Cambridge of his youth as he grapples with an educational
system that increasingly ignores heritage as it re-packages culture in different ways and
parcels it out among new and varied types of educational programs.
In my previous chapter, I argued that Jude Fawley was destined for failure
because of an educational system that brought into conflict culture and cultural capital.
And like Jude, because Bast suffers as a result of mentorship gone awry, he acts as a
harbinger of the disappointment of educational reform. But where Jude is an explicit
commentary on the accessibility of Oxbridge itself, through Bast Forster casts a critical
eye on those institutions designed to distribute individual elements of Oxbridge to the
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lower and middle classes. These institutions, of course, grew out of the Arnold-Ruskin
type conversations of the nineteenth century: “Even in the nineteenth century, after all,
the mechanics’ institutes and adult schools, and the public libraries, had increased the
working man’s access to knowledge and culture; such landmarks as the 1896 Act of
Parliament providing for the Sunday opening of museums, and the founding in 1899 of
Ruskin College, Oxford, specifically for working men, were signs of the times.” 49
Norman Page finds that the time between Jude the Obscure and Howards End saw an
increase in individual students finding success in such programs, and he concludes in turn
that “[i]t may be objected then, that Forster, speaking from the limitations of his own
experience and class, had an inadequate sense of the social and human realities and that
he exaggerates the extent to which a truly civilised life is dependent upon an unearned
income.”50 Page’s slightly patronizing reading cannot account for Bast’s failures other
than to discredit Forster for failing to see the widespread benefits of such programs.
While Page, of course, is right to credit the Working Men’s College and
University Extension Programs for improving the lot of many, a closer look at the
motivation behind the creation of these institutions may undercut his optimism and
explain why Forster wanted to temper their successes, or at least analyze them in a more
critical way. Importantly, I am not arguing in any way that Forster did not believe these
programs were worthwhile—his longstanding involvement in both shows otherwise— or
that he was exhibiting a snobbishness just as damning as Goldie Dickinson’s. Instead, I
think that Forster only wanted to record the process of the loss of his version of heritage
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even as he helped usher in its successor, and while these institutions were certainly not
responsible for such loss, they do illustrate the particularities of the complications that
arise around cultural transmission for all classes at the beginning of the period associated
with modernism. As I conclude this chapter, I turn specifically to the Working Men’s
College, the founder of which, F.D. Maurice, had hoped to instill in his students those
same values of fellowship and intellectual discussion that Forster attributes to Cambridge.
Established almost sixty years before Forster published Howards End, the
Working Men’s College undertook with great seriousness the idea of an inclusive adult
education. In an invaluable overview of the College’s origins published in honor of its
centennial (1954), J.F.C. Harrison focuses on the college’s founder F.D. Maurice and his
commitment to creating an institution that responded to gaping holes in education for the
lower classes while also creating an environment that duplicated the fellowship of
Oxbridge. The principal of the college at the time, Sir Wilfrid Eady, summarizes the
College: “Above all it is not just a place for evening classes; it is a College, with all the
ordered corporate life and free companionship that is in the word.”51 Indeed, for Maurice,
Harrison recalls, “The word symbolized…the spirit of a corporate life, of fellowship, of
brotherhood in the deepest, Christian, sense.”52 This fellowship, according to his model,
would come not only from the students interacting with one another, but with learned
men—their teachers. The college was designed to bring classes together in “lessons
rather than lectures,” with ample time for discussion in which all questions or opinions
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would be welcomed.53 Maurice’s vision here seems like an ideal combination of Ansell
and Tilliard’s cow discussion and the Schlegels’ tea with Bast: the college would
facilitate free-flowing discussion in which members of all classes were valued
participants. The workingman “was conceived to be ‘a person, not a thing, a citizen and
not a slave or even a wage-earning animal.’”54As a result, literature was taught as part of
a greater framework of history and ethics. Maurice “seems to have felt that the primary
function of literature in the classroom was to illustrate other subjects, rather than to whet
an appetite for reading for its own sake.”55
At its time, the College was a revolutionary idea, miles apart from the Mechanics’
Institutes, “with their science for artisans, and Lord Brougham’s appeals to them to get
knowledge that they might get on.”56 The Mechanics’ Institutes offered what Maurice
found to be only superficial knowledge, with banal exhortations to “improve your mind
that you may rise in the world.”57 The Working Men’s College offered an openly spiritual
analysis of education, with a focus on brotherhood, fellowship, and mutual benefit. And
arguably its most revolutionary tenet was that rather than continue the dully watered-
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down scientific lessons of the Mechanics’ Institutes, it would take up the humanist
tradition of Oxford and Cambridge, a hitherto unheard of prospect in the field of
education for working men.58
Maurice wanted his college to evoke the Oxbridge tradition not only in spirit, but
in practical execution. Under the leadership of George Tansley, the Working Men’s
College modeled its hierarchy of examinations and honors on the Oxbridge system, and
annual visits to these older universities were begun. Further, Tansley proposed a “resident
tutor” at both Oxford and Cambridge who would act as a correspondent and serve as an
“ex-officio member of the Council.”59 “When the Founders had talked of a college and of
a liberal education for working men,” Harrison explains, “they had always had thoughts
of Oxford and Cambridge in the back of their minds; but it was the general collegiate
spirit rather than the specific scheme of studies that they had desired to emulate.”60 That
spirit, spelled out by Maurice in his 1854 pamphlet, Scheme of a College for Working
Men, would insist on establishing commonality between his university and Oxford and
Cambridge in the service of elevating that most respected fellowship: “I do not mean that
we shall ever have a Gothic chapel or hall, or endowments, or that we should wish for
them. But I mean that, starting from a common maxim and a common object, there ought
to be an understanding between us, even when the subjects which we teach are most
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different… that is not found, so far as I know, among professors or tutors elsewhere.”61
Maurice’s vision was an educational and cultural utopia, an institution in which “only
connect” would have been realized in its fullest capacity nearly sixty years before Forster
wrote Howards End. This vision linked together adult education for the working classes
with Oxbridge tradition, a relationship later evoked by Bast and the Schlegels.
The College, however, was not especially successful in its early years. In 1883 the
total number of students for the year was 425; in 1889 it had risen to 875; until 1896 it
remained steady at around 790; at its peak in the late 1800s it reached over 1000, but
those numbers steadily declined soon after.62 In 1873, it considered changing into a
center for the newly popular University Extension Movement that came out of
Cambridge, which had gathered so much momentum that it saw the establishment of the
Workers’ Educational Association in 1903, and, in the year before the publication of
Howards End, the College offered its first University Tutorial Class. Richard Altick
specifies one of the biggest obstacles to workingmen’s education: “The fact remained,
however, that the working class was so completely unprepared for higher education that
all but the most indomitable spirits soon lost hope.”63 Here Altick introduces a point that
helps explain why Bast, who is a clerk and not a mechanic or workingman, is such an apt
symbol of the adult education movement: these programs, while geared toward
mechanics and workingmen in name, ultimately were better suited to skilled artisans
rather than common laborers. “Business and professional families” took the mechanics’

61

Qtd. in Harrison, A History of the Working Men’s College, 20.

62

Harrison, A History of the Working Men’s College, 20.

63

Altick, The English Common Reader, 210.

137

place and the Mechanics’ Institutes ultimately attracted students who were from the
“higher branches of handicraft trades, or are clerks in offices, and, in many instances,
young men connected with liberal professions.”64 The same happened at the Working
Men’s College, as white-collar workers soon outnumbered actual workingmen by a large
margin. Even the university extension program found this to be the case, eventually
becoming mostly populated by women and business and professional men.65 Bast’s
clerkship, his autodidactism, his position on the cusp of gentility make him the
consummate beneficiary of any number of emergent adult education programs at the
beginning of the twentieth century. Those institutions had, however, only limited success
in the latter half of the nineteenth century, illustrating that Bast comes up against a
tradition still in the process of inventing itself.
The final push for such reinvention came in the years immediately preceding
Forster’s writing Howards End, as the Education Act of 1902 abolished the old school
boards and resulted in rapid educational expansion that took place at all levels, ushering
in an era of significant growth in the sheer amount and diversity of universities, a
phenomenon on which I comment in my final chapter.66 The moment, then, was ripe for
Forster to reflect on where the university education of his own experience might go or
how it might compare to those of the newer institutions. Forster picks up these main ideas
from the recent history of adult education—fellowship and free discussion, how to
educate working and middle classes, and the evolution of cross-class education from
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vague platitudes of self-improvement to in-depth discussions of literature—and examines
their relationship to his own version of culture and its associated heritage. Bast and his
conversations with the Schlegels emphasize fellowship and meaningful understanding of
art because that was the common thread Maurice wanted to share with Oxbridge; the
relationship between the Schlegels and Bast mimics the kind of environment Maurice
wanted on a national scale. And if the endeavor fails, with Bast never achieving any real
benefit, it is less a commentary on the failure of the Working Men’s College mission as
much as it is the realization that Maurice’s tie to the heritage at Oxford is, at last, out of
date.
With that in mind, we can look anew at the old questions of creating a national
policy for culture, a seemingly tired debate that Helen and Margaret enter into when they
attempt to mentor Bast. The clerk unwittingly becomes the subject of vigorous
discussion in response to the hypothetical question posed at a dinner party: “How ought I
to dispose of my money?” (105). Should the financial gains of one generation be used to
provide for the poor of the next? Matters of financial necessity overlap with questions of
cultural gain as discussion ensues over “what right had ‘Mr. Bast’ to profit” from others’
hard-earned income, as well as what kinds of culture should be sufficient for him—must
he have a free library? Free tennis courts? Should he be assigned a “Twin Star,” “some
member of the leisured classes who would watch over him ceaselessly”? Should he be
given “food but no clothes, clothes but no food” (105)? Margaret, assigned for the
purposes of the debate the position of the “Society for the Preservation of Places of
Historic Interest or Natural Beauty” argues that “Mr. Bast”—always in quotes now, who
has come by this point to in the discussion to represent his entire class— should simply
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receive cash: “Money’s educational. It’s far more educational than the things it
buys…isn’t the most civilized thing going, the man who has learnt to wear his income
properly? ...give Mr. Bast money, and don’t bother about his ideals. He’ll pick up those
for himself” (106). It is a valid enough position, and argued for and against well by the
other guests. Interestingly, though, another woman’s suggestion that “Mr. Bast” receive
“personal supervision and mutual help,” in which “the effect…was to alter poor people
until they became exactly like people who were not so poor,” is quickly dismissed by the
Schlegel sisters (107). The mentorship the women offer Bast, it seems, is recognizably
unviable, even though “personal supervision and mutual help” is exactly what Helen
attempts with Bast on her own in the latter half of the novel. In her argument against
mentorship, Margaret only affirms the import of class privilege, but she ignores that Bast
cannot simply “pick up” the heritage she herself had been granted.
The negative reaction to the idea of mentorship sticks out to me because it marks
this debate as unique among conversations regarding education for the lower and middle
classes; the inclusion of mentorship makes the debate not as typical of the kinds of social
progressivism that critics such as Bradbury, Zemgulys, and Medalie read as being
criticized in the novel. This dig at mentorship alludes to my earlier point regarding
Forster’s recognition that mentorship is an ineffectual replacement for heritage, and asks
the reader to consider specifically how the institutions in charge of such adult education
respond to a more pervasive loss of heritage. As the sisters grapple with engaging both
Leonard Bast, the individual to whom they try to share their heritage (even if they fail), as
well as “Mr. Bast,” the nonspecific person who is at the heart of a debate over matters of
educational policy, they get at a key issue at stake in the rise of universities and adult
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education at the beginning of the twentieth century, which is the loss of the sovereign
educator’s instinct that heritage could ever be taken across classes. To use Mrs. Wilcox’s
phrase, Forster finds it is “an instinct which may be wrong” (55).
Maurice’s instinct that a line could be traced directly from Oxford and Cambridge
to his own College may not be a feasible one; the University Extension lectures may not
be actual extensions of the Cambridge that creates them. The break does not come from
the inability of the lower classes to access culture more generally—that kind of reading
leads to the snobbishness Page and Rosencrance detect—but from this uncomfortable
idea that culture can be mentored or passed down. There was a heritage that came with an
Oxbridge education, one to which Forster felt greatly connected, and it seems his failed
experiment with mentorship and Bast constitutes his acknowledgment that this particular
experience cannot ever be duplicated or shared. Mrs. Wilcox directs the “an instinct
which may be wrong” phrase at Helen and Paul’s incompatibility, but Margaret takes it to
mean “they belong to types that can fall in love, but couldn’t live together. That’s
dreadfully probable. I’m afraid that in nine cases out of ten Nature pulls one way and
human nature another” (55). It seems apt, though, in Bast’s case as well. The instinct
behind a place like the Working Men’s College or the University Extension Centers that
opened all over England is, I think Forster would find, admirable in every way. But it is
incompatible with the instinct of another sort, the heritage that he had come to enjoy at
Cambridge. Educating Bast is hardly a worthless endeavor, but it will not take the place
of heritage. Even the oldest institutions of education must now face a newly expansive
view of defining and acquiring culture.
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VI. Forster and Liberal Decline
If any mentorship succeeds in Howards End, it is the mentorship of Margaret
Schlegel by Ruth Wilcox, whose deeply personal ties to Howards End mark the novel’s
most poignant connection to a heritage connected to history and tradition. For Mrs.
Wilcox, the transmission of material goods, a topic I will explore in my next chapter,
matters not a whit, even as her leaving the home to Margaret creates complications for
her estate: “Mrs. Wilcox has left few clear indications behind her,” and only hastily
scribbles her testament to leave to Margaret Howards End (55). She sought for Howards
End “a spiritual heir,” and her own spirit “stayed in and out, ever a welcome ghost” (83,
138). The two women form, over time, a close bond, and Margaret assumes Mrs.
Wilcox’s position as Henry’s wife after her death. But while Margaret may have taken
over Mrs. Wilcox’s physical place, Mrs. Wilcox seems to last even in death. Margaret
says to Helen near the novel’s end:
I feel that you and I and Henry are only fragments of that woman’s mind. She
knows everything. She is everything. She is the house, and the tree that leans over
it. People have their own deaths as well as their own lives, and even if there is
nothing beyond death, we shall differ in our nothingness. I cannot believe that
knowledge such as hers will perish with knowledge such as mine. (282)
Through Mrs. Wilcox, Forster seems nostalgic for meaningful spiritual ties, even as he
acknowledges those ties, as his old Cambridge ones, may no longer carry the same
relevance or value. The value of such spiritual mentorship, or the tie to one’s heritage,
has been usurped by inheritance, the importance of material goods or economic capital.
While Margaret herself is the subject of Mrs. Wilcox’s spiritual bequest, Howards End
will eventually go to Bast and Helen’s child, the object of material inheritance. While the
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spirit of Mrs. Wilcox will always live in Margaret, even Margaret realizes that it does so
incompletely, since with Mrs. Wilcox died her devotion to her ancestors.
Forster’s wistfulness for Mrs. Wilcox is in line with what so many of the
foundational arguments about the novel, from critics such as Rose Macaulay, Lionel
Trilling, and F.R. Leavis, claim of Forster’s politics, in particular his struggle with being
“on the fag-end of Victorian liberalism.”67 In such readings Mrs. Wilcox represents an
earlier time: Forster’s nostalgia for Victorian liberalism in the face of modern disquiet.
The compromises between the dichotomous Schlegels and the Wilcoxes, between culture
and business, are demonstrative of Forster’s own political compromises. Indeed, Forster
is often considered a not-quite-modernist, an author too-firmly rooted in both the literary
tradition and political liberalism of an ageing Victorianism to be a convincing modernist.
Malcolm Bradbury, in particular, has argued that while Forster is hardly an “oldfashioned” writer, he is merely at the periphery of Bloomsbury, and hence of modernism,
the era of liberal decline.68
It follows, then, that in mourning Mrs. Wilcox, Forster is mourning the
Cambridge of his youth, the heritage that helped shape him, and feels a bit of nostalgia as
he sees slipping away the age in which he could so happily and unwarily engage in its
culture. In his 1946 essay, “The Challenge of Our Time,” Forster reflects on that
“admirable age”:
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[it]…practised benevolence and philanthropy, was humane and intellectually
curious, upheld free speech, had little colour-prejudice, believed that individuals
are and should be different, and entertained a sincere faith in the progress of
society. The world was to become better and better, chiefly through the spread of
parliamentary institutions. The education I received in those far-off and fantastic
days made me soft and I am very glad it did, for I have seen plenty of hardness
since, and I know it does not even pay. But though the education was humane it
was imperfect, inasmuch as we none of us realised our economic position…we
did not realise that all the time we were exploiting the poor of our own country
and the backward races abroad, and getting bigger profits from our investments
than we should… All that has changed in the present century.69
Grateful for his education and the outlook it gave him, Forster nonetheless realizes it has
lost relevance in modern society, and thankfully so, in some ways. He turns, though, back
to that “old morality…the doctrine of laisser-faire,” and asks that it be combined with the
“new economy.” This is a confirmation of Forster’s dedication to liberty and the
preservation of freedom of one’s mind. Though it is a commentary on much bigger
political currents, Forster’s recollection of the education of his youth is his own reminder
that heritage helped create his own art, and even if such heritage cannot be duplicated
exactly, it still bears lasting relevance for anyone concerned with the freedom of the mind
and the cultivation of the spirit. The Schlegel’s “personal relations” must live on, as
surely as Mrs. Wilcox’s spirit would forever preside over Howards End.
During an interview granted to a young man at Cambridge after his novelistic
career had ended, Forster was asked if the undergraduate’s generation “bewildered
Forster.” He responded “no, he was fortunate to have always been around young people
from having lived so much in Cambridge. He thought he understood them; it was their
relation to the world they live in that he did not understand.”70 Forster felt he could no
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longer write about “the old-fashioned world with its homes and its family life and its
comparative peace,” the war having ruined the vestiges of his political liberalism and
leaving him with fear over the country’s and democracy’s future.71 Looking to my next
chapter on Virginia Woolf and how she sees mentorship and the university factoring into
the Great War, it is important to note that the university always remained for Forster a
place that should be separate from the ugliness of war. I turn once more to Forster’s
biography of his friend, Goldie, to illuminate Forster’s own feelings on his beloved
Cambridge. After the Great War, Forster writes, “Cambridge only increased his sadness.
All that he had cared for and worked for had vanished, and a grim obscene power took its
place.” Forster recalls an incident in which a group of soldiers burst out laughing at the
site of an undergraduate in cap and gown, laughing at “the tradition I had been educated
in, and that it should be laughed at in its own home appalled me…No one defended it or
even seemed to regret it, it had become a wraith which the next puff of gas would drive
away.”72 Woolf, of course, will challenge Forster’s vision of a perfect pre-war
Cambridge, but for him it remained, till the last, the symbol of the very best kind of life,
where students would learn to always be “the light of truth burning in a storm.”73
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Chapter 3
“The Procession of the Sons”: Gendered Mentorship in To the Lighthouse
Almost the same daughters ask almost the same brothers for almost the same
privileges. Almost the same gentlemen intone almost the same refusals for
almost the same reasons. It seems as if there were no progress in the human
race, but only repetition. We can almost hear them if we listen singing the
same old song, ‘Here we go round the mulberry tree, the mulberry tree, the
mulberry tree’ and if we add, ‘of property, of property, of property,’ we shall
fill in the rhyme without doing violence to the facts.
-Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas
In 1916, Virginia Woolf wrote to women’s rights activist Margaret Llewelyn
Davies that the Great War was a “preposterous masculine fiction” that made her “steadily
more feminist.”1 Woolf continues this argument in A Room of One’s Own (1929),
claiming that it was the war that “hardened women’s views about their male rulers.”2 In
her pacifist polemic, Three Guineas, Woolf links outright the “tyranny of the patriarchal
state” to the “tyranny of the Fascist State.”3 Published in 1938 on the cusp of World War
II and its very real threat of a Nazi invasion, Woolf’s critical version of British social
history portrays the educated middle class as participating in a self-renewing cycle of
patriarchy that is reflected in the gendered nature of daily activities. A society that
perpetuates male dominance in turn perpetuates war; the violence of war, Woolf claims,
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is a uniquely “man’s habit.”4 The country, then, becomes vulnerable to Fascism because
it accepts “tyranny” as a matter of course.
The validity of the causal relationship that Woolf posits between patriarchy and
war has met resistance from the day Three Guineas was published. The book was
criticized harshly by Woolf’s contemporary John Maynard Keynes; her own husband,
Leonard Woolf; and even her nephew, Quentin Bell, who claimed her argument was
“wholly inadequate,” taking particular issue with “a discussion of women’s rights” being
joined “with the far more agonizing and immediate question of what we were to do in
order to meet the ever-growing menace of Fascism and war.”5 Critically, these concerns
persist today, as Three Guineas is often regarded as Woolf’s least successful work,
replete with rhetorical oddities, unresolved arguments, and, given its focus on women of
her own class, narrow scope.6 This, coupled with Woolf’s own tendency to “[present]
herself as an unworldly, even mystical private person with no desire for contact with
political life,” long devalued Woolf as a wartime critic, encouraging critics as different as
F.R. Leavis, Paul Fussell, and Elaine Showalter to read Woolf only in the context of her
narrative innovations characteristic of modernism.7
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Renewed attention to Three Guineas, however, has helped recast Woolf as a
prominent social commentator with particularly strong pacifist views that permeate both
her fiction and non-fiction. Alex Zwerdling and Mark Hussey have revolutionized Woolf
studies through their emphasis on her as a war critic, effectively removing her from the
ivory tower on which she had been perched throughout the fifties and sixties.8 In Virginia
Woolf and War, Hussey argues for Woolf’s position as “a serious political and ethical
thinker,” and reads all of her work as “deeply concerned with war… it helps redefine our
understanding of the nature of war.”9 Hussey, though, generalizes the main argument of
Three Guineas to reflect what he sees as Woolf’s views on war as a whole:
…from her earliest to her final work she sought to explore and make clear the
connections between private and public violence, between the domestic and the
civic effects of patriarchal society, between male supremacy and the absence of
peace…Woolf shares with many historical women’s campaigns for peace a
sense of the interconnectedness of violence and male dominance.10
Emphasizing the war content of Three Guineas helps Hussey to get around some of the
gaps and stretches in the book’s argument and rhetoric; focusing on the text’s anti-war
stance and connecting it to Woolf’s larger corpus of fiction subjugates the tenuousness of
that connection between wartime violence and male dominance, assimilating it into a
greater contemporary conversation about women’s views on war. This critical
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conversation on Woolf and war has, importantly, helped to historicize and politicize
Woolf, but it also potentially encourages a somewhat myopic reading of Three Guineas
that overlooks the particularities of Woolf’s social critique by reading the book too
exclusively in the context of war.
In a claim that helpfully builds on Hussey’s reading, Daniel Pick remarks in a
passing footnote to War Machine that any analysis of Three Guineas must also recognize
the blame Woolf places on the system of education for upholding the gender roles that,
she argues, lead to war.11 While his obvious imperative is to read Woolf—as does
Hussey— as a wartime critic, Pick strikes me here as being exactly right in wanting to
put more emphasis on the nature of Woolf’s argument against educational institutions.
Building on this point, I argue in this chapter for a more nuanced reading of Three
Guineas that moves beyond the text’s war content and examines more fully the way that
education upholds the “given [gender] roles and mystifying identifications” that Pick
mentions. In contextualizing Woolf’s “manifesto” within her wider interest in education,
I link her specific argument about the militaristic patriarchy that leads to war back to the
chief establishment that Woolf argues perpetuates it: the university, which she criticizes
as a profoundly classist and gendered institution. Further, I propose that attending to
Woolf’s stance against the exclusionary tactics of higher education, as she lays it out in
Three Guineas, illuminates a greater concern present in her fiction regarding the exact
mechanisms through which institutions of higher education perpetuate tyranny. Woolf’s
11

The full footnote reads: “It is possible to read Woolf, at least at certain points of the essay, as endorsing a
stark psychological and biological, as well as historical dichotomy between men and women, in their
respective relations to war and Fascism. On the other hand, any adequate analysis of Three Guineas would
need to stress, alongside the bi-polar gendered terms of guilt and innocence, implication and immunity the
text offers, its powerful insistence that the current system of social and economic relations, above all for
Woolf the system of education, upholds for both sexes given roles and mystifying identifications” (pg. 3
footnote 2).
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criticism of higher education is twofold, as she interprets the unequal access to
universities as a sign of “tyranny,” and also sees this tyranny in the very process by
which universities transmit social values. This process connects education to cultural
transmission, and so is defined by Woolf in terms of mentorship.
My argument is primarily concerned with Woolf’s “daughters of educated men,”
those shut out of the system of education that she claims perpetuates patriarchy. Alluded
to in A Room of One’s Own but the subject of sustained discussion in Three Guineas,
these women, “the weakest of all the classes in the state,” exert the least direct influence
on society, having been instructed only in the areas of “poverty, chastity, derision, and,—
what word covers ‘lack of rights and privileges?’” (16; 78). The repeated refrain,
“daughters of educated men,” reveals rhetorically the dependency these women endure
due to their lack of education, while simultaneously underscoring the discrepancy
between their paltry education and that which their fathers received.12 Educated at either
Oxford or Cambridge, the father is specifically implicated for not passing on to his
daughters the education which, Woolf goes on to say, he always passes on to his sons.
The education so central to the text is cast as a particular model, that of transmission, and
the way that Woolf phrases the term for these victims of sociopolitical atrophy—“the
daughters of educated men”— leads me to conclude that Woolf’s problems with
education are inextricable from her problems with how that knowledge is transmitted: it
is a problem of mentorship.

12

The “Daughters of Educated Men” are hindered on two fronts: many receive no education at all, and the
few who do remain powerless as a result of the educational system that perpetuates exclusionary tactics.
These women keenly feel the disparity between themselves and their fathers and brothers, who have access
to the knowledge, degrees, and appointments denied to them.
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The inconsistencies and shortcomings she cites are put in terms of mentorship, as
educated men are here faulted for not acting as mentors to their daughters. These
“daughters of educated men” reveal Woolf’s concern with not just who is being educated,
but who is passing knowledge on to whom.13 To return to this chapter’s epigraph from
Three Guineas, Woolf takes a vituperative stance against tired rationales for male
exclusivity and private property. The “mulberry tree” and “property” are not only
indicators of the literal transmission of property and inheritance along male lines; they
also symbolize the cultural values transmitted to the sons of educated men, relics of what
I contend Woolf claims is an outmoded mentorship. The “same old song” is the
institutionalized duplication and transmission of these values. In the plight of the
“daughters of educated men,” the particularities of Woolf’s critique converge: she points
to a reproduced, patriarchal, and exclusionary male discourse as it is intertwined with the
Oxbridge tradition and she points to the absence of a viable, transmissible entity— a
culture worth passing on.
In contextualizing Three Guineas within Woolf’s wider interest in education and
the passing on of knowledge, I hope to extend the recent arguments of both Melba
Cuddy-Keane and Lois Cucullu, who have both sensed Woolf’s concern with cultural
transmission. Cuddy-Keane’s interests are explicitly pedagogical: she locates Woolf “in
an environment rife with controversy about the dissemination and transmission of
intellectual culture,” and traces her participation in “an on-going pedagogical debate” that
13

Woolf herself was the “daughter of an educated man”; her father, Leslie Stephen, was a Cambridge
intellectual. In her essay “A Sketch of the Past” Woolf describes the “communicative, literate, letter
writing” into which she was born (62). Stephen believed women should be as well educated as men and
encouraged Woolf’s reading. In his preface to Three Guineas, Hussey explains, “Such homeschooling was
a source of some bitterness later in her life, as she recognized the advantages that derived from the
expensive educations her brothers and half brothers received at private schools and university” (xi).
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goes beyond institutional boundaries.14 Cucullu, in Expert Modernists, Matricide, and
Modern Culture, argues for Woolf’s concern with the reproduction of social roles, as she
sees Woolf transgressing the “social authority of the household…and mak[ing] the
modernist intellectual a key player among the experts now responsible for reproducing
the social order.”15 Both Cuddy-Keane and Cucullu imply that Woolf advocates forms of
propagation that build on rather than reproduce intellectual institutions, but neither
addresses exactly what it is that intellectual institutions reproduce, or the nature of the
mechanisms of social reproduction. Mentorship, in my argument, brings together
Cucullu’s social reproduction with Cuddy-Keane’s pedagogical transmission; the two are
linked as Woolf attacks the university for reproducing through mentorship the masculine
“social order” she seeks to delegitimize. Further, I build on Cucullu and Cuddy-Keane’s
work by claiming that Woolf additionally seeks an alternative mentorship, one actively
involving the “daughters of educated men,” that could in turn help constitute a new
“social order.”16
This chapter explores how the mentorship implied by the “daughters of educated
men” surfaces in To the Lighthouse (1927), a novel full of educated men and their
daughters. Since the importance of war to this novel has already been well-demonstrated,
I read the novel’s commentary on war not as a critical ending point but as part of Woolf’s

14

Melba Cuddy-Keane, Virginia Woolf, the Intellectual, and the Public Sphere (Cambridge: Cambridge
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This refers back to the explanation of the classical version of mentorship described in my introduction
and chapter on Hardy: Thomas Simmons’s claim about mentorship as an “invocation,” but not duplication,
of the father. Woolf responds here to both mentorship as duplication and invocation.
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larger commentary on the cultural transmission associated with university education.17
Where my earlier chapters considered the class implications of cultural transmission, I
examine here the ways in which that transmission was also affected by gender. I argue
that Woolf establishes mentorship in the novel as a masculine tradition, and that she uses
mentorship to characterize the patriarchal relationship between education (Oxbridge) and
war identified in Three Guineas. Woolf’s earlier Jacob’s Room (1922) and even The
Voyage Out (1915) also criticize the exclusivity and militarism of male mentorship and I
believe To the Lighthouse raises this masculine mentorship only to resist it altogether. In
a more drastic claim than either Hardy or Forster would make, Woolf argues here that the
content being transmitted is ultimately as non-viable as the processes of transmission. In
a move more powerful than any piece of education legislation, the war called for a radical
end to cultural transmission, a transmission Woolf faults for leading to war in the first
place. She proposes a uniquely female mentorship to take over from this traditional
mentorship, a proposition explored primarily in the relationship between Mrs. Ramsay, a
traditional domestic woman who has a particularly keen sense of perception, and Lily
Briscoe, the artist who adores her. The novel, I claim, is an attempt by the daughters of
educated men to construct both their own narrative perspective and their own model of a
transmissible culture. The success of this attempt, though, Woolf herself comes to
question, as Three Guineas ultimately calls for a “culture of outsiders,” signaling an end
to mentorship as a viable system for cultural transmission at all, and wondering what, if
anything, could take its place.

17

See Hermione Lee’s biography of Woolf already cited in this chapter, and also Tammy Clewell’s
Mourning, Modernism, and Postmodernism (2009), and Karen Levenback’s Virginia Woolf and the Great
War (1999).

153

I. Mentorship as a Masculine Institution
To the Lighthouse sets up a pattern of male mentorship through Mr. Ramsay,
James Ramsay, Andrew Ramsay, and Charles Tansley, and argues that this pattern is
passed down through institutions of higher education. The novel begins by establishing
the presence and persistence of a distinctly male tradition, one that is handed down from
generation to generation. On the first page, we are introduced to James Ramsay, the
young son of Mr. Ramsay, an academic who “feed[s] eight children on philosophy!”18
Symbolizing the next generation, young James is situated among terms of futurity:
“tomorrow,” “to which he had looked forward for years and years,” and “future
prospects” (3). While the boy hopes that his immediate future includes a family
expedition to the lighthouse, his father bluntly dashes such hopes, insisting that the
weather certainly “won’t be fine.”
The future that Mr. Ramsay envisions has less to do with weather or family
outings and more to do with indoctrinating James with the same values to which he
adheres. From the comfort of his mother’s lap, James sees his father in a pitch of
excitement, declaring “Boldly we rode and well!” as he nearly collides with Lily
Briscoe’s easel. Fortunately, the painting is spared, as “he turned sharp, and rode off, to
die gloriously…upon the heights of Balaclava” (8). What nearly knocks into Lily’s art is
not simply a too-boisterous walk in the garden, but a Tennyson poem. “Boldly we rode
and well,” from “The Charge of the Light Brigade,” places Mr. Ramsay firmly in a
masculine tradition of the past. The poem was written in 1854 during the Crimean War as
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a celebration of valor and courage even in the face of defeat.19 This past is made present,
though, by Mr. Ramsay’s substituting the pronoun “we” for the “they” original to
Tennyson’s poem. That small “we” has considerable weight: in Three Guineas, Woolf
defines the term as encompassing “a whole made up of body, brain and spirit, influenced
by memory and tradition” (22). With his son looking on, Mr. Ramsay makes it clear that
he believes in that same male tradition of patriotism and valor championed by
Tennyson’s poem.
James, it would seem, is meant to learn and pass on this tradition, as well. The
values on display in “The Charge of the Light Brigade” go hand in hand with Mr.
Ramsay’s personal philosophy on child-rearing: “He was incapable of untruth; never
tampered with a fact; never altered a disagreeable word to suit the pleasure or
convenience of any mortal being, least of all of his own children, who, sprung from his
loins, should be aware from childhood that life is difficult” (4). Although harsh, Mr.
Ramsay’s outlook, like the one in Tennyson’s poem, encourages fortitude. Mr. Ramsay
wants his children to learn to accept obstacles as inevitable, to learn that one needs,
“…above all, courage, truth, and the power to endure” (4). In fathering eight children,
Mr. Ramsay has endured—not only do his many children represent his literal
propagation, but, if he teaches them as he plans, he will have transmitted those values

19

The subject of Tennyson’s poem is the ill-advised and disastrous charge of the British cavalry in the
Battle of Balaclava on October 25, 1854. Mr. Ramsay is the portrait of not only masculinity, but of a
dangerous masculinity, the same one that Woolf would claim rationalized the violence of the Great War.
The presence of the poem at such an early point in the novel signals the valorization of wartime disaster,
and implicates this narrative in the many deaths of the Great War.
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that, because he so vociferously sets them against his wife’s habits, are characterized in
the novel as distinctly male.20
As Mr. Ramsay’s progeny, James embodies physical continuity, straightforward
reproduction, and the duplication of a tradition of valorous manhood.21 But if James,
who ends up just like his father, represents the presence and continuity of a particular
type of tradition, it is Mr. Ramsay’s protégé, Charles Tansley, who represents how that
tradition of masculine virtues is consciously reproduced and passed on through a male
mentor. One of the many young men who “parodied” Mr. Ramsay, Tansley is completing
his dissertation (as Mr. Ramsay assumes Andrew will one day) under the supervision of
Mr. Ramsay, and, with his repeated echoes of the impending bad weather, seems to have
adopted his mentor’s attitude, as well.22 Indeed, while not Ramsay’s biological child,
Tansley is every bit the son of an educated man by virtue of the allowances of
mentorship. While he may have a working-class background, Tansley is granted the
possibility of moving outside his class as the novel’s version of Cambridge indoctrinates
him with its values.
20

The Ramsays, of course, have a brood of both boys and girls. Mr. Ramsay’s interactions, though, are
geared more towards his sons, whereas Mrs. Ramsay is the one, as I explain in my third section, to take into
account what her daughters should learn.
Additionally, many of the men in the novel echo Mr. Ramsay’s coldness. Charles Tansley, especially, is
quick to chime in that the weather will not hold, and to resist moments of emotional vulnerability during his
walk with Mrs. Ramsay. Augustus Carmichael and William Bankes, also, are aligned more closely with
Mr. Ramsay.
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The values to which Cambridge grants Tansley access are more clearly delineated
in one of Woolf’s earliest novels, 1922’s Jacob’s Room. As Tansley envisions himself
“for ever walking up and down, up and down, with Mr. Ramsay,” we hear the echoes of
Jacob Flanders’ footsteps (7). It is a cool night at Cambridge as Jacob buttons his jacket
and takes leave of the pleasurable company of his friends: “Back from the Chapel, back
from the Hall, back from the Library, came the sound of his footsteps, as if the old stone
echoed with magisterial authority: ‘The young man—the young man—the young man—
back to his rooms.’”23 Given that the novel narrates its protagonist’s life from the
perspective of those who will mourn his death in the Great War on the book’s final page,
such regression and repetition of Jacob’s footsteps and youth seem a fitting
foreshadowing to the impending lament, which famously takes place over a pair of
Jacob’s old shoes. Jacob’s Room is also a historical commentary: Woolf sees the culture
that produced the intimate academic gathering of Jacob and his friends as subsequently
calling them to war, to the endless deaths of so many young men. In this passage, Woolf
emphasizes not the end result—death in war—but how Jacob ends up there as a result of
that which Cambridge taught him.
I will discuss the import of the war in the next section, but first, I would like to
establish that there is precedent for reading in Woolf characterizations of the university as
engendering mentorship-type relationships. Vincent Sherry extrapolates from Jacob’s
footsteps a useful summary of Woolf’s critique: “The cadence to which his steps conform
only confirms the ratios of an authority established, passed on: rational, male.”24 It is not
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the subject of Sherry’s line—“rational, male”— that explains how this repetition comes
about; it is his verb, “passed on,” which implies that this repetition occurs as a result of a
conscious act of transmission. In matriculating at Cambridge, Jacob, as Sherry rightly
asserts, inserts himself into the tradition of patriarchy criticized so overtly by Woolf in
Three Guineas. In Jacob’s Room, Cambridge only continues an educational system
already in place, one begun by Jacob’s tutor, Mr. Floyd. “‘Oh bother Mr. Floyd!’ said
Jacob, switching off a thistle’s head, for he knew already that Mr. Floyd was going to
teach them Latin, as…Mr. Floyd, like his father before him, visited cottages miles away
on the moors, and, like old Mr. Floyd, was a great scholar” (20). Knowledge in the novel
is, from the outset, cast in terms of “passing down.” Mr. Floyd himself went to either
Oxford or Cambridge (Betty Flanders cannot remember which, as they are equal in her
mind), and he prepares Jacob to do the same. Once there, Professor Plumer, whose name
implies his embodiment of scholarly tradition, resumes the role of mentor and Jacob is
left to take his repetitious footsteps.25
Indeed, all the Cambridge men are cast in language that situates them as part of a
great tradition of mentorship: “Look, as they pass into service, how airily the gowns blow
out, as though nothing dense and corporeal were within. What sculptured faces, what
certainty, authority controlled by piety, although great boots march under the gowns. In
what orderly procession they advance” (32). Jacob’s footsteps down the dormitory hall,
the boots marching under the pluming gowns, and the shoes that are Jacob’s only remains
In accordance with my argument about the institutionalization mentorship of the values that lead to war,
Sherry continues, “This masculine order of a rationalistic language extends its empowerment to Jacob
through the university that institutionalizes these values” (279).
25
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symbolize his active participation in a transmitted tradition. Mentorship in the novel
began as a kind, deliberate gesture of education for a lonely widow’s son, yet it quickly
becomes an equally deliberate act of transmitting particular knowledge and cultural
values. Given the novel’s tragic end it is obvious that that these values culminate in war,
so I would like to emphasize here the way in which the novel relies on the language of
transmission before Jacob ever even goes to war. Mentorship in this construction goes
beyond exposing a social problem as it had for Hardy and Forster; mentorship according
to Woolf actually is the source of the problem itself. The language describing his
education is put in terms of mentorship, showing how Woolf came to think of it as a
defining model for understanding the ways that the “male rationales” mentioned by
Sherry are carried on.
While Jacob Flanders and James Ramsay may initially resist their mentors,
neither successfully dodges their influence: James, at the novel’s end, is as gruff and
unfeeling as his father, and Jacob dies to protect the lifestyle afforded to him by
Cambridge. 26 Both sons of educated men, they are the grateful recipients of Woolf’s
famed “Arthur’s Education Fund,” recipients of male exclusivity, private property, and
male rationales. But while both are the beneficiaries (or victims) of mentorship, it is
Charles Tansley, the son of an uneducated man, who emphasizes the social implications
of mentorship. Privy to the same educational opportunities as Jacob Flanders and James
Ramsay, Charles Tansley underscores that mentorship inculcates more than just basic
26

As a young child, James finds his father overbearing (tyrannous, even), especially in contrast to his
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the magnificence of his head; for his exactingness and egotism (for there he stood, commanding them to
attend to him); but most of all he hated the twang and twitter of his father’s emotion which, vibrating round
them, disturbed the perfect simplicity and good sense of his relations with his mother” (36-7).
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knowledge: mentorship is both the transmission of values and the creation of a system
that allows those values to be transmitted beyond biological lines and become an
institutional norm. Tansley, while from a family as “poor as church mice,” is seen as
“exceptionally able” by Mr. Ramsay (6). The son of a chemist, Tansley has “paid his own
way since he was thirteen” (12). As a male, however, he is granted access to institutional
mentorship (with Mr. Ramsay) through the university, and so is able to join in a
particular tradition of passed-down values that grant authority and power to men. He
may, as Mrs. Ramsay points out to Lily, be tutoring his sister at home, but he cannot
admit her to the same university privileges he enjoys (197). An unpalatable version of
Leonard Bast, he is still more successful than either Bast or the fated Jude Fawley, as
Tansley accomplishes precisely what Jude cannot do: through hard work and the proper
training, he gains access to an institution typically outside of his class.27
The idea that Tansley could overcome his lower-middle class origins and attain a
Cambridge-type degree, while inspiring, is hardly a naïve assumption on the part of
Woolf that simple hard work could yield positive results. Rather, Tansley’s ability to
transcend class boundaries links education to the class and gender struggles so important
to Woolf. As Hermione Lee points out, Woolf’s “essays and fiction of the 1930s present
a disfigured society with a hypocritical culture and an unbridgeable class gap. They
diagnose rigidly constructed gender identities, which exclude or oppress the misfits of
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either.”28 To the Lighthouse, in allowing Tansley to bridge this gap by virtue of his
gender and the allowances of mentorship by other men, demonstrates the profound
possibilities of institutionalized mentorship. Firstly, institutional forms of mentorship
promote gendered educational access and transmission (i.e. the Tennyson poem and the
“rational, male cadence” of Jacob’s footsteps). Secondly, this mentorship points to
possibilities for upward class mobility and, correspondingly, the possible acquisition of
upper-class cultural capital—a degree. While his humble origins prevent him from even
being considered as a possible match for Prue (Mr. Ramsay says he would disinherit her
should they marry) he can still write the same dissertation expected of Andrew (66).
Mentorship creates Tansley’s one possibility for upward class movement. In Charles
Tansley, especially, Woolf makes the argument that mentorship is a masculine institution
housed in the halls of higher education while granting only men social mobility and
power. Woolf’s deprecatory portrait of Tansley’s character as an unfeeling atheist who
makes the Ramsay women shudder also foreshadows her impending critique of
mentorship, resonating with the doom that permeates Tennyson’s, “All in the valley of
Death.”29

28

Lee, Virginia Woolf, 338.

29

Tansley seems to be inspired by Woolf’s older brother, Thoby, who had, according to Sherry, a real
passion for the Age of Reason, “a sensibility given to strong opinions and convinced in particular of the
irrelevance now of Christianity, fiercely moral but committed to logic rather than faith as the basis of
correct action, his rational atheism stemmed identifiably from Leslie’s root” (238). While Toby’s “rational
atheism” is echoed in Tansley, though, Thoby’s intellectual privileges were very much a matter of more
literal inheritance. Woolf was shut out on both counts because of her gender—she could not directly access
Cambridge through either being self-taught or born into it. She may have had access to the knowledge, but
could not, like Tansley, be granted access.

161

II. The Failure of Male Mentorship
Turning to the Great War’s looming presence in the novel, I argue that the
patriarchy Woolf famously implicates is actually part of a greater system of the
exclusions and shortcomings of mentorship and the particular relationship it posits
between gender, social policy, and education. In “The Parable of the Young Man and the
Old,” Great War poet Wilfred Owen casts the seminal patriarch Abram (Abraham) as a
murderer, who kills both his son and “half the seed of Europe.”30 Owen’s feeling that
fathers have quite literally killed their sons as one generation sends the next to war is part
of a more generalized narrative of the Great War that came about shortly after the war’s
conclusion. Samuel Hynes explains this “Myth of War” as a “collective narrative of
significance,” a way for the nation to explain and come to terms with what it had
endured. Hynes argues that this narrative began with “a generation of innocent young
men, their heads full of high abstractions like Honour, Glory, and England, [who] went
off to war to make the world safe for democracy.” Not only were these men “slaughtered
in stupid battles planned by stupid generals,” but, as Owen suggests, they blamed the
previous generation: “They rejected the values of the society that had sent them to war,
and in doing so separated their own generation from the past and from their actual
cultural inheritance… [the story] can be reduced to two terse propositions: the old betray
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the young; the past is remote and useless.”31 Together, Owen and Hynes capture the
narrative of Jacob Flanders and Andrew Ramsay: armed with the “Tennysonian”
(Victorian) values of male valor and courage received from their fathers, they die in war.
Hynes’s “tyrannous Old Men,” an entire generation of murderous patriarchs, point to the
“patriarchy” that Woolf criticizes in Three Guineas as fascist and tyrannical, imposing
their justifications for war with deadly consequence.32
For Nancy Topping Bazin and Jane Hamovit Lauter, this patriarchy is embodied
by Mr. Ramsay, whose attachment to Tennyson’s poem provides an easy link, in their
argument, between the “husband-hero” and “soldier-hero,” the patriarch who feels
superior to and protective of women, and the patriarch who wants to protect his country.
The war imagery surrounding Andrew (and Jacob, by implication) stems, then, from a
patriarchy that is both domestic and political.33 But as criticisms of Three Guineas
illustrate, the presence of two types of patriarchy (domestic and political) does not
necessarily imply a causal relationship between them. So, instead of taking the militarism
of To the Lighthouse immediately back to the novel’s domestic engagements, I take it
31
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back to the novel’s educational framework in order to flesh out this connection more
fully. If, as I have argued, institutions of higher education instill the patriarchal values of
the previous generation, then it follows that the values these institutional mentors
transmit are related to the militaristic ones that Owen attacks. In this “Myth of War,” the
violence is the end-product, what Hynes calls “cultural inheritance.” For Woolf, however,
this inheritance itself is culturally inculcated; because it is actively mentored, it is part of
a greater system of education and class represented by Tansley. The wartime violence in
To the Lighthouse, after all, is limited to a simple bracketed statement, buried in the
book’s center: “[A shell exploded. Twenty or thirty young men were blown up in France,
among them Andrew Ramsay, whose death, mercifully, was instantaneous.]” (133). This
compression does not diminish the impact of war; it enlarges it and makes the war part of
a more systemic social failure outlined in the passage’s surrounding pages, a failure in a
system characterized by mentorship. Not only does patriarchy make excuses for violence,
but that patriarchy has been mentored. Patriarchy has been institutionalized, passed down
from generation to generation. If universities operate by a system of mentorship and men
continue to advance socially by the allowances of mentorship, they will continue to
transmit the same patriarchy, which would lead to the same violence, and the same war
that these institutions permitted in 1914. For this reason, Woolf scrutinizes male
mentorship, first connecting it explicitly to war and then wondering what, if any,
possibilities it holds for the future.
Woolf relates mentorship to both the university and the violence that she believes
follows from it. While Cambridge may have been the seat of early Bloomsbury
intellectualism, it was also the site of Liberal politics that reached a terminal crisis in the

164

Great War. Sherry makes a forceful case for reading Woolf in relation to the political
Liberalism that led to the Great War, a formative event for literary modernism. Here,
Sherry offers a very close reading of both Woolf’s language and the language he shows
her to be appropriating and ultimately arguing against—those “authoritative male
rationales” I mentioned above. These rationales are the “rational intercourse” or
“language of reason” of Liberal politics, and rationalized a war that was not actually
reasonable at all.34 Sherry links this language of rationality to the politics implicated in
the war, analyzing the language of reason present in Three Guineas as Woolf argues
against war. Sherry explains:
Closely argued, densely and empirically reasoned, this antiwar treatise is
massively and even wearisomely buttressed with its apparatus of scholarly
citation and case-making, syllogism and proof. Its passionate rationality stands as
strikingly at odds with the cooler and sauver manner of her accomplished style,
moreover, as it reveals the underlying, abiding strength of that intellectual faith. If
those protocols of documentary logic appear overprepared, their excesses preserve
a memory of what they attempt to correct: the errors of insufficiency to which an
overconfidence amounted in 1914.35
The “overconfidence” to which this rationalism leads is precisely what guides Jacob
Flanders to war. The language of mentorship or “passing down” in Jacob’s Room further
relates the education associated with the Latin tutoring and the classic Cambridge
education to a Liberal political agenda.
Like this male rationalist discourse, mentorship is blamed for propagating
rationales for war. Having received the appropriate education from Mr. Floyd, Jacob goes
up to Cambridge in October 1906, a particularly poignant date just after the sweeping
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Liberal election victory.36 Jacob’s graduation in 1914 sees another key moment in Liberal
political history: the outbreak of the Great War. Woolf’s description of war’s outbreak
incorporates the language of transmission and casts it as a distinctly masculine mode. As
“Five strokes of Big Ben intoned,” Timothy Durrant, a classmate of Jacob’s who is now a
Whitehall clerk, records that war has been declared. The note is typed, the “burden of
knowledge” carried across the street, onto “the sixteen gentlemen, lifting their pens or
turning perhaps rather wearily in their chairs, decreed that the course of history should
shape itself this way or that way, being manfully determined… to control the course of
events.” This “manful determination” is that of Liberal politicians:
Pitt and Chatham, Burke and Gladstone looked from side to side with fixed
marble eyes and an air of immortal quiescence which perhaps the living may have
envied, the air being fill of whistling and concussions, as the procession with its
banners passed down Whitehall….altogether they looked too red, fat, pale or lean,
to be dealing, as the marble heads had dealt, with the course of history. (171-2)
This passage is put in terms of transmission, depicting the physical projection of the
voice dictating the call to war, carrying the burden of knowledge, the transmission of this
knowledge from the voice to the sixteen men to their colleagues, to the procession at
Whitehall. This language establishes that the course of history, the march to war, truly is
“manfully” determined as it is passed down, as mentorship is a uniquely male institution
for Woolf.37 The war is the natural conclusion to the “mechanical (male) rationality” that
Sherry finds in the character of Mr. Dalloway in The Voyage Out: linguistic reason is
“powerful. It is male. It is the engine of advance.”38
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Jacob’s Room shows that such language “advances” only violence. But it is,
crucially, the university that is implicated in this connection. Indeed, Woolf’s criticisms
of Cambridge were many. Hermione Lee observes:
In all her writings about Cambridge, there is the same tone—whether it’s in her
unpublished caricatures of Saxon, ‘one of the great men of our time,’ who in the
end never did anything except crossword puzzles, or her fictional version of
privileged Cambridge life in Jacob’s Room, or her encounter with the closed
doors of the ‘Oxbridge’ library in A Room of One’s Own. She criticised the closed
world of Cambridge Socialites all her life for ‘rousing jealousies and vanities.’
And she would never forget how the young men irked her.39
Albeit for somewhat different reasons, Woolf shared with D.H. Lawrence a distaste for
Cambridge’s exclusions, a disdain that comes from, in part, the way that these exclusions
are perpetuated. The presence of Durrant in the passage above relates this narrative of
“the course of history” back to Cambridge, an institution represented in the text as the
seat of male rationality. Mr. Floyd, Professor Plumer, Jacob Flanders, Timothy Durrant
are the transmitters and receivers of the culture Woolf deems patriarchal and authoritarian
in Three Guineas, and all are equally implicated in this procession that excuses a call to
war. And if the masculine mentorship transmitted through Cambridge leads to war, it
cannot, to use the term Woolf associates with Mr. Ramsay, “endure.” When Woolf asks
in Three Guineas, “where in short is leading us, the procession of the sons of educated
men,” she looks back at Jacob’s heavy footsteps down the Cambridge corridor, the

Hermione Lee echoes the mechanical nature of the language surrounding war in Jacob’s Room: “… the
emergence of a young life is obliterated by the war, which is seen as a grotesque mechanical force
superimposed on to terrifying chaos” (336).
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banners passed down at Whitehall, and questions where this mentored, masculine
liberalism can possibly go next.40
Jacob’s Room does not answer that question. As Hynes suggests, “War is not the
subject of the novel, but it is the termination of it, the event after which no story remains
to tell…at the end of the book there is only a vacancy, which represents both the dead
Jacob and his dead world, the ‘civilization’ of Edwardian England.” 41 While Jacob’s
Room shows how male rationales are linked to patriarchy and demonstrates that the
university perpetuates these rationales through mentorship, the novel does not move
beyond the emptiness of war and widespread loss of mass male youth, that which male
rationales attempted to justify. But what lies beyond? Sherry looks to the forcefully
shaped arguments of Three Guineas to gauge Woolf’s reaction to rational, male language
as also an act of “desperation.” “The extremity of current circumstances repeats,” he
continues, “the inefficiency of reason’s appeal to history.”42 Turning again to my
epigraph from Three Guineas, Woolf’s stance against tired rationales for male exclusivity
reads with a familiar pattern: “It seems as if there were no progress in the human race, but
only repetition” (80-1). As property is passed down male lines, war is “the monotonously
recurring product of patriarchal order.”43 Woolf, in the thirties, cannot see any possibility
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beyond a repeat of violence, as the male authority housed in Cambridge offers only an
exclusionary history that merely recycles ineffective male rationales.
So when repetition characterizes the majority of male relationships in To the
Lighthouse, it signals Woolf’s sense that mentorship has reached its end. Speculating as
to why his friendship with Mr. Ramsay has faded, William Bankes thinks: “Whose fault
it was he could not say, only, after a time, repetition had taken the place of newness. It
was to repeat that they met…and their paths lying different ways, there had been,
certainly for no one’s fault, some tendency, when they met, to repeat” (21). Even Mr.
Ramsay’s own work is characterized by its inability to innovate: “He had made a definite
contribution to philosophy in one little book when he was only five and twenty; what
came after was more or less amplification, repetition” and “He had not genius; he laid no
claim to that: but he had, or might have had, the power to repeat every letter of the
alphabet from A to Z accurately in order” (23; 34-5).44 Mentorship, however, cannot
survive on this repetition. As Mentor encourages Telemakhos to take his own path, the
mentee must preserve the tradition he inherits while also individualizing it, understanding
it in the context of his present-day society. Mr. Ramsay’s work represents masculine
thought’s inability to move forward, signaling in the novel that the future of mentorship
is not clear.
In Jacob’s Room, Cambridge mentorship is offered as a kind of breeding ground
for male discourse, a discourse which ultimately leads right to war. Jacob Flanders and
later Andrew Ramsay demonstrate Woolf’s belief that mentorship’s repetition has
44
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become dangerous, since it leads only to war. Jacob’s and Andrew’s fate is similar to that
of Septimus Smith in Mrs. Dalloway: like Charles Tansley, Smith has the opportunity to
become solidly middle class, but the war’s violence leaves him unable to advance, and
like Rachel Vinrace of the Voyage Out, there is no other narrative possibility other than
for him to die. With war as its endpoint, mentorship is no longer viable; repetition has
become self-destructive.
In To the Lighthouse, though, Woolf examines whether mentorship can lead to
additional possibilities other than death. Woolf does not distinguish these possibilities as
necessarily fruitful, since they still lead only to repetition. In To the Lighthouse, male
mentorship is itself under scrutiny as a system that itself transmits values; if authoritative,
male rationales can lead only to war, what of a system that privileges and relies on male
authority and rationality? The repetition associated with Mr. Ramsay, the book’s primary
male mentor, signals that Woolf’s continued analysis and attack uncovers problems of
mentorship that persist even after the war, or may even lead to another one. James, Mr.
Ramsay’s heir to intellectualism, is left with no way out of mentorship’s bind: he and
Cam vow to “fight tyranny [Mr. Ramsay] to the death” on their eventual voyage to the
lighthouse, but Cam realizes that James has simply slipped into Mr. Ramsay’s role, and
she wonders to which one she should “yield” (168). The tyranny the Ramsay children
must resist is twofold: war (which claims Andrew) and the male authority that Mr.
Ramsay represents. If James cannot help but repeat the male authority of his father, he
may not be able to resist the other either.
Woolf further questions where masculine mentorship can lead through the figure
of the mentee who does not succumb to war’s violence, who seems immune to the
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tyranny of war and the tyranny Mr. Ramsay represents to his children: Charles Tansley.
Just as Cambridge harbors the discourse that led to war in Jacob’s Room, the university
again produces a male, rationalist discourse in To the Lighthouse through Tansley.
Tansley, as per Hynes’s “Myth of War,” feels he must speak out against the violence
perpetuated by his elders. The novel’s final pages depict him as an anti-war speaker,
“denouncing something: he was condemning somebody,” Lily thinks (197). But this is
not the break with the old values that is seems. Instead, it is only an unwitting echo of
Tansley’s dissertation, which was, as Mrs. Ramsay had thought, about “the influence of
something upon somebody” (23). Tansley, the epitome of mentorship’s potential, is still
very much a product of that mentorship even though the subject of his discourse has
superficially changed. It is still that male, rationalist discourse of Jacob’s Room, even
though Tansley didn’t have to die.
But while he lives, Charles Tansley offers only false hope for mentorship.
William Bankes sees him as the potential spokesman for the next generation: looking at
him during a political discussion, Bankes thinks, “perhaps…here is the man. One was
always waiting for the man…for Mr. Tansley seemed to be saying, You have wasted your
lives. You are all of you wrong. Poor old fogies, you’re hopelessly behind the times…he
had courage; he had ability; he was extremely well up in the facts” (94). But Tansley,
because of the very allowances of mentorship, seems to promise only repetition of the
same old rationales. Bankes’s “courage” and “ability” echo Tennyson; his praise of
Tansley’s being “well up in the facts” only underscores the persistence of old male
rationales. Tansley is Mr. Ramsay’s brightest protégé, the one who imagines himself
“gowned and hooded, walking in a procession” of young men led by Mr. Ramsay, and he
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ends up with a lifestyle very similar to his mentor’s, having received a fellowship, gotten
married, living in Golder’s Green, and making Lily Briscoe shudder every time she sees
him (196). Resistance to tyranny—both patriarchal and political—is done emptily; its
transmission is continued through an institutionalized mentorship. Mr. Ramsay has
indeed lived according to his dictum that one needs “the power to endure,” since he lives
on just as much through Charles Tansley as he does through his biological children.
Mentorship privileges that which endures, but Woolf believes it does so at a time when
history’s events do not merit endurance. As Tansley represents the potential successes for
men under the auspices of mentorship, he also represents their failure, since he cannot
move beyond that tired “power to endure,” leaving mentorship floundering in endless
repetition.

III. Male Mentorship in Decline
I have argued that To the Lighthouse presents mentorship as a masculine
institution, one that transmits traditional male values through the university structure. In
light of the Great War, the novel associates this male mentorship with a justification of
violence that precipitated a war Woolf considered unjust. As a result, mentorship in To
the Lighthouse is thrown into question: it produces institutionalized repetition of these
values, leaving Woolf wondering what can possibly remain as a viable subject of cultural
transmission. No such possibilities exist in Jacobs Room, since the novel ends with the
very absence of any transmission. All of Jacob’s knowledge acquired at Cambridge leads
to what it is not there—Jacob, whose profound vacancy fills the room. But in To the
Lighthouse, this knowledge is transmuted into physical terms, tangible proof of its
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existence; Woolf assigns to male knowledge a very literal “power to endure.” 45 In To the
Lighthouse, material goods are more than the luxury commodities enjoyed by the refined
men at Oxford and Cambridge mentioned in A Room of One’s Own or the haunting
presence of Jacob’s shoes as a reminder of the steps he took at Cambridge. Cultural
knowledge in To the Lighthouse itself can and does come to be measured in strictly
material terms. Mr. Ramsay’s books are about “subject and object and the nature of
reality” (23); James Ramsay is introduced as literally sitting in a pile of things; Tansley
talks about his dissertation, as well as the possibility of a fellowship, professorship,
readership, and a lectureship, tangible, noun-based markers of intellectual status or
cultural capital.46 Male rationales and male knowledge are the subjects of mentorship as I
have outlined it, and they come to be defined in the novel as too rational, too tangible, too
similar to the “of property, of property, of property” passed down in Three Guineas. I
believe that Woolf articulates through the association of male mentorship with
“thingness” her particular problems with the male discourse that mentorship naturalizes.
Only then can she finally allude to alternate possibilities for a less exclusionary
mentorship. In opposition to men’s material needs, Woolf positions women and their
rejection of this materialism in favor of feeling.
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Whenever the artist, Lily Briscoe, tries to comprehend Mr. Ramsay’s work, “she
always saw clearly before her a large kitchen table” (23). Lily blames this mental image
on Andrew: when she asks him what his father’s books were about, he replies, “Subject
and object and the nature of reality.” Lily is, understandably, still confused: “And when
she said Heavens, she had no notion what that meant. ‘Think of a kitchen table then,’ he
told her, ‘when you’re not there’” (23). The passage evokes the reflective work of John
Maynard Keynes, Woolf’s Bloomsbury friend. In “My Early Beliefs,” Keynes reflects on
his intellectual life within his Cambridge milieu. Early Bloomsbury, Keynes shares, was
indebted to G.E. Moore’s Principia Ethica, from which he and his friends learned that
“Nothing mattered except states of mind, our own and other people’s of course, but
chiefly our own.”47 Keynes recalls “the beauty of the literalness of Moore’s mind,”
claiming, “But even when he was awake, he could not distinguish love and beauty and
truth from the furniture. They took on the same definition of outline, the same stable,
solid, objective qualities and common-sense reality.”48 Moore’s philosophy is, of course,
infinitely more complicated than a passing reference to furniture, but the tradition Keynes
describes here is in fundamental ways that same rationalist discourse I discussed above.
Keynes, a Liberal himself, implicates this rationalism in creating a too-objective world
view that undervalues human emotion, a view that began to wear thin even in the years
leading up to the Great War, and completely collapsed afterwards.49 By literally
objectifying the male transmission that came out of Cambridge, Woolf parodies this
47
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outlook, taking aim at the entire system of a phony progressivism associated with
Cambridge that did not turn out to be, in her argument, progressive at all.
Even upon realizing that “we completely misunderstood human nature,” Keynes
reverts to an affirmation of mentorship:
It did not occur to us to respect the extraordinary accomplishment of our
predecessors in the ordering of life (as it now seems to me to have been) or the
elaborate framework which they had devised to protect this order…we had lost
something which our predecessors had without replacing it. I still suffer incurably
from attributing an unreal rationality to other people’s feelings and behaviour.50
Keynes, while he acknowledges that Moore “left out altogether some whole categories of
human emotion,” reflects a bit too nostalgically on the traditions from which Bloomsbury
grew. Keynes situates Moore’s philosophy into a greater tradition that echoes what I have
called male mentorship:
I have said that we were amongst the first to escape from Benthanism. But of
another eighteenth-century heresy we were the unrepentant heirs and last
upholders. We were among the last of the Utopians, or meliorists as they are
sometimes called, who believe in a continuing moral progress by virtue of which
the human race already consists of reliable, rational, decent people, influenced by
truth and objective standards...51
Keynes concedes that his philosophy is not sustainable in a post-1914 society; he even
regrets the snobbishness and lack of “vulgar passions” suffered by early Bloomsbury and
acknowledges that D.H. Lawrence might justly have felt some distaste for “intellectual
chic.” However, he identifies the problem as belonging to a particular historical moment
rather than a flawed institutionalized norm; he sees Moore’s rationalism as a misguided
development of a longer held intellectual transmission, but never questions the validity or
50
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fruitfulness of this transmission’s history.52 By emphasizing material goods as markers of
a languishing male mentorship, Woolf is not claiming that physical things are not worth
having (that would, of course, undermine the foundation of A Room of One’s Own), but
that the intellectual tradition that shuts women out of such transmission is lacking in a
more full and vibrant understanding of humanity that could offer a sustainable outlook in
a postwar society. She characterizes male mentorship by placing it firmly at odds with
that which it overlooks: the intangible, the irrational, the lack of authority.
Woolf underscores the frailty of male mentorship by making it reliant on women,
the very people it rejects. Women have a distinctly non-Rationalist agenda in the novel.
Male mentorship is indeed in need of sustenance, and it turns to women to provide it.
Mrs. Ramsay, with her son in her lap, demonstrates to James that “into this delicious
fecundity, this fountain and spray of life, the fatal sterility of the male plunged itself, like
a beak of brass, barren and bare” (37). Without Mrs. Ramsay to birth his children and
support his authority, Mr. Ramsay cannot pass on anything. As Cucullu explains, the
Ramsays each acknowledge their “complicity in and responsibility for reproducing social
order.”53 While Mrs. Ramsay lacks power in the social order, she recognizes that she
facilitates that male authority: “Indeed, she had the whole of the other sex under her
protection; for reasons she could not explain, for their chivalry and valorous, for the fact
that they negotiated treaties, ruled India, controlled finance…” Because of women, men
are able to build up those authoritative rationales that justify their increasing power. But
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this power that men exercise as a result of the allowances that mentorship permits them is
not stable or self-sustaining. Indeed, one of the book’s main harbingers of male authority,
Tennyson’s poem, comes to foreshadow the decline of male mentorship, as Mrs. Ramsay
appropriates the poem for her own understanding of male weakness:
But what had happened?
Some one had blundered.
Starting from her musing she gave meaning to words which she had held
in her mind for a long stretch of time. ‘Some one had blundered’ Fixing
her short-sighted eyes upon her husband, who was now bearing down
upon her, she gazed steadily until his closeness revealed to her…that
something had happened, some one had blundered. But she could not for
the life of her think what.
He shivered; he quivered. All his vanity, all his satisfaction in his own
splendour, riding fell as a thunderbolt, fierce as a hawk at the head of his
men through the valley of death, had been shattered, destroyed. (30)
With an emphasis on the poem’s “blunder,” Mrs. Ramsay realizes the feebleness of the
language of truth, courage, and endurance that are the source of her husband’s strength.
While she cannot articulate exactly why, she knows that the steadfastness of Mr.
Ramsay’s power is waning, unable to progress beyond the blunder. Seeing that he is
“outraged and anguished,” she wants to soothe him, but does so by retreating to the
mentorship he has come to rely upon, and instead comforts their son: “She stroked
James’s head; she transferred to him what she felt for her husband…” Here, Mrs. Ramsay
is equally implicated in male mentorship—it depends on women’s participation, on Mrs.
Ramsay teaching her daughters to emulate her role as a supporter to her husband; Cam,
by the novel’s end, embodies exactly such mentorship as she tries to bring comfort to Mr.
Ramsay.54 Mrs. Ramsay takes on the role of Coventry Patmore’s famed “Angel of the
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House,” made ironic in Woolf’s essay “Professions for Women.” According to Cucullu,
this Angel of the House is keenly interested in reproduction, but in biological and social
forms rather than cultural. The social reproduction undertaken by the Angel is the
marriage and moral piety that Mrs. Ramsay herself propagates. The biological and social
reproduction for which women are responsible—marriage, children, and harmony in the
home—are separate from male cultural procession, but are charged with sustaining it. If
male cultural procession leads to war’s devastation, Mrs. Ramsay’s emotion and
sympathy are aimed at soothing and healing over that devastation.55
As Bazin and Lauter claim, women’s subordination to men while inflating their
egos has direct impact on society: “When such actions are done to further civilization or
knowledge, all is well. Sometimes, however, a man’s inflated ego makes him overtly
self-confident, pompous, and dictatorial: his behavior then becomes fascistic. He imposes
his will on others, by force if necessary.”56 While Bazin and Lauter assume a bit too easy
a link between patriarchy and violence, they are right to point out that women play a role
in enabling this patriarchy. For Bazin and Lauter, women’s subordination is proof of
patriarchy’s tyranny. I suggest though that Woolf is actually commenting on the
unsustainability of a male system that relies so thoroughly on female support. The
university plays a key role in the ways Mrs. Ramsay chooses to mollify her husband. She
sees herself as infinitely inferior to Mr. Ramsay, in part because of the prestige granted to
him by universities; she holds his position up as a kind of lighthouse in itself, a place she
female mentorship into which they have been raised has been hitherto used as a supplement to male
mentorship.
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admires but never can achieve.57 She chooses to revive Mr. Ramsay by turning to the
institution that is the seat of male mentorship’s strength, the university, and offers up
Charles Tansley—not her sons—as proof of her husband’s virility, as a way of allaying
Mr. Ramsay’s concern that he is a “failure.” Mr. Ramsay’s response asks Mrs. Ramsay to
also use her gift of feeling to restore him, to remind him of his intellectual talents: “But
he must have more than that. It was sympathy he wanted, to be assured of his genius, first
of all, and then to be taken within the circle of life, warmed and soothed, to have his
senses restored to him, his barrenness made fertile, and all the rooms of the house made
full of life” (37). Mrs. Ramsay’s emotion works in harmony with male institutional
transmission: reminded of his mentee’s devotion and his own intellectual rigor, then
finally bolstered his wife’s sympathy, Mr. Ramsay is comforted.
In further proof of male mentorship’s need for female sustenance, Mrs. Ramsay
extends her sympathy to Tansley himself, reviving him by “insinuating…the greatness of
man’s intellect, even in its decay, the subjection of all wives” (10-11). Mr. Ramsay can
give to Tansley access to male mentorship, but it is Mrs. Ramsay who grooms the young
man as to how to sustain it through wifely subjection. She gives Tansley a model of what
to want or expect. Mrs. Ramsay soothes her son’s sadness, her husband’s feared
“sterility,” and now soothes this mentee, too. As a result, “for the first time in his life
Charles Tansley felt an extraordinary pride; a man digging in a drain stopped digging and
looked at her, let his arm fall down and looked at her; for the first time in his life Charles
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Tansley felt an extraordinary pride; felt the wind and the cyclamen and the violets for he
was walking with a beautiful woman. He had hold of her bag” (14).58 Armed with a
physical souvenir of Mrs. Ramsay, he is rejuvenated, repeating his own praise. This is
Mrs. Ramsay’s gift; her social and biological reproduction ensures reproduction of men’s
culture. It must, because this male culture, with its overemphasis on the tangibles of
academic rank and material acquisition, is not self-sustaining.

IV. Women’s Mentorship
Mrs. Ramsay’s attempts at reviving a decaying male mentorship, though, result
only in ensuring its monotonous repetition since, as I have claimed, it no longer has
anything to offer other than now-hollow rationales. In response, Woolf proposes in the
novel a model of mentorship that entails a specifically female form of cultural
transmission, a transmission that does not have the goal of sustaining male social order.
Denied access to Cambridge herself, Woolf wants a radically different mentorship, one
that does not rely on the university. When Woolf shuts women out of Cambridge in To
the Lighthouse, she does so not necessarily because they cannot grasp the subject matter
taught, but because they cannot see the university as a framework through which to study
and reproduce social order in the way that men do. Women in To the Lighthouse prove
themselves equally capable as men in terms of thinking about social problems, but they
do not have the same resources. Mrs. Ramsay, while she considers herself an
“investigator, elucidating the social problem,” can think about the problems of “rich and
poor… employment and unemployment,” but she is powerless to do anything about
58
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them—“insoluble questions they were, it seemed to her” (9). Mr. Ramsay, though,
reserves his thinking “for the young men at Cardiff next month.” Men have the
university’s sponsorship for isolating social problems; women do not.
To some extent, this turn is anticipated as early as Woolf’s The Voyage Out.
Rachel Vinrace enters the novel as a kind of clean slate, raised isolated and without any
substantial education. She is a typical “daughter of educated men” as her father,
Willoughby, committed “nameless atrocities with regard to his daughter” that leave
Rachel uneducated in terms of more basic knowledge, such as “the shape of the earth, the
history of the world, how trains worked, or money was invested.” 59 Completely devoid
of any mentored skill, Rachel also lacks the knowledge of how to read other people’s
emotions. Rachel’s Aunt Helen attempts to mentor Rachel at least in the art of emotion,
but ultimately all she can offer Rachel is the same type of mentorship that Woolf would
later criticize—one centering on men. In this case, that man is Terence, who is very much
the son of an educated man. Woolf puts Rachel in a bind where the terms of mentorship
cancel each other out: as with Philip Wakem and Maggie Tulliver, Terence can transmit
his Oxbridge knowledge to Rachel, but the only institution to which he can grant her
access is marriage. Rachel has not received male or female mentorship, and when she is
suddenly offered both—by Terence and by Helen—there is no way for her to bring the
two together in any workable way. Rachel and Helen, in trying to use the structures of
masculine mentorship, cannot succeed. Rachel’s death at the end of the novel signals the
impossibility of a women’s mentorship that simply plugs women into a male equation.
If Tansley himself were to offer an explanation for Mrs. Ramsay’s inability to
wrap her head around her husband’s work, for example, it would be because women do
59
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not engage in activity that produces physical transmission.“Yes, it was pretty well true,
[Tansley] thought. They never got anything worth having from one year’s end to another.
They did nothing but talk, talk, talk, eat, eat, eat. It was the women’s fault. Women made
civilization impossible with all their ‘charm,’ all their silliness” (85). Women are here
accused of being antithetical to the “civilized”; the graspable information indicative of a
mentored male culture directly conflicts with what women know and have. Woolf herself
concedes this point in “Women and Fiction”: “Often nothing tangible remains of a
woman’s day. The food that has been cooked is eaten; the children that have been nursed
have gone out into the world.”60 In a way, then, Tansley is correct. If women were to
apply the mentorship model to the physical objects to which they are granted access,
women’s culture would be sorry indeed. For all that women have to pass down in terms
of tangible transmission are recipes, such as Mrs. Ramsay’s grandmother’s recipe for
Boeuf en Daube, and jewelry, like the lost brooch of Minta Doyle’s grandmother. The
acquisition of these physical goods means nothing to Mrs. Ramsay: “it was all one
stream, and chairs, tables, maps, were hers, were theirs, it did not matter whose, and Paul
and Minta would carry it on when she was dead” (113-4). For women, physical objects
are just that—objects. They are neither the markers of cultural transmission nor the
markers of endurance required by men.
Woolf identifies women as upholding the value of emotion, which is precisely
intangible, in stark contrast to the tangible items that have come to characterize the futile
remains of male mentorship. After the gastronomical triumph that is her perfectly cooked
French beef, she reflects on her feelings of peace and rest, “Of such moments, she
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thought, the thing is made that endures” (105). Her concern with endurance indicates her
attempts to appropriate Mr. Ramsay’s “power to endure” for women. As such, Woolf
proposes a radical shift in the way feelings are used. In the holograph manuscript of the
novel appears a glimpse of what Woolf was trying to accomplish with her negation of
male mentorship. The sketch for the “Time Passes” section looks like this:
“Hopeless gulfs of misery.
Cruelty.
The War.
Change. Oblivion.”
And then, “human vitality”61
This “human vitality” is Mrs. Ramsay’s true gift; it survives her and it fills a real gap felt
in a postwar society. Reading the scene in A Room of One’s Own where Woolf reflects on
a Cambridge dinner party, Hermione Lee claims that Woolf believed that romance was
the missing presence. “Romance is something that one finds in the poetry of Tennyson
and Christina Rossetti,” Woolf said, “something that ‘celebrates some feeling that one
used to have’, back then, before the war.”62 Tennyson can be refigured, moved toward
“human vitality” rather than “shock and shell.”63 Lee finds that many of Woolf’s
characters—Betty Flanders, Mrs. Dalloway, Mrs. Ramsay—feel it; and so do her men,
such as Mr. Ramsay, Septimus Smith, and Peter Walsh. “In their minds,” Lee claims,
“memories hover of an earlier time before the war, a time that seemed to hold more
promise, and a sad sense that time is gone.”64 Woolf proposes in To the Lighthouse, then,
a radically different subject as the object of transmission, shunning altogether the
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intellectual rationalism that is the subject of male mentorship’s now-futile transmission.
She turns to the power she grants Mrs. Ramsay, the other kind of knowledge that Rachel
Vinrace lacks: that of sympathy and feeling, the power of human vitality.
Woolf establishes here a new form of knowledge to be passed on, an argument
consistent with Cuddy-Keane’s claim that Woolf “developed an alternative pedagogy
outside the educational institutions.”65 Much like Arnold’s vision of culture, this
alternative pedagogy promotes a classless, democratic, but intellectual readership. While
she evokes in some ways Arnold’s sense of culture as a far-reaching intellectualism,
however, Woolf is eager to remove culture from the institution-based mentorship Arnold
advocated. Woolf’s alternative pedagogy for women is based on intimacy and the
ephemeral and is intended to extend mentorship beyond its exclusionary past, the
exclusions Hardy and Forster felt so keenly. Once Woolf hurls that famous inkpot at the
Angel of the House, Mrs. Ramsay has the power to become not the propagator of a life to
suit men’s own needs, but the subject of women’s mentorship. Perhaps anticipating her
later claim in A Room of One’s Own that women think back through their mothers, Woolf
seeks to transform those feelings of unity and sympathy into a cultural transmission that
moves beyond biological or social reproduction. While Mrs. Plumer can only ponder her
role as support to her husband and pass that vague ideal to her daughters, Mrs. Ramsay
concerns herself with actively transmitting something that is really worth having.
Although she supports male mentorship, she simultaneously begins to shape a uniquely
female mentorship that is independent of male need. The ephemeral quality of Rose’s
fruit bowl arrangements, meant to be eaten; of Mrs. Ramsay’s harmonious dinner parties;
of her sympathy for the lighthouse boy with the tubercular hip; these become the objects
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of transmission. According to this women’s mentorship model, culture becomes
associated with precisely what is not meant for keeping, but for feeling. So when Cucullu
claims that the expulsion of the Angel of the House “makes space for a revised social
calculus and new cultural formations,” we can see Woolf appropriating the male
mentorship model, a cultural formation, for the feelings of unity and harmony that
women see as what should endure.
Just as Tansley, who is not Ramsay’s son, shows that masculine mentorship is
more than biological and social reproduction, I suggest that Lily Briscoe is the
experimental subject for women’s mentorship, arguing for women’s “cultural
reproduction,” as Cucullu would call it. Lily, whose rejection of marriage signifies her
rejection of the institutionality associated with male mentorship, learns at Mrs. Ramsay’s
knee the art of feeling. Lily aims to transmit the art of feeling to future generations not in
the traditional role of marriage that Mrs. Ramsay envisions for her daughters, but by
capturing it in her painting. Mrs. Ramsay’s love, she believes, “was meant to be spread
over the world and become part of the human gain.” “Could loving,” she asks, “make her
and Mrs. Ramsay one? For it was not knowledge but unity she desired, not inscriptions
on tablets, nothing that could be written in any language known to men, but intimacy
itself, which is knowledge, she had thought” (47; 51). Lily returns to the Ramsay house
after the war, at the close of the “Time Passes” section. Where the remains of war are
strewn about, with the house fallen into disrepair, Lily enters, and “Then indeed peace
had come” (142). She seems primed to duplicate Mrs. Ramsay: she sees all the old
characters (or at least those who have survived), feels the same fear of Mr. Ramsay, and
finds him still begging for sympathy. However, she enters with the promise of a radically
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different, postwar mentorship of peace. Lily strives to make something enduring of the
unity characteristic of her mentor, capturing Mrs. Ramsay’s adage, “Life stand still here.”
Lily builds on Mrs. Ramsay’s efforts at making feeling a lasting, transmissible entity:
“Mrs. Ramsay making of the moment something permanent (as in another sphere Lily
herself tried to make of the moment something permanent)—this was the nature of a
revelation.” Struck by a “moment of stability,” Lily thinks she has found a way to be the
subject of Mrs. Ramsay’s mentorship if only she can use her art to the capture
permanence of feeling (161).

V. Rejecting Women’s Mentorship
It is difficult to argue, though, for the success of Mrs. Ramsay’s mentoring Lily.
How would such transmission be measured? The problem is spelled out at the end of the
novel’s first section, “The Window,” when Mrs. Ramsay, reflecting on her bliss, thinks to
herself, “Nothing on earth can equal this happiness” (124). It is not that the happiness as
an emotion is unparalleled, but that it cannot be duplicated in experience; how can one
replicate the precise emotions association with a particular moment? The qualifier, “this
happiness,” points to the specificity of circumstance on which every behavior depends.
Harmony, peace, love, and intimacy can be modeled, but not ultimately transmitted. Lily
can admire Mrs. Ramsay and even strive to capture her likeness in a painting, but the
female mentorship she seeks is as unsustainable as the masculine mentorship she resists.
Mrs. Ramsay’s refrain, “Life stand still here,” is simply an impossible achievement.
And so I conclude that mentorship of all types fails as the Great War enters in the
novel’s interlude, “Time Passes.” Here, masculine mentorship finally is rendered hollow,
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as the Ramsay family furniture sits unused and Mr. Ramsay’s prized Waverley novels
mildew on their shelves.66 The physical markers of cultural transmission eventually rot
from disuse. The inheritors of these empty objects are lost, as well, as Andrew and Prue
Ramsay, the son and daughter of an educated man, both die. Andrew is slain instantly by
the “shot and shell” glorified by Tennyson, and Prue dies in childbirth in a failed
expression of the biological reproduction that was women’s domain. And, most
profoundly, Mrs. Ramsay, the family’s unifying force, the wellspring of her husband’s
virility, dies quietly in her sleep. Mentorship and transmission are cut off radically at all
levels. There is nothing left to endure. Lily’s redemptive end comes not from her being
successfully mentored, but from her recognizing the futility of mentorship as a model of
cultural transmission. “[Mrs. Ramsay] was dead,” Lily reflects. “The step where she used
to sit was empty. She was dead. But why repeat this over and over again? Why be always
trying to bring up some feeling she had not got? There was a kind of blasphemy in it. It
was all dry: all withered: all spent” (150). Mentorship and its associated repetitions, both
masculine and feminine, have died. Woolf, having identified all the problems with male
mentorship, cannot find a viable solution for women either except the final, regretful
rejection of the mentor.
That Lily ultimately completes a painting speaks to her realizing this very
rejection. She sees Mr. Ramsay and “His immense self-pity, his demand for sympathy
poured and spread itself in pools at her feet, and all she did, miserable sinner that she
was, was to draw her skirts a little closer round her ankles, lest she should get wet” (152).
Lily is overwhelmed: “All Lily wished was that this enormous flood of grief, this
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insatiable hunger for sympathy, this demand that she should surrender herself up to him
entirely, and even so he had sorrows enough to keep her supplied for ever, should leave
her, should be diverted…before it swept her down into its flow” (151). Lily is given the
opportunity to use the gift of sympathy she learned from Mrs. Ramsay, but she resists.
Ultimately, that sympathy would once again only revive men; women’s mentorship
cannot get around patriarchy. A procession of Ramsays marches before her, and finally,
“the hope of sympathy and the desire for praise, had entered some other region, was
drawn on, as if by curiosity, in dumb colloquy, whether with himself or another, at the
head of that little procession out of one’s range… The gate banged” (156). Only at that
moment of radical rupture is Lily ready to resume her painting—“Where to begin?”— to
use her power of feeling for her own expression, for the first time (157).
Lily experiences a moment of courageous failure: she knows, per Mrs. Ramsay’s
mentoring, that she should praise and pity the patriarch but is, thankfully, unable to do it.
“She had felt,” she claims, “now she could stand up to Mrs. Ramsay—a tribute to the
astonishing power that Mrs. Ramsay had over one” (176). And as she picks up her
paintbrush, she leaves behind her desire to somehow capture the essence of Mrs.
Ramsay’s feelings in symbolic terms. Instead, she “tunnels” through the past,
illuminating its darkness with her own collected impressions. She is no longer concerned
with painting as a transmissible form. Instead, she accepts that the painting will be “hung
in attics…it would be destroyed” (208). Lily’s success is in realizing that, in her own
words, “what did that matter?”
If the novel is, as Alex Zwerdling insists, “concerned with [Woolf’s] sense of
institutional and ideological change and continuity,” and simultaneously interested in
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Cuddy-Keane’s claim that Woolf pursues the pedagogical outside institutional
boundaries, then my claims regarding mentorship signal an ideological change.67 Cultural
continuity cannot happen in the borders of any institution, be it Cambridge or the country
house. And it is in this way that the failure of mentorship in To the Lighthouse lays the
groundwork for Woolf’s denunciation of mentorship in Three Guineas. There, she calls
for “finding new words and creating new methods …by remaining outside your
society…” (219). This culture of outsiders, is the legacy of Lily Briscoe. An outsider to
the Ramsay family and the institutions the family represents, only she is granted an
illuminated perspective.
The language of exteriority Woolf uses is the same as Sue Bridehead’s—the only
woman mentor in Jude the Obscure. For Sue and for Woolf, the cultural capital being
offered is simply not worth having. In this sense, the very real Woolf can denounce
mentorship in ways Sue Bridehead could not. Sue regrets not being better able to lie to
Little Father Time about the society that shuns him, but Woolf refuses to acquiesce to the
tyranny of mentorship. When the outsider says in Three Guineas, “in fact, as a woman, I
have no country. As a woman I want no country. As a woman my country is the whole
world,” we can see Lily, on the novel’s final page, rejecting the institutions that have
stifled her for too long: “It was done; it was finished” (209). The ending of the novel,
Lee claims, “is poised between arriving and returning, getting somewhere…and being
finished.”68 Lily arrives at the realization that mentorship has ended; cultural
transmission must come from somewhere else. Her strength comes in finally refusing to
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support it any longer. Refuting male mentorship’s authority and women’s support of it
entirely, Woolf assumes her radical position of outsidership in Three Guineas, where, as
a woman refusing the limitations of her “country,” she strongly denies tyranny on all
fronts.
While she may abandon mentorship, though, Woolf cannot abandon education.
To understand how the “daughters of educated men” are to morph into a “society of
outsiders” is to understand, according to my argument, Woolf’s particular criticism of
mentorship as an exclusionary model of cultural transmission. Woolf does not, however,
deny the value of a university education. The “daughters of educated men” are
mentorship’s victims, while the projected, idealized “society of outsiders” is to have
somehow done away with it. In a way, she falls into the same trap as did Arnold. As she
makes clear in A Room of One’s Own, Woolf happily associates culture with a vaunted
tradition of classical learning, and she wants it to be freely accessible regardless of class
or gender. She cannot, however, propose a viable model for this. She cannot construct
either a brand new type of mentorship that is bereft of patriarchal overtones, or a whole
new way of transmitting knowledge that is not mentorship at all. As were Arnold’s
sovereign educators, her “outsiders” are intended to assist with cultural transmission, but
even though Woolf rejects mentorship, she cannot propose a viable alternative.
Where a culture of outsiders will suffer is that education provides the “daughters
of educated men” with training, and hence self-earned income, which emancipates these
daughters from their fathers and brothers: “Since it is beyond the power of her family to
punish her financially she can express her own opinions. In place of the admirations and
antipathies which were often unconsciously dictated by the need of money she can
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declare her genuine likes and dislikes. In short, she need not acquiesce; she can criticize”
(21). So, if the daughters of educated men want to stop war, then they must continue to
educate themselves in whatever capacity they can, since “[i]f there were no means of
training them to earn their livings, there would be an end of that influence.” This
influence requires using their meager income to support peace, and is the sole social
influence available to the daughters of educated men. Only through economic capital can
they gain any social capital, but this economic capital can only come from engaging with
institutions of education. Daughters of educated men are victimized by mentorship, but
still somehow must rely on it; they can never really be “outside.” Lily’s rejection of
mentorship proposes a system of outsidership that may not be viable in the face of social
and political upheaval in the face of a looming war.
The paralysis Woolf feels shapes her final novel, Between the Acts, which is
fundamentally pessimistic in that the failure of mentorship present in the novel points to
political inequities that cannot be overcome. Miss La Trobe exemplifies the “culture of
outsiders” for which Woolf argues in Three Guineas, but all La Trobe can produce is a
pageant play that reproduces an insular culture. This insularity is the problem Jed Esty
outlines in A Shrinking Island, where he argues that English intellectuals try to integrate
social and aesthetic power in a resurgence of national culture: “For Woolf, as for Powys,
Eliot, and Forster, pageantry was a dramatic genre that could allow the emergence of a
choral voice, giving form to communal values rather than to individual impressions or
divisive ideologies. The desirability of a collective or impersonal voice had become an
urgent political as well as aesthetic matter in the period.”69 In the face of the Fascist
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threat, Woolf is inclined to reach out to a more inclusive view of “national tradition,”
seeking to redefine it ways that reflect her “troubled half-love for England.”70 If women’s
mentorship in To the Lighthouse probes possibilities for a radical break from English
tradition, Between the Acts, according to Esty’s reading, only comes back to the
uncertainty of what comes next. But in light of her concern with mentorship, Woolf’s
pessimism for her artists stands out amid Esty’s sympathetic reading. Lily Briscoe and
Miss La Trobe are drawn into portraying a culture that does not accommodate them.
Woolf in To the Lighthouse and Three Guineas rejects mentorship, but does not know
how to stop its influence. Further, she cannot assign lasting and meaningful significance
to the culture of outsiders that offers any promise for the future. As Woolf wonders in
“Women and Fiction,” how can a woman combine the “emotional,” “intellectual,” and
“political”? This may be the real tragedy of Between the Acts: as the mirror is turned on
the audience, they too are mired in mere repetition.
Woolf rejects empty indicators of cultural capital and she considers the
limitations of a culture of feeling or emotion, but she never questions whether an
education associated with culture is worthwhile. Turning to the literature of the thirties at
the beginning of my next chapter, however, I take Woolf’s argument to a further
conclusion. If, as she claims, cultural transmission is inherently political and must be
radically cut off in order to stop the perpetuation of tyranny, then what should become of
culture itself? Culture is not immune from the political threat, and that threat increased
exponentially in the face of World War II. Culture by that point most definitely is no
longer the straightforward process of virtue and study that Arnold wanted, since Arnold’s
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prescription of culture as a cure for political strife is patently inadequate in the face of the
Fascist threat Woolf feared. With the close of World War II, Woolf’s radical claim that
mentorship must end proves to not be radical enough.
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Chapter 4
“Culture Cannot Compensate”: Parodic Mentorship and the Rise of the Welfare State
“Ridicule is the only honorable weapon we have left.”
—Muriel Spark, “The Desegregation of Art”
In my earlier chapters, I demonstrated that mentorship’s failures in the novels of
Hardy, Forster, and Woolf point to the modernist-era assertion that Oxbridge culture
could no longer be passed down effectively. In this chapter, I argue that as the modernist
era drew to a close, writers who doubted the transmissibility of culture also called into
question culture’s fundamental worth. “It is a commonplace to-day that culture is at a
crisis,” F.R. Leavis writes in his Mass Civilisation and Minority Culture (1930).1 Even
though Leavis’s call for an English curriculum as the response to this crisis may have
been controversial (Paul Fussell calls his work “vigorously self-righteous, moralistic,
[and] badly written”), he was not the only one to note the correlation between education
and a culture in crisis.2 His growing apprehension over the relationship between
education and cultural preservation was also felt by other writers of the period, including
Kingsley Amis and Evelyn Waugh. The thirties saw a widespread recognition of the
problem of cultural transmission that Hardy and Forster identified, but these writers did
not share Leavis’s optimism that the culture transmitted by the university was worth
salvaging. In my final examination of the mentor, I argue that mentorship has been made
parodic, a comic symbol of the absurdity of continuing to pass on a culture finally seen as
anachronistic and irrelevant.
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If mentorship, as I will argue, ceased to transmit meaningful or significant values,
it was because education was felt to be of little use or consequence. Amis famously takes
such a position on education in Lucky Jim (1954), but the origins of that novel’s argument
are in Amis’s own experience of education: “I went up to Oxford in the spring of 1941,”
writes Amis in his Memoirs (1991), “in impeccably proletarian style, being driven over
from my parents’ house in Berkhamsted by the family butcher in his battered Morris, and
approaching the wrong way up Plough Lane.”3 In keeping with his awkward entrance,
Amis finds his university years increasingly discomfiting, hardly the “magic years” of
academic rigor and personal growth described nostalgically by E.M. Forster. The
intellectual debate foregrounded in The Longest Journey has been replaced by banal
banter from “worthy dullards” over the vulgarity of kid gloves.4 The gloves become a
fitting image—surely they, too, are “proletarian”— as Amis’s description of Oxford puts
academics aside and focuses instead on the Oxford lifestyle, simultaneously mocking and
mourning the leisure culture so long associated with the university. Unlike his harshly
aimed criticism of nineteen-sixties Cambridge (which he associated exclusively with
tiresome dinner parties and frippery), Amis’s take on nineteen-forties Oxford is
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somewhat more ambivalent as his trademark wit is undercut by a strong sense of loss: he
characterizes Oxford by what it no longer is, couching it in terms of a steady decline.5
Taking Evelyn Waugh’s Brideshead Revisited (1945) as counterpoint, Amis
depicts Oxford as languishing. The homosocial camaraderie Waugh celebrates in Charles
Ryder and Sebastian Flyte comes to be replaced by isolation and drudgery. Though
greeted warmly by a sherry party hosted by friends,
[t]his initial blaze of glory did not last, was untypical. After a year and a half of
war smart Oxford, anything like the Oxford to be seen in Brideshead Revisited,
was shut for the duration, much of it never to reopen…Oxford had been changing,
certainly since 1939, perhaps longer, a change accelerated but not, I think, caused
by the war. Elegance (foppery) was losing ground to purposefulness
(philistinism). In Brideshead Revisited, the novel par excellence of pre-war
Oxford, though written in retrospect and not published until 1945, nobody ever
seems to go near an exam even in thought, let alone deed—simply being there at
the university was the point of going to it. In 1946-48 it was sometimes as if
exams filled the world.6
In this nostalgic look back at Brideshead Revisited, Amis suggests that Flyte’s “foppery”
is a youthful indiscretion, part of the carefree lifestyle afforded by Oxford. Waugh’s
young men are a positive version of Amis’s own fellow undergraduates, who he
characterizes as “not working, getting drunk, and pursuing young women.”7 The
Brideshead characters do not need to participate in academic studies because "culture" is
something they already have and have had long before attending Oxford by virtue of their
upper-class upbringing. Flyte can leave Oxford without a degree and not stir up much
5
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disappointment since the university is merely an add-on, another experience of leisure.
Amid this cultured oasis, Waugh grants his characters refined aesthetic taste and social
insight, namely Flyte’s luxuriously hedonistic lifestyle and Anthony Blanche’s wry yet
perceptive wit, outside of any academic context. Presenting another version of Forster’s
Cambridge dormitory debate about a cow and philosophy, Waugh makes Oxford a
gathering place for discussion that is not necessarily dependent upon classroom learning.
For Amis, however, this cultured camaraderie was on the decline. When he pits
the exams that “filled the world” against the ease and joy of “simply being there,” he
points to the loss of the social and intellectual heritage outlined by Forster, hinting that it
has been replaced by a concern for performance and stark utility that may come at the
expense of an appreciation for the arts. Evoking Matthew Arnold, Amis alludes to this
culture of exams as “philistinism.” The “philistines,” Arnold believed, “do not pursue
sweetness and light, but… prefer to them that sort of machinery of business, chapels, teameetings.”8 By the forties, according to Amis, the dreaded philistinism had infiltrated
even the institutions of higher learning that Arnold had thought were immune. Amis
celebrates Waugh’s characters as the vestiges of an Arnoldian ideal society where Oxford
had remained impermeable to philistinism.9 For Charles Ryder, Oxford is hallowed
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because it gives him the opportunity to gain “sweetness and light,” beauty and intellect,
and he can gain them from his friendships rather than academic learning. For Amis,
however, Oxford creeps toward philistinism because its exams do not measure beauty
and intellect, but the dry classroom learning that Waugh rarely even mentions. By
emphasizing the credentializing function of the universities, Amis argues that in the postwar period utilitarianism has finally been assimilated into the universities; the fellowship
and conversation treasured by Forster have disappeared; and Woolf’s prediction that
Oxbridge culture was unsustainable has come true.
In the aftermath of the Great War, Woolf forecasted the end of Oxbridge cultural
transmission on the grounds that it passed on only the values of war. Likewise, for
Waugh writing in the forties, the source of Oxford’s decline is also intertwined expressly
with war: as the army takes over the Marchmain chapel, the country house and its
aristocratic family disappear, the war leaving its indelible mark on the British physical
and cultural landscapes. Brideshead Revisited captures those last moments of Waugh’s
beloved Oxford, a farewell to the university as he had idealized it in its prewar state.
Reflecting on his university days in his Memoirs (1991), however, Amis also identifies
the impact of peace on the forties: “I reached Oxford [for his second year] just nicely in
time for the start of the autumn term, more than ready to throw myself into the tasks of
peace.”10 These tasks of peace, while never defined precisely, seem key to Amis’s
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experience at post-war Oxford. They are, I claim, a possible indicator of how precisely
Oxford became for Amis and his contemporaries the subject of ridicule rather than praise.
To help explain how the tasks of peace could have contributed to Amis’s eventual
distaste for Oxford, I turn to Virginia Woolf’s landmark essay of the forties, “The
Leaning Tower,” in which she explains how a writer’s experience of his education is
colored by the political climate in which he lives. Woolf groups together Leftist writers
from Waugh’s generation and examines the increasingly complex authorial
responsibilities that have come to be associated with an Oxbridge education in the face of
national upheaval. Beginning with an overview of nineteenth-century writers, Woolf
determines that their writing was not affected by the physically distant wars of the
century, from which those writers were completely disconnected. When she asks,
however, “Were the nineteenth-century writers affected by the settled, the peaceful and
prosperous state of England?” the answer is a firm yes.11 Peace grants these writers
“leisure” and “security”: “life was not going to change; they themselves were not going
to change. They could look; and look away” (110). These writers are, to use Woolf’s
metaphor, perched high on a steady tower, a place of privilege and unmoving perspective
that reflects the writers’ own limited experience.
For these early writers, stability had been a benefit of class position and, relatedly,
the education such a position affords. The nineteenth-century writers, Woolf summarizes,
“were all of them fairly well-to-do middle class people. Most had been educated either at
Oxford or at Cambridge” (108). The result of this illustrious education is the “tower” of
Woolf’s title, “[h]e sits…raised above the rest of us; a tower built first on his parents’
11
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station, then on his parents’ gold. It is a tower of the utmost importance; it decides his
angle of vision; it affects his power of communication” (112).12 Class privilege allows for
education, which in turns allows for both the acquisition of writing skill and a stable
perspective or vision that this writing will reflect. This helps to explain, to return to my
argument, the lingering veneration of Oxford and Cambridge found in novels such as
Jude the Obscure and Howards End: university education in these times and for these
authors was wrapped up with a public acknowledgment of having learned a particular art,
as these institutions are the recognized transmitters of a specific cultural capital, or
certain type of recognized knowledge. While acknowledging disparities of class that
make this acquisition frustratingly impossible, these novels reflect back on a historical
moment when institutionalized education was associated readily with stability and
privilege. Even in critique, writers such as Hardy and Forster celebrate the possibility of
institutional education because, for them, this education still makes possible the
preservation and transmission of knowledge and art.
This privileged and stable perspective, however, could not well last much past the
declaration of war in 1914. While the writers of 1914 came to their writing with the same
education and advantage as their predecessors, Woolf suggests, they became increasingly
aware of a growing instability in their own position. The peace following the Great War
was of a different kind than that of the nineteenth century, since the war preceding it had
such lasting and profound effects on both class and politics. In turn, writers could no
longer assume an unaffected position; they must take into account sweeping changes on
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their own home front and an increasing awareness of happenings abroad.13 Moving to the
group of writers that she situates as beginning to write around 1925 (the “Auden
Generation” 14), Woolf relates a writer’s education to emergent political turmoil:
at first sight there seems little difference, in station, in education [from their
predecessors] …They are tower dwellers like their predecessors, the sons of wellto-do parents, who could afford to send them to public schools and universities.
But what a difference in the tower itself, in what they saw from the tower! When
they looked at human life what did they see? Everywhere change; everywhere
revolution. (113-4)
While there may have been “neither war nor revolution in England itself… The books
were written under the influence of change, under the threat of war” (113). With the rise
of communism and fascism, along with increasing political upheaval and uncertainty,
“the tower of middle-class birth and expensive education” begins to lean (113).
Thirties writers become acutely aware of their middle-class birth and privileged
education in ways that make them uncomfortable, creating a conflicted sense of self that
echoes Jude’s disjointed habitus. These writers sense the precariousness of their own
position and first feel “discomfort”; then “self-pity for that discomfort”; finally, this pity
“soon turns to anger—to anger against the builder, against society, for making us
uncomfortable” (114). Awkwardly turned against the society that granted them privilege
in the first place, Woolf argues, they turn to scapegoating and excuse finding, “all very
natural tendencies” (114). Unable to “throw away their capital” as they become
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increasingly aware of the global effects of tyranny and injustice (suffered by those unable
to gain any kind of meaningful capital), they create work “full of discord and bitterness,
full of confusion and compromise” (115). These men had been brought up to appreciate
their privileged education, but now turn against the social and political disparity that
allowed them such privilege. While choked by their anger at the same society that
granted them privilege, this generation of writers could find clarity and stability in their
personal experiences, and, in turn, become “great egotists,” writing so well about
essentially themselves (120).15
Woolf’s summary of the thirties explains Oxbridge’s continued presence in the
writing of that era, as these writers’ expensive educations remained part of their
upbringing and training while eventually becoming a persistent source of guilt and
uneasiness. Where such education was previously a matter of pride or a hallmark of
cultural capital, it has now become also a kind of albatross. Privileged education
continues to inform authorial perspective, but in an increasingly problematic way since
the benefits of that education are limited; education cannot reduce the global threats of
fascism and communism, nor can it account for more local class disparities that have
become increasingly scrutinized. In this context, the “tasks of peace” that Amis believed
took place at Oxford in the early forties are hardly as inconsequential as they may seem
in his passing remark; they refer to the important relationship Oxbridge tries to forge with
a rapidly altering political landscape. By engaging in the “tasks of peace,” Amis
acknowledges that Oxbridge can no longer reasonably be the isolated oasis of the writers
of the nineteenth century. To be relevant, the university must become part of a greater
15
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system of political reform, nationalism, and resistance to the “tyranny” abroad. When
university education cannot do those things, when it attempts to carry on as before, it is
ineffective and foolish. Yet, Amis implies, efforts to mirror national reform movements
must be equally unsuccessful if exams, empty indicators of rote knowledge, are the new
markers of Oxbridge achievement.
Education in the novels of the period becomes the subject of a much broader
scope of critique, as the nature of an Oxbridge education fluctuated while the universities
struggled to find an identity among calls for new political relevance. In attacking their
own education—or, perhaps, exploring its limitations— mid-century authors
acknowledged, as Woolf does in To the Lighthouse, that the leisure culture of Oxbridge
no longer pointed to a refined heritage or the acquisition of meaningful knowledge as it
had for Waugh. This culture had now become incomplete, unable to prepare its students
to participate in political matters that seem increasingly more pressing. Woolf’s “great
egotists” look back at the entirety of their own educational experience from public school
to university with renewed criticism not necessarily of the quality of their education, but
of its ultimate purpose. If the university had now become charged with the daunting
“tasks of peace,” then it surely had to change to reflect its newfound responsibilities for
the future, an especially problematic task for an institution that was, as I have shown,
based so much on the preservation and transmission of the past.
What we are left with in mid-century fiction is a series of autobiographical or
semi-autobiographical novels, memoirs, and essays that reflect on an entire educational
system in ways that vacillate between nostalgia for the author’s carefree youth and his
contempt for the inability of that experience to be carried forth in any meaningful way:
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Henry Green’s Pack My Bag (1940), Anthony Powell’s A Question of Upbringing
(1951), Graham Greene’s A Sort of Life (1971), and George Orwell’s posthumously
published “Such, Such Were the Joys” (1952) all look back at the authors’ own varied
educational experiences, all of which are privileged and all of which are described in
increasingly critical terms. Their work represents institutionalized education in a variety
of forms. Orwell describes St. Cyprian’s as a brutal prep school “crammer” intended to
prepare him for admissions exams, while Powell and Green, who were together at Eton
and Oxford, argue that their education was more about networking. Reflecting on their
own lives as students in the thirties and forties, these authors share what publisher
Geoffrey Faber calls “signs of exhaustion.” As the nation “suddenly exchanged riches for
poverty, and power for insecurity,” authors, too, had to adjust and consider whether or
not their education could at all prepare them for the daunting nature of the tasks of
peace.16 It is perhaps their contemporary Cyril Connolly who best summarizes the
persistent pessimism that accompanies the seeming lightheartedness in many of these
works: “Nothing dreadful is ever done with, no bad thing gets any better; you can’t be too
serious. This is the message of the Forties from which, alas, there seems no escape.”17
With this as a conclusion, these authors’ negative or ambivalent view of
institutional education must come from their belief that this education could no longer be
taken seriously. Institutional education was vitally serious to Arnold because it was
responsible for cultural preservation, but if education’s success is now to be measured in
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pragmatic terms by exams and political relevance, then it lacks the inherent value it had
enjoyed in the past. Unlike the nineteenth-century writers whose education was tasked,
per Woolf, with teaching them their art, post-war writers must now confront national
turmoil with an education that was ill-equipped to fulfill such a role. If modernist-era
writers, as I have suggested, were concerned as to whether or not Oxbridge could (or
should) preserve and transmit the version of liberal-humane culture that had long been
associated with the universities, then the generation that followed envisioned an even
more radical break in which the relationship between education and culture was
questioned at the most fundamental level. In its time of “crisis,” culture became
increasingly difficult to define and seemed to lose its value as it was separated out from
its long-held association with education.

I. A Comic Crisis of Culture
The rise of the campus novel in the fifties only extends the thirties-era critique of
educational institutions as protectors of culture. These novels undercut Herbert
Pembroke’s notion of school as “the world in miniature,” often arguing that campus life
is overly isolated with little relevance to the world outside. Poking fun at the institution of
teaching itself and often mocking the very subjects which are taught, professors in
campus novels are typically either old-fashioned and obscure or flippant and
irresponsible. One of the most notable examples of the genre, Amis’s Lucky Jim (1954) is
among the most cutting satires of the period. Paul Fussell interprets Amis’s novel as
“specifically a satire on the sort of thought and behavior not just found at but apparently
encouraged at a university: laziness, vanity, cultural and intellectual affectation, self-
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absorption, and sycophancy.”18 According to this argument, the Oxbridge lifestyle is no
longer a carefree intellectualism but an “affectation” of culture coupled with mere
frivolity. The culture preserved and transmitted by the university has lost its connotations
of tradition and enlightenment.
Impediments to institutional forms of cultural transmission had become not only a
matter of access, which had been— as my previous chapters demonstrate—at the heart of
discussions of education for decades. Lucky Jim and its mid-century ilk advance Woolf’s
argument that the culture transmitted at the university is not worth having. Even in their
critical examinations of cultural transmission, Hardy and Forster still look to Oxbridge as
the seat of a definable culture; Woolf questions the institutionalization of culture, but not
the learning that defines it. But by the fifties, culture had become so separated from
learning that it could take the form of the antiquated and stodgy Professor Welch of
Amis’s Lucky Jim. “No other professor in Great Britain,” the newly appointed Jim Dixon
reflects on Professor Welch, “set such store by being called Professor.”19 But Welch’s
accomplishments as a professor are minimal: “How had he [Welch] become Professor of
History, even at a place like this? By published work? No. By extra good teaching? No in
italics” (8).20 Professor Welch thinks he has prestige just because of his title, even though
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he has not demonstrated any of the actual talent a professor is expected to have. As a
university professor, he represents a literal preserver of culture, but his culture is, like his
academic specialty, “medieval” or outdated. The culture Welch offers is as irrelevant and
meaningless as his title of “professor”; it has lost its connotation of status and
achievement. Dixon is enlightened precisely because he realizes that the traditions to
which Welch clings are increasingly irrelevant. When he describes his upcoming lecture
“Medieval Life and Culture” to an overeager graduate student, Dixon silently
acknowledges how vague and outdated the university tradition is: “I thought I might start
with a discussion of the university, for instance, in its social role,” he says to the student,
but then “[h]e comforted himself for having said this by the thought that at least he knew
it didn’t mean anything” (28).
If culture has lost its ready association with a specific tradition of learning, then
the act of cultural preservation at the university becomes a kind of comic pantomime.
When Dixon stands in front of a lavatory mirror, trying to put on his best “Evelyn Waugh
face,” he is trying to act as if culture still matters the way it did to Waugh (220).
University professors, as Amis argues in Lucky Jim, are “pretenders to high culture”
rather than keepers of it.21 In his review of the novel, Somerset Maugham attacks people
like Jim who go to the university to get a job and not a cultural education:
It is the white collar proletariat…They do not go to the university to acquire
culture, but to get a job, and when they have got one, scamp it. They have no
manners, and are woefully unable to deal with any social predicament…They are
mean, malicious and envious…Charity, kindliness, generosity are qualities they
hold in contempt. They are scum. Some will doubtless sink back, perhaps with
relief, into the modest class from which they emerged; some will take to drink,
some to crime and go to prison. Others will become schoolmasters and form the
young, or journalists and mould public opinion. A few will go into parliament,
21

Fussell, The Anti-Egotist, 7.

207

become cabinet ministers and rule the country.22
Maugham’s tone is ominous, arguing that post-war academic standards have greatly
devalued an education’s cultural worth. Because education has now been redirected
towards “the tasks of peace,” those tasks associated with political policy and social
change, Amis argues the university is no longer is tasked with transmitting culture; to
carry on as if education still propagates culture must surely be an act. As Leavis
indicates, university education had indeed reached a crisis in the fifties as it struggled to
find its identity amid accusations of pretended high culture and uselessness.
In this context, it would be difficult to construct an argument regarding
mentorship because it is not clear what content would be transmitted. Christine
Callaghan, for example, the mentor in Lucky Jim, offers Jim Dixon mentorship in the
form of monetary patronage and sexual desire as a means out of a dreary university
career. She is obviously not related to the types of cultural preservation that I have argued
are intertwined with mentorship earlier in the century, as those mentors depended on a
socially agreed upon sense of the value of the university culture (then Oxbridge) that
simply does not exist by the mid century. It is natural, then, for this concluding chapter
also to move away from Oxbridge and the university altogether, away from the
institutions that so plainly have ceased to offer meaningful mentorship. Instead, I will
show that even though mentorship at the university level is no longer a tangible ideal, the
figure of the mentor can still be used to depict concerns over the transmission of culture.
This transmission is now put into the greater context of education at all levels as statemandated national attention to the content and structure of education grows.
Contemporary and friend of Waugh, Amis, and Greene, Muriel Spark turns to a
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mentorship that takes place at a far younger age and is far more fraught with
complication and ambivalence than any I have previously examined as she articulates
persistent concerns about the impact of post-war social policy—the “tasks of peace”— on
the preservation of culture, a term she finds increasingly difficult to define as it loses its
ready association with university education. In the novel, Spark uses mentorship to
articulate that the distance between culture and education is, finally, decisive and
permanent. The mentorship she depicts is ultimately parodic, a comic re-imagination of
the cultural preservation that had long been considered part of an esteemed educational
tradition.
Born in Edinburgh in 1918, Muriel Spark lived and wrote through some of the
most profound policy changes in the United Kingdom until her recent death in 2006.
Educated in Scotland, she lived in Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia), and worked for British
intelligence during World War II. Critic Alan Bold summarizes nicely her career’s
reputation and scope: “Dealing with a period ranging from the 1930s to the present,
Spark is one of the most lucid and alert of contemporary writers.”23 Spark’s economic
prose and sharp wit are the hallmarks of her fiction, but the most frequent subject of
critical work is her theology, for, like Greene and Waugh, she was a convert to
Catholicism. The disproportionate emphasis on Spark’s religion has resulted in a gross
underrepresentation of her engagement in historical matters, despite the frequent attention
to current events in many of her novels.24 Consequently, descriptions of her relationship
23
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to Greene and Waugh are often limited to their shared religion, Greene’s financial
support of Spark during the writing of her first novel, and an occasional anecdote
regarding Waugh’s praise of Spark’s work.25 I believe that Spark’s relationship to these
authors, however, extends beyond the theological and the familiar, and that she, too,
offers social commentary at least as insightful as theirs.
A notable exception to the critical trend of overemphasizing Spark’s Catholicism,
Marina MacKay’s “Muriel Spark and the Meaning of Treason” argues for more attention
to be paid instead to Spark’s “historical inquiries” as she studies treason in several of
Spark’s novels.26 Like MacKay, I turn to the The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie (1961) and
offer a reading that emphasizes the novel’s historical engagement. But where MacKay’s
reading focuses on the novel’s play with fascism, I turn instead to its take on what I
contend is the novel’s subject and background of education reform. Spark, I argue,
elucidates the motivation behind the critiques her contemporaries leveled against
Oxbridge as she offers the necessary connection between education reform at the national
level and the cultural preservation that, as I have been suggesting, had been the task of
the university. If education had at one point been linked to an individual’s cultural
acquisition, it now, having been legislated at every level, refers to a social imperative that
has little to do with culture at all. In The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie, mentorship proves
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more successful than it has in any other novel in this dissertation, only the version of
culture the mentor transmits is not worth preserving.
Set in Edinburgh in the nineteen thirties, The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie follows a
group of schoolgirls during their time at the Junior Division of the Marcia Blaine School.
Monica Douglas, Rose Stanley, Eunice Gardiner, Sandy Stranger, Jenny Gray, and Mary
Macgregor comprise the “Brodie Set,” led by their teacher, the memorable and eccentric
Miss Jean Brodie. Miss Brodie, who is proudly “in her prime,” declares herself the tenyear-old girls’ mentor and tasks herself with cultivating their appreciation for a culture
that is limited and defined by Miss Brodie’s own tastes. During their two years with her,
the girls are mesmerized by Miss Brodie’s sexual escapades and thrilled by her elitism
and passion. After encouraging a student—Joyce Emily Hammond—to run off and fight
for Franco, Miss Brodie is eventually “betrayed” by Sandy to the school’s headmistress
and is dismissed on the grounds of fascist sympathies in 1939, wondering until her death
in 1946 which of her students turned her in. Sandy becomes a Roman Catholic nun and
acts as a mentor of sorts herself after publishing her treatise on “The Configuration of the
Commonplace.”
In this last chapter, I argue that Spark’s The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie is, in part,
a response to the sweeping educational reform policies of the forties that very clearly set
out to make education a national “task of peace.” Although socially and geographically
far removed from Oxbridge, The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie is still very much concerned
with matters of cultural acquisition, especially as governmental policy comes to dictate
more fully who and what is taught. Miss Brodie herself is a parody of traditional
humanist values as I have presented them, as she clings to the preservation of high
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culture, flagrantly refutes any sense of social prudence while partaking in her own
version of a leisure culture, and, in a comic nod to Matthew Arnold’s “sovereign
educators,” takes on only a small group of elite students that she seeks to indoctrinate
with her own values. Brodie’s version of culture has little to do with the pragmatic
Marcia Blaine version of education and this growing disconnect between useful
education and traditional high culture makes it clear for Spark that no institution is fit to
take on cultural transmission. In turn, mentorship itself is now possible only in parody, a
comic reflection on a system of cultural preservation that, as I have shown, never could
quite live up to its promises or expectations.

II. Miss Brodie’s Mentorship and the Sovereign Educator
Miss Brodie is one of Spark’s most famous and enigmatic characters, a reputation
she has earned in part due to her sheer audacity. “Attend to me, girls,” Miss Brodie
demands, insisting her students model their behavior and tastes on her own.27 A selfproclaimed mentor, Miss Brodie believes she embodies what culture should be and that
she is uniquely capable of transmitting it to her “set.” I will elaborate on the specifics of
Miss Brodie’s unusual definition of culture in the next section, but here I emphasize first
that Miss Brodie’s mentorship shares some of the same principles as Matthew Arnold’s
sovereign educator, and second that Miss Brodie, for all her eccentricities, is an effective
mentor. In the previous novels I have examined, mentorship fails in a move that marks
the modernist-era attempt at a break with the traditions of institutional cultural
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transmission, but Miss Brodie’s mentorship succeeds in a re-imagination and
reexamination of select parts of those traditions.
Both Miss Brodie and Arnold’s sovereign educators intend to preserve and
transmit to new generations the appreciation of art characteristic of high culture. “Art and
religion,” Miss Brodie teaches, come first, “then philosophy; lastly science. That is the
order of the great subjects of life, that’s their order of importance” (24-5). With that
mantra, she teaches the girls about famous artists and regales them with stories about her
exotic travels. “Full of culture,” as one of her students reflects, Miss Brodie is an
Edinburgh graduate well-versed in the “art and religion” she privileges (26). When Miss
Brodie proclaims to her students that she is “putting old heads on your young shoulders,”
she means that she intends to bring them up in a way influenced by older tradition,
replicating the liberal-humane learning that had been the backbone of Arnold’s sovereign
educator (5). The sovereign educator, stripped away from its institutional affiliations and
all the problems Hardy identifies, has the grand but straightforward mission of inspiring
one’s pupils to be motivated by the same culture that has inspired oneself—and Miss
Brodie considers this her mission, too.
Both Miss Brodie and Arnold’s sovereign educator consider this duplication or
passing on what one has learned to be of paramount value. This transmission takes place
through the cultivation of a “best self,” who in turn inspires others toward their own “best
selves.” Proudly in her “prime,” Miss Brodie is at a moment in which she believes she
can act as a “best self,” or the greatest possible mentor. As Arnold envisioned his ideal
mentors would do, Miss Brodie prides herself on her own knowledge and experience and
fully intends to transmit to her students those same values. With her curt and forceful
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calls for allegiance—“Follow me”; “Attend to me”— Miss Brodie demands her girls take
in the knowledge she offers so that they can become “best selves”: “If only you small
girls would listen to me I would make of you the crème de la crème” (7; 8; 11). Miss
Brodie’s superlative language, one of the hallmarks of her mentorship, commands
unwavering allegiance. Miss Brodie holds herself to a certain standard and demands it of
her young pupils since she is intent on transmitting what she knows, that which she
believes truly to be the very best. Although each girl is “famous” for her own individual
characteristics and Miss Brodie recognizes and fosters those differences, she remains
certain that she can duplicate what matters, what is essentially “Brodie” and therefore the
“best,” by attuning the girls to her own history, likes, and dislikes.
Even if, as I will argue, the novel comes to question the stuff of Miss Brodie’s
version of culture, the process through which she transmits her values is undoubtedly
effective. In terms of transmission, Miss Brodie enjoys far more tangible success than
Arnold’s imagined sovereign educators. Echoing a Jesuit maxim, Miss Brodie exclaims:
“Give me a girl at an impressionable age, and she is mine for life” (6). A bold statement,
to be sure, but Miss Brodie can support it. The novel opens in 1936, four years after her
term of instruction for these girls has ended, and they are still, the narrator claims,
“unmistakably Brodie” as they complete the senior school, and they continue to reflect on
their time with Miss Brodie into their adulthood as well (2). Even in her new identity as
Sister Helena, Sandy Stranger remembers that her “biggest influence” was not “political,
personal,” or “Calvinism,” but “a Miss Jean Brodie in her prime” (35). David Lodge
interprets the novel’s flash-forward technique —the entire narrative moves quickly
among various points in time ranging from 1930 to well past Miss Brodie’s death in
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1946—as an affirmation of Miss Brodie’s continued influence. The technique is designed
to “present the extension of Miss Brodie’s influence on the girls in their adult life
simultaneously with their relationship as teacher and pupils.”28 Miss Brodie demands
long-term influence on the girls’ lives and implores her girls to “all grow up to be
dedicated women as I have dedicated myself to you” (66). She believes the girls’ future
will reflect the success of her own teaching efforts. After finding out that Sandy has
joined a convent, Miss Brodie laments, “What a waste. That is not the sort of dedication I
meant. Do you think she has done this to annoy me?” (66). Juxtaposing Miss Brodie’s
call for loyalty with a glimpse at future betrayal, Spark makes it clear that Miss Brodie’s
mentorship is intended to shape the girls’ future, for she has a vested interest in their lives
that extends far beyond their years at Marcia Blaine.
Miss Brodie’s work as a schoolteacher is inseparable from the long-term values
she wishes to instill. Elaborating on Miss Brodie’s role as an influential teacher, one of
the most traditional of literary figures, Lodge suggests: “Miss Brodie’s ‘beneficent and
enlarging effects’ are mainly educational. Though she is a memorably individual
character, she is not an unfamiliar type: the charismatic teacher who leaves an indelible
mark on her pupils.”29 A simple schoolteacher, like Jude Fawley’s Mr. Phillotson had
been at first to his young student, the untraditional Miss Brodie still fills a traditional role
that requires real dedication to the individual student while cultivating knowledge and
eventual independence. It matters a great deal to Spark that the mentor in her novel be
recognizable as a schoolteacher, and she intertwines mentoring and teaching to a greater
28
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degree than they have been in any of the novels I have examined previously. If Miss
Brodie is both a successful mentor and a successful teacher, I suggest that her mentorship
harks back to Arnold’s claim that the sovereign educator facilitated an institutional
education that could itself be instilled by a mentor.
A mentor who is a schoolteacher, specifically, implies a tangible connection
between a culture that is passed along and the knowledge that is schooled; such a mentor
is the closest to the sovereign educator, who uses his own vast education (gained at
Oxbridge, per Arnold) to acculturate his pupils. Indeed, Brodie’s mentorship stems
neither from philanthropy nor sympathy, as had that of the Schlegel sisters or Mr.
Phillotson, all of whom only exposed a heritage that could not be transmitted even when
the knowledge itself could. Her mentorship is not that of Mrs. Ramsay, who permits for
the possibility of a mentorship separate from institutional affiliation. Instead, Miss
Brodie’s mentorship is motivated by an impulse similar to the sovereign educator’s: she
seeks to make culture the privilege of the few so that it may benefit the many, and she
believes that institutional education provides her the best possible forum for doing so.
And where teachers in this project have hitherto been fairly vilified—Mr. Phillotson
becomes a competitive rival; the stodgy Professor Plumer and the overbearing Mr.
Ramsay have a proclivity for a material transmission lacking sustainability— Miss
Brodie succeeds as a teacher and mentor, generally leaving a lasting and positive memory
for each member of her elect.30 In making Miss Brodie a successful mentor and teacher, a
“best self,” and a champion of the arts, Spark has brought together some of the longestheld assumptions about the best that education can offer.
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By placing institutional education and mentorship at cross-purposes, the novels I
studied in earlier chapters confirmed the sovereign educator as a utopian impossibility at
best, and a short-sighted and elitist abstraction at worst. So when Spark evokes a
successful sovereign educator-type mentor with her efficacious mentorship, emphasis on
best-selfhood, and demand that her students remain engaged in noble pursuit of art as a
way to inform and shape their everyday life-decisions, it may seem that she sees new
opportunities for mentorship’s impact outside the narrow confines of Arnold’s Oxbridge.
She seems to affirm the possibility of institutionalized mentorship, rather than argue for
its demise. Spark’s novel might thus be understood as a radical refutation of the
modernist skepticism about the transmissibility of culture in institutions of education;
perhaps she would be sympathetic to Leavis’s optimism for the university and reject the
arguments of Amis and other postwar writers that institutionalized education had become
mechanical and irrelevant.
But in her reflections on Christina Kay, her own personal Miss Brodie from her
days at the James Gillespie School for Girls, Spark begins to resist the idea that
mentorship and education could have the widespread impact Arnold wanted, or could
protect the institutional forms of culture to which Leavis clung. Miss Brodie’s successful
mentorship may evoke an ideal combination of education and culture, yet that success
also becomes increasingly irreproducible. Remembering Miss Kay, Spark recalls a note
from John Steinbeck’s tribute to teachers: “I have come to believe that a great teacher is a
great artist and that there are as few as there are any other great artists. Teaching might
even be the greatest of the arts since the medium is the human mind and spirit.”31
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Steinbeck tempers his celebration of teaching by his admitting just how rare good
teaching actually is, a fact Spark herself confesses when she says one of the reasons she
did not attend university was that “[t]he chance of finding another inspiring teacher like
my later ‘Miss Jean Brodie’ in the form of Christina Kay was very slight.”32 Spark’s look
back on her school days shares some of the wistfulness present in Waugh’s nostalgia for
a disappearing Oxford culture; she and Waugh both celebrate an exceptional experience
of education knowing how difficult it will be to ever duplicate it.33
By casting herself as the “leaven in the lump,” Miss Brodie makes it clear that she
thinks she is the lone teacher at Marcia Blaine who can guide her students toward
meaningful education (6). Her solitariness becomes a problem in and of itself, for the
very small Brodie set proves simply incapable of furthering Miss Brodie’s vision in any
extensive way beyond treasuring a pleasant memory of an eccentric teacher. Eunice
Gardner, for example, tells her husband she wants to visit Miss Brodie’s grave, but can
provide him with only a fumbling answer when he asks who Miss Brodie was: “She used
to give us teas at her flat and tell us about her prime…She fell for an Egyptian courier
once, on her travels, and came back and told us all about it. She had a few favourites. I
Miss Brodie fits Woolf’s implied definition of a teacher as well, since Woolf maintains that writers learn
their craft from their education and Miss Brodie certainly tends to the creation of the artist. Sandy, who
becomes an artist herself through the publication of her The Transformation of the Commonplace, is a
ready indicator of Miss Brodie’s abilities. As Mackay explains, “what the treacherous Sandy learns from
the treacherous Miss Brodie is that it is possible to reshape the world according to her own needs and
desires…Miss Brodie turns her girls into artists by showing them that the world in which they live is
intractably multiple and endlessly rewritable” (MacKay 513).
32
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was one of them. I did the splits and made her laugh, you know” (26). While Miss Brodie
may represent a venerated tradition of mentorship and education, that tradition also seems
disjointed and random. Eunice’s husband gives her a telling, deadpan response: “I always
knew your upbringing was a bit peculiar.” His confusion over his wife’s upbringing
points to the difficulty of assessing clearly the value of Miss Brodie’s mentorship. This
complicates the long-term potential of Miss Brodie’s culture, for once she is let go from
Marcia Blaine, no one can take her place and recreate her “peculiar” brand of culture.
While Miss Brodie represents successful mentorship and a steadfast commitment to
culture, the Arnoldian image of cultured education she presents cannot help but fade.

III. Miss Brodie’s Culture and the Modern Philistines
Miss Brodie, I suggested above, is a successful mentor when considered as an
individual teacher leading her own small group of a chosen elect. Even if her mentorship
is rare, she successfully evokes the older, Arnoldian ideal of the sovereign educator. I
argue here, however, that the subject transmitted through her mentorship is a version of
culture that nonetheless betrays its limitations. When examined in the context of the
novel’s larger engagement with education, Miss Brodie’s “peculiar” culture seems selfindulgent and frustratingly difficult to define. If the act of her mentorship represents the
best possible version of culture, the subject of her mentorship represents emergent
accusations against high culture as lacking a clear purpose in contemporary society. Miss
Brodie criticizes the Marcia Blaine School as an “education factory,” but her proposed
curriculum is equally restricted and extreme since the culture she wants to transmit is
ultimately defined by and meaningful to only her (6). Miss Brodie holds her culture in
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counterpoint to the stark practicality of the Marcia Blaine curriculum, yet she fails to
make any convincing argument for the benefits of her cultured approach beyond its
perpetuation of her own ideals. Even though she evokes the sovereign educator and a
culture premised on an “inward operation,” Miss Brodie’s culture is not predicated on
Arnold’s “reading, observing, and thinking in order to come to reason,” but an undefined
predisposition that constantly reinforces its own specialness.34 As a result, her mentorship
proves just as unsustainable as that of the mentors I have examined previously, since the
culture she perpetuates lacks any clear or lasting value.
The culture Miss Brodie attempts to pass on is never plainly explained; she is
certain she will pass on to her girls what she believes matters, but she cannot articulate a
coherent system behind her criteria for determining something as “culture.” The girls of
the Brodie set learn from their mentor a most unusual and diverse body of “cultural”
information:
These girls were discovered to have heard of the Buchmanites and Mussolini, the
Italian Renaissance painters, the advantages to the skin of cleansing cream and
witch-hazel over honest soap and water, and the word ‘menarche’; the interior
decoration of the London house of the author of Winnie the Pooh had been
described to them, as had the love lives of Charlotte Bronte and of Miss Brodie
herself. They were aware of the existence of Einstein and the arguments of those
who considered the Bible to be untrue. They knew the rudiments of astrology but
not the date of the battle of Flodden or the capital of Finland. All of the Brodie
set, save one, counted on its fingers, as had Miss Brodie, with accurate results
more or less. (2)
The list is a bizarre amalgamation of random bits of art, history, literature, and hygiene; it
does not identify with any cohesiveness what would constitute being “cultured” or
“educated.” Further, the compatibility between education and culture once implied by
Miss Brodie’s depiction as a successful mentor and schoolteacher begins to erode as Miss
34
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Brodie refuses to teach even the basic standards of a primary school curriculum. She tells
her students to “Hold up your books” and pretend they are studying “our history
lesson…our poetry…English grammar,” when in fact she plans to tell them “about care
of the skin, and of the hands…about the Frenchman I met in the train to Biarritz” (7).
Miss Brodie rejects any prescribed curriculum and replaces it with personal anecdote and
opinion. Ultimately, the only criterion she uses to determine cultural and educational
worth is whether or not she finds a particular cultural artifact or historical narrative to be
personally interesting. The correct answer to her question, “Who is the greatest Italian
painter?” is Giotto, simply because “he is my favourite” (7-8). Miss Brodie’s culture is
purely self-referential in that it is affirmed by no one else and presented as a matter of
nothing more than her personal taste.
In Miss Brodie’s mind, though, her eclectic culture is no less important than
Oxbridge culture had been to Arnold, and her insights on “care of the skin, and of the
hands” are on par with the primacy of truth and beauty. Even though Miss Brodie’s
culture appears to be a random assortment of insights and artifacts, she passionately
defends its validity and seriousness. Like Arnold and Amis, she fears the threat of
“philistinism” to her culture, which still evokes a venerated tradition of art and
intellectual inquiry. Although the particularities of her tradition differentiate hers from
Arnoldian culture, she seems to think her culture faces the same type of threats and merits
the same types of protection. Indeed, Miss Brodie levels the insult “Philistine” at her girls
when they fail to remain poised during Mr. Lloyd’s art lesson: “It is obvious…that these
girls are not of cultured homes and heritage. The Philistines are upon us, Mr. Lloyd” (51).
The “Philistine” designation calls to mind Arnold’s utilitarian thinkers and Amis’s exam-
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advocates, but Miss Brodie’s “Philistines” are merely young girls giggling at the female
form in a lesson on Italian paintings. To Miss Brodie, though, her girls are guilty of a
more serious offense: that they do not take culture seriously enough.35 While she may
later dismiss the exams for which the pragmatic Miss Mackay wants the students
prepared, Miss Brodie implies here that the real threat to her culture is the fundamental
inability to recognize its value.
While the girls are eager to parrot Miss Brodie’s assertion that culture has value,
their response to being labeled “Philistines” makes it apparent that they do not have any
tangible sense of what culture’s actual significance is. Their understanding of Miss
Brodie’s culture portrays it as seemingly as archaic as the term “philistine” itself. To
show Miss Brodie that they really do take culture seriously, the girls anxiously attempt to
make themselves appear “of cultured and sexless antecedents” (51). The addition here of
“sexless” to a “cultured antecedent” makes those antecedents appear as lifeless as the
figures the girls study in their trips to the museum. Miss Brodie would not notice the
museum statues’ nudity, Sandy maintains, because “Miss Brodie’s above all that.”
Similarly, when Sandy and Jenny write their version of Miss Brodie’s love story with the
doomed Hugh Carruthers, they decide that surely Miss Brodie could never have “had
sexual intercourse with Hugh” (18). Even though “Miss Brodie said they clung to each
other with passionate abandon on his last leave,” Sandy is convinced her teacher remains
35
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pure: “I don’t think they took their clothes off, though,” she tells Jenny (18). By
removing sex from culture, the girls create an image of Miss Brodie that paints her as a
historical relic of another time, idealized to the point of being completely detached from
the vagaries of the modern world. She is elevated to the extent that she becomes an
unrealistic abstraction. Jenny and Sandy can only depict a romanticized Miss Brodie in
the story they write because their mentor has offered them a culture so “above all that”
that it is cut off from everything else. If Miss Brodie sees herself as defending a culture
so profoundly serious and pure it has been raised to the status of desexualized statues
austerely displayed in museums, she must reproach the Philistines for laughing at sex
because she fears they bring a mundane perspective to what she thinks is profoundly
solemn. Being so elevated and idealized, Miss Brodie and the culture she represents
become the subjects of merely a studious curiosity. Culture here is sterile, removed and
protected from any engagement that might threaten its appearance of purity.
Not coming from “cultured homes and heritage,” the girls do not readily
appreciate culture’s value, which is precisely why Miss Brodie thinks she must keep
culture cordoned off for a select few. To permit access to that culture, Miss Brodie
believes, she must awaken an appreciation for it. Even if separate from class, culture
remains exclusive and privileged in that it reflects a particular engagement enjoyed only
by a small group. If one already has a spirit of culture, Miss Brodie believes she can help
it emerge:
“The word ‘education’ comes from the root e from ex, out, and duco, I lead. It
means a leading out. To me education is a leading out of what is already there in
the pupil’s soul. To Miss Mackay it is a putting in of something that is not there,
and that is not what I call education, I call it intrusion, from the Latin root prefix
in meaning in and the stem trudo, I thrust. Miss Mackay’s method is to thrust a lot
of information into the pupil’s head; mine is a leading out of knowledge, and that
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is true education as is proved by the root meaning. (36)
If education is a matter of “soul” and Miss Brodie’s girls are her “elect,” then clearly
culture belongs to but a predetermined few and cannot be transmitted to everyone.
Instead, she can only “lead out” culture from where it already resides. Miss Brodie may
bill her culture as the self-cultivation inherent to Bildung, but given the importance she
grants herself in that process of cultivation it is clear that her culture is actually the
development of taste more closely affiliated with habitus. Miss Brodie’s ex duco seems to
rely on an already-present recognition of culture. Hugh Carruthers, for example, is a
made up figure, a compilation of Keats, Wilfred Owen, and Burns. She presents her
fictional love story as truth, immediately after reminding her girls that “we are civilized
beings” (9). But even if the girls are civilized, they have no way of knowing the literary
references constituting Miss Brodie’s dead lover; the adult “cultured” reader catches the
references, but the girls cannot. Miss Brodie seems to want to lead out culture, but she
has not yet put in the knowledge that constitutes the learning of that culture. 36 Her culture
is drawn only further into isolation as it becomes increasingly clear that it belongs only to
the select few who have somehow managed to understand it.
In pointing out what she believes to be the shortcomings of Miss Mackay’s
philosophy, Miss Brodie actually reveals the problem of her own: how can one pinpoint
what constitutes culture if it comes from a place as abstract as the soul? Could culture
ever reside in everyone? This is why Miss Brodie must teach such an eclectic mix of
knowledge: she is not actually trying to teach a specific curriculum that transmits a
specific version of culture, for culture has no specific referent that can be “thrust into”
36
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one’s mind. Instead, culture is a kind of awareness, the cultivated taste Miss Brodie
herself enjoys. As Waugh depicts Oxford as a way of life rather than a program of
learning, Spark gestures here toward an education that reflects a cultured outlook or
attitude. But because Miss Brodie is a schoolteacher to those “not from cultured homes
and heritage,” she must rely on classroom lessons to teach a culture that had hitherto been
left out of the classroom. Her teaching philosophy, her “ex duco,” is an attempt to reclaim
culture as a privileged perspective that emerges from self-cultivation, but this seems
incompatible with the in trudo of her institutional milieu.
The conflict between ex duco and in trudo is not far removed from the conflict
between culture as a process and culture as a product that I outlined in my first chapter.
Ex duco characterizes culture as a process of the awakening of an appreciation for the arts
and intellect; in trudo looks for measurable indicators of specific knowledge having been
transmitted and successfully acquired. Hardy, I argued, uses the figure of the sovereign
educator to demonstrate that Jude can acquire culture as process, but not the social
indicators of having gained culture (i.e. a Christminster degree). In denying in trudo,
Miss Brodie rejects the idea that culture should have a socially assigned value at all. Her
culture can appear “peculiar” to those who do not care to embrace it, but its inherent
value will remain clear to those who truly understand it. Miss Brodie’s culture is
portrayed as antiquated and haphazard, but this has absolutely no bearing on her
commitment to it. In fact, Miss Brodie goes so far as to encourage a view of culture that
celebrates its distinction from social convention. And this is where she breaks from
Arnold’s sovereign educator in a crucial way and illustrates a fundamental change in
culture’s purpose: Miss Brodie’s culture is fully intended to remain inaccessible to those
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who do not readily recognize its value. For Arnold, culture may begin as the exclusive
perspective of the few, but the sovereign educator would work to develop a sensibility
that could eventually be made available to all, whereas Miss Brodie delights in the
specialness of her elect. Even if Jude Fawley and Leonard Bast prove the hollowness of
Arnold’s claims about class transcendence, Arnold believed that culture promised a
character refinement that would encourage individuals of all classes to work toward
social harmony. In contrast, Miss Brodie attempts to develop a sensibility defined by
social contrariness. Part of education’s “leading out” involves defining oneself as distinct,
and maintaining that air of distinction.37 Arnold advocated classical texts as a means to
cultivate “civilized” behavior among all of England; Miss Brodie advocates her personal
tastes as a means to cultivate opposition to almost everyone else.
It becomes clear even on the first page of the novel that Miss Brodie’s training
prepares her girls to operate against norms, endlessly rewriting rules to suit their own
tastes. The novel opens with a glimpse at how the Brodie set wear their school-mandated
panama hats: “The girls could not take off their panama hats because this was not far
from the school gates and hatlessness was an offence. Certain departures from the proper
set of the hat on the head were overlooked in the case of fourth-form girls and upwards so
long as nobody wore their hat at an angle” (1). The girls, however, resist: they manage to
wear “their hats each with a definite difference,” denoting from the outset that what
makes them “immediately recognisable as Miss Brodie’s pupils” is their subtle defiance
of rules and their desire to differ from a prescribed standard (1). As the girls talk to a
group of boys over a boundary of bicycle handlebars, Spark further emphasizes the nature
37
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of the girls’ separatism: they are only united through Miss Brodie, and they are, with her
guidance, against conformity. Indeed, that resistance to conformity may be one of the few
unifying threads behind Miss Brodie’s culture. The girls “had no team spirit and very
little in common with each other,” but their allegiance to Miss Brodie marks them as
distinct (2). By encouraging her girls to resist other people’s rules, Miss Brodie ensures
they will continue to elevate only her version of what really matters, while she also
emphasizes that culture should remain the subject of difference and enjoyed only by the
few.
Miss Brodie teaches nonconformity not out of any sense of disrespect for rulefollowing altogether—after all, she demands the girls follow her own rules expressly—
but as a means of resistance against what she calls “this education factory,” the Marcia
Blaine School. This tension between culture as an idealized separateness and as a
pointless distraction from useful knowledge reflects, I believe, what had become of the
narrative of institutional cultural transmission at the mid-century. Spark’s novel argues
that the structure of education under the legislation of the modern welfare state
reproduced only a way of thinking in which culture was no longer a vaulted tradition that
could inform an entire curriculum, but an increasingly isolated program of study.38
Modernists such as Forster and Woolf depict contemporary embodiments of (failed)
mentorship to illustrate that institutional forms of cultural transmission are no longer
possible; Spark, however, turns to a radically traditional, Arnoldian mentor to
38

Born in Scotland, Spark received a Scottish—not English—education. Education in Scotland is certainly
not exactly the same as in England: “Education in Scotland remained distinct, in its traditions, which were
in some respects superior to those of the south, and in its practical organization, which was not now more
impressive” (Calder 545). However, Scottish schools were organized in primary and secondary stages and,
thanks to a further Act of 1945, had been “brought into line with the English on certain important points”
(Calder 545). For Spark’s own account of her Scottish education, see Curriculum Vitae pages 49-76.

227

demonstrate how out of date is the fundamental assumption that culture as it once was
even has a place in institutional education. As the writers of the thirties and forties had
argued, schools could no longer foster a cultural sensibility that would put together
classroom learning and intellectual dialogue into a meaningful and transmissible culture.
Humanist culture struggles to remain relevant or to define itself as anything more than a
vague resistance to the “uncultured,” and in turn it faces criticism as either a snobbish
elitism or an irrelevant pursuit. Spark’s private girls’ school is a caricature of some of the
generalities about modern education expressed at the beginning of this chapter, as Miss
Brodie’s culture struggles to find validity in the face of education’s legislated emphasis
on practicality, exams, and “hard knowledge.” 39
The Marcia Blaine School evokes the specific ways in which the final
nationalization of education symbolized the complete break between institutional
education and the transmissible version of culture. The 1944 Education Act was the
culmination of a host of social reform movements undertaken around World War II, and
addressed especially the issue of secondary education. 40 Following the recommendations
of the 1942 Social Insurance and Allied Services (the “Beveridge Report”), the Act made
secondary education free and compulsory for all and brought the maintenance of these
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schools under the purview of public authorities.41 The educational reform measures of the
forties saw a renewed commitment to universal education, providing especially increased
opportunities for secondary and further education. Education was very much a matter of
what Beveridge called “social insurance” because it provided a potentially solid
foundation for both economic prosperity and equality.42 As school reform had been a
particular interest of the utilitarian movement, the 1944 Education Act was motivated by
the belief that school reform could enact social reform and economic growth.43
Social reform and economic growth are of little concern to Miss Brodie. Such
mundane preoccupations are precisely what she resists in her insistence on staying at
Marcia Blaine. “There needs must be a leaven in the lump,” she claims, as she is
determined to elevate her group of young students above a school standard that she sees
as misdirected when it guides students away from the version of culture she advocates
(6). And while the Marcia Blaine School is not a state school, it is implied that it shares a
similar curriculum when Miss Brodie contrasts Marcia Blaine to a progressive or
experimental school. Rationalizing her refusal to ever leave Marcia Blaine, Miss Brodie
41
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says with great disdain: “It has been suggested again that I should apply for a post at one
of the progressive schools, where my methods would be more suited to the system than
they are at Blaine. But I shall not apply for a post at a crank school” (6). Ironically, Miss
Brodie associates herself in many ways with the oldest of educational traditions, yet her
approach is now seen as more in line with a “progressive” school.
The progressive and the traditional meet up in a corridor at Marcia Blaine.
Walking her students past a poster of Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin with the words
“Safety First” emblazoned across the bottom, Miss Brodie explains that the school’s
headmistress, Miss Mackay, “retains him on the wall because she believes in the slogan
‘Safety First.’” Miss Brodie, however, refutes such a claim. “But safety does not come
first,” she admonishes her girls, “Goodness, Truth and Beauty come first” (7). In defense
of such practical admonishments as “Safety First,” Miss Mackay tells the girls that
“Culture cannot compensate for lack of hard knowledge,” encouraging them to work hard
on all subjects (69). In her somewhat sarcastic “You will have to work hard at ordinary
humble subjects for the qualifying examinations,” Miss Mackay ridicules the elevated
perception of culture the girls have learned from Miss Brodie (69). She asks them about
their own “cultural interests,” downplaying culture as a kind of extracurricular pursuit
(68). To Miss Mackay, culture is a matter of interest or personal enjoyment, not the
sustained pursuit of a particular type of knowledge.
In Never Again (1993), Peter Hennessy looks back at the national fervor
motivating the 1944 Education Act. The push for such major reform, he maintains, was
part of a greater concern with what schools could pass on to future generations, which
offers some explanation behind Miss Mackay’s viewpoint: “Education, as everybody
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knew then and knows now, is crucial to the wider social and economic well-being of the
country. There is a direct link between the quality of educational investment in one
generation and the industrial output, balance of payments and strength of the currency in
the next and the next-but-one.”44 Education is here figured as both Amis’s “tasks of
peace” and as part of a greater narrative of transmission, but it has nothing to do with
traditionally understood culture. In Culture and the Grammar School (1965), however, H.
Davies argued that culture was still part of education’s purpose: “Traditionally education
has been concerned with the task of cultural transmission and the culture in question has
been that of a minority group. It has been the duty of the schools to preserve this
culture—the best that has been thought and said—and to hand it on reverently to an elite
class.”45 While arguing in support of culture’s position in education, Davies actually gets
at its potential collapse. If education in the forties had been intended to improve the
economic lot of the population in its entirety, then is there still a benefit to keeping
culture as the privilege of the elite? The forties-era acknowledgment of the unequal
distribution of knowledge among dominant groups left “egalitarian trends in sociological
analysis” questioning what “counts as knowledge.”46 Culture could not be the preparation
for the real world it had once been considered; it becomes only one possible curriculum
out of many, and it is seen in opposition to other forms of equally valid knowledge.
Nowhere in the novel is this increasing split between “culture” and other types of
study more apparent than in the girls’ decision to attend either the Classical or Modern
School. This divide between classical and modern schools is an allusion to the “eleven44
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plus.” This exam, created by the 1944 Butler Education Act, was designed to determine a
student’s future career path, because the results of a student’s eleven plus exam would
dictate his or her track in the tripartite secondary school system, which divided students
among the grammar (academic) school, the modern school, or a technical school.47 The
grammar school, or what Miss Brodie calls the “Classical” school, gave students the most
traditional education with an emphasis on classic literary texts. As outlined in The
Education of the Adolescent, the modern school would not focus on the traditional
subjects of the school curriculum, but was based on a “child-centered approach” that had
been “deemed appropriate for the mass of pupils who had neither the ability nor the
aptitude for a full-length academic course.”48 The structures of education had physically
and ideologically separated “Truth and Beauty” from “Safety First,” only underscoring
that Miss Brodie’s culture is indeed not for everyone. Her culture, she intends, is for the
elite, disconnected from modern society.
The stakes of the eleven-plus exam were inordinately high; a clever poor child
could move up a social class by getting into a good grammar school. There are echoes of
Mr. Tulliver here, since the grammar school and its traditional curriculum were still
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associated with upward mobility. Minister of Education Ellen Wilkinson championed this
tripartite policy as being “essentially meritocratic”:
People have said that by talking in terms of three types of school we are
promulgating a wrong social philosophy. I do not agree. By abolishing fees in
maintained schools we have ensured that entry to these schools shall be on the
basis of merit… I cannot agree with those people who say that by setting up
distinction of brains between people you are only producing another kind of
distinction. I am glad to think that we are not all born the same.49
Based on the “distinction” of “brains,” the eleven plus seems to offer the same pseudoeducational advancement Bourdieu found in 1930’s France. The eleven plus system,
Angus Calder chides, “ensured that privilege was perpetuated behind a façade of
democratic advance.”50 The tripartite system, though defended as egalitarian and meritbased, ignored the way in which the “distinction of brains” had developed in the first
place as a result of years of disparate educational opportunities among classes, and only
underscores the elitism and separateness of a curriculum of culture.
As their final teacher in the primary school, Miss Brodie prepares her students for
that key decision, encouraging them to the Classical in her typically leading fashion: “I
am not saying anything against the Modern side. Modern and Classical, they are equal,
and each provides for a function in life. You must make your free choice. Not everyone is
capable of a Classical education…So that the girls were left in no doubt as to Miss
Brodie’s contempt for the Modern side” (64). Miss Brodie’s “contempt” for the Modern
school is distinct from the charges against utilitarianism made by Arnold, Leavis, and
even Amis. Instead of faulting utilitarian pragmatism or crass socioeconomic motives,
Miss Brodie asserts their irrelevance to the only life that matters: her life of culture. Miss
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Brodie’s close-minded and absolute dedication to the superiority of her own dictated
culture leads her to a romanticized fascism. As Lodge argues, “Miss Brodie’s sympathy
for the Fascist movements of the ‘thirties is not a reasoned political attitude, but an
extension of her egotism and romantic sensibility.”51 Her unusual and dangerous political
affiliation only further illustrates that culture has come to signify the division— exactly
what Arnold had feared anarchy would produce.

IV. Culture and Parody: Toward a “Desegregated Art”
Given the novel’s setting in a primary school, Miss Brodie’s culture is a comic reimagination of Little Father Time’s “Age masquerading as Juvenility.” I suggest that the
source of Spark’s parody of culture in education is Miss Brodie’s attempt to disseminate
the tenets of a venerable culture to students too young to grasp her lessons. Miss Brodie
invokes much of the Oxbridge culture I have detailed throughout this project: an
emphasis on tradition; the commitment to ancient Greek “Truth and Beauty”; and the
Arnoldian sense of culture as a developed, transmissible, and refined inward process and
sensibility. When Miss Brodie applies these tenets to a primary school education, though,
she radically isolates and artificially elevates culture away from serious conversations
about culture’s worth. The disparity between the weight of this serious cultural tradition
and the education of a group of very young girls is jarring and laughable as Spark mocks
the way that culture in its traditional form seems irrelevant to its surroundings. Even if
the texts of culture still represent “the best which has been thought and said in the world,”
the subjective nature of that “best” in light of the massive social upheaval of two world
wars diminishes culture’s capacity as an expansive or reparative force.
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Culture cannot remain at Marcia Blaine, and to imply that it can only makes
culture appear “peculiar,” disjointed, and inaccessible—even dangerous. In fact, Miss
Brodie’s fascism is an outcome of her romantic, aestheticizing character. Just as she
keeps her culture isolated in a school for innocent young girls, Miss Brodie fails to
understand fascism’s dire implications. Even in her trips to Germany and Austria before
World War II, Miss Brodie only notices how the countries “were now magnificently
organised” and how “Mussolini had put an end to unemployment with his fascisti and
there was no litter in the streets” (131; 31). Culture, in the transmissible form Miss
Brodie embodies, does not know how to apply a tradition of the past to a profoundly
unsettled present. Her most condemning critique of Nazism comes in the passing remark
to Sandy, “Hitler was rather naughty” (131).
Fascism eventually matters a great deal to Joyce-Emily, however, who leaves to
fight for Franco at Miss Brodie’s urging and dies along the way. Joyce-Emily
“boasts…that her brother at Oxford had gone to fight in the Spanish Civil War,” and
“[t]his dark, rather mad girl wanted to go too, and to wear a white blouse and black skirt
and march with a gun” (126). War for Joyce-Emily is fashion; her understanding of war
is limited to the picture Miss Brodie brought back from Italy “showing the triumphant
march of the black uniforms in Rome” worn by Mussolini’s marching troops (31). At
Marcia Blaine, war was “something going on outside in the newspapers and only once a
month in the school debating society” (126). Joyce-Emily’s death illustrates that when
culture is separate from the tasks of peace Amis details, it risks becoming an
irresponsible egotism. For Sandy Stranger, Joyce-Emily’s death is enough to make her
realize that she owes Miss Brodie loyalty “only up to a point” and that her mentorship
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ought finally to be rejected. (136). Sandy does not betray Miss Brodie on political
grounds—Sandy finds there are Fascists “less agreeable than Miss Brodie” in the
Catholic church she joins—or out of some concern for “world affairs,” but because she is
interested in “putting a stop to Miss Brodie” (134). Sandy’s call for an end to mentorship
is a call to end a cultural transmission that cannot account for a changing society with
increasing political strife.
Spark’s parody is grounded in her view that ridicule is, to return to this chapter’s
epigraph, “the only honorable weapon we have left.”52 The claim comes from her lecture
“The Desgregation of Art,” in which she makes the case for what she calls a
“desegregated” literature, “one that will immerse us in the facts and prevent our
sentimental self-indulgence.”53 Spark admonishes artists’ emotional efforts to arouse
sympathy or indignation; she advocates instead the emotionally detached forms of parody
and satire. Emotional work provides the reader with a false sense of accomplishment in
which one feels good for having experienced sympathy, which only further segregates
readers from the particular plight they encounter in literature. “The Desegregation of Art”
is Spark’s response to “a marvelous tradition of socially-conscious art” that has
thankfully raised awareness of suffering in “social life or in family life,” but she is quick
to point out the limitations of such efforts.54 This art can depict “the gross racial injustices
of our world, or in the exposure of the tyrannies of family life on the individual.”55 These
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portrayals can be powerful and moving, evoking the strong response a reader may have
had to the Fawley children hanging dead in a closet, or Leonard Bast crushed beneath the
weight of the books he valued. But for Spark, such displays of emotional anger are no
longer the most effective, “it isn’t achieving its end or illuminating our lives any more.”56
Spark picks up on the same radical shift in perspective that Woolf had attributed to the
effects of war. After World War II, this shift has intensified: “we have come to a moment
in history when we are surrounded on all sides and oppressed by the absurd.”57 And
everyone, regardless of their level of sophistication or education is “aware of this fact.”
Therefore, the “art of ridicule is an art that everyone can share in some degree, given the
world that we have.”58
Spark argues in favor of parody because she believes it has the enlightening
effects that had at one point been assigned to culture:
Our noble aspirations, our sympathies, our elevated feelings should not be
inspired merely by visits to an art gallery, a theater, or by reading a book, but
rather the rhetoric of our times should persuade us to contemplate the ridiculous
nature of the reality before us, and teach us to mock it. We should know ourselves
better by now than to be under the illusion that we are all essentially aspiring,
affectionate, and loving creatures. We do have these qualities, but we are
aggressive, too. And so when I speak of the desegregation of art I mean by this
the liberation of our minds from the comfortable cells of lofty sentiment in which
they are confined and never really satisfied.59
Miss Brodie’s version of culture fails to account for the “rhetoric of our times” that
everyone can now speak, just as Spark claims that Arnold’s vision of self-directed
Bildung as a means of social harmony is almost a complete charade. Culture cannot be
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transmitted in ways that look toward tradition and continuity, for the absurdity of the
postwar world cannot find significance in an art dedicated too much to its own
preservation.
Although Spark and Amis share a sense of a culture that is no longer transmissible
through education, Spark’s call for accessible and diverse forms of parody as a way to
resist too-limited forms of culture are in stark contrast to Amis’s sharp satire. For Amis,
culture was doomed on two fronts. An anti-modernist, he was frustrated by the
inaccessibility of Bloomsbury high aesthetics and found that it represented a stifling and
elitist version of culture.60 But at the other extreme, he was vocally against the
democratization of education, a position summed up in his now ubiquitous phrase, “more
means worse.”61 Along with C.B. Cox and A.E. Dyson, Amis contributed to the “Black
Papers” (in contrast to the government “White Papers”) of the late sixties, attacking
especially the 1963 Robbins Report, which recommended immediate expansion of and
access to the universities.62 Amis pokes fun at education reform in Lucky Jim in the
characters of Beesley and Mrs. Welch, concluding both that culture has become too
diffused to have lasting value and that culture in its traditional form is largely irrelevant.
Like Amis, Leavis argues for the continued benefit of culture, but remains concerned that
its widespread availability has also diminished its commitment to tradition. With his
characteristic drama, he concludes with sadness, “The prospects of culture, then, are very
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dark. There is less room for hope in that a standardised civilisation is rapidly enveloping
the whole world.”63
T.S. Eliot had come to a similar conclusion in the forties. When he defines
“culture” in Notes towards a Definition of English Culture (1949), he does so because “a
doctrine only needs to be defined after the appearance of some heresy.”64 One form of
“heresy,” he argues, was the diffusion of education. He resists synonymy between
education and culture and challenges assumptions that the purpose of education is to
transmit culture: “we must observe that the assumption that culture can be summed up as
skills and interpretations controverts the more comprehensive view of culture” that he
takes in his earlier chapters.65 Eliot maintains that the diffusion of education cheapens it;
culture should remain the privilege of the select few who can understand and appreciate it
fully.
By arguing that the diffusion of education has a negative impact on cultural
preservation, however, Eliot must admit a stronger link between education and cultural
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transmission than he is prepared to admit in his denunciation of education’s “skills and
interpretations.” Eliot returns to the subject of his earlier essay, “Tradition and the
Individual Talent,” and in doing so finally acknowledges that cultural transmission
depends on education:
We know now that the highest achievements of the past, in art, in wisdom, in
holiness, were but ‘stages in development’ which we can teach our springalds to
improve upon. We must not train them merely to receive the culture of the past,
for that would be to regard the culture of the past as final. We must not impose
culture upon the young, though we may impose upon them whatever political and
social philosophy is in vogue. And yet the culture of Europe has deteriorated
visibly within the memory of many who are by no means the oldest among us.
And we know, that whether education can foster and improve culture or not, it can
surely adulterate and degrade it. For there is no doubt that in our headlong rush to
educate everybody, we are lowering our standards, and more and more
abandoning the study of those subjects by which the essentials of our culture—of
that part of it which is transmissible by education—are transmitted; destroying
our ancient edifices to make ready the ground upon which the barbarian nomads
of the future will encamp in their mechanised caravans.66
Eliot wants simultaneously to preserve tradition and to recognize its end. In a long and
complex sentence, Eliot struggles to articulate the viability of cultural transmission: it
depends on education, yet education may or may not be able to “foster and improve
culture.” The decay present in The Wasteland had reached a crisis point by the forties, as
the culture of the past manifestly ceases to be transmissible and Eliot looks to salvage
“essentials” before they disappear. Cultural diffusion in his argument directly threatens
cultural transmission because of culture’s already very precarious state.
As I have argued, however, cultural transmission as it related to education had
long since been scrutinized by writers of the modernist age. To borrow a term from
Raymond Williams, the breakdown in cultural transmission is its own “long revolution,”
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a gradual move toward an expansive understanding of culture.67 Hardy, Forster, and
Woolf associate education reform (the “diffusion” of education) with the inevitable
failure of cultural transmission in its traditional sense, but not in the causal relationship
Eliot posits. Instead, they offer a fuller account of culture’s intransmissibility even in the
most elite institutions of Oxford and Cambridge. The inevitability of a break between
culture and education that is not blamed on education reform but illuminated by it leads
Spark to take a more sympathetic view of cultural diffusion. According to Spark, once
culture takes into account its inherent problems of accessibility and transmissibility, it
can finally be refigured in redeeming ways that simply no longer depend on educational
institutions or on a tradition of the past. In granting Miss Brodie such striking
resemblance to the sovereign educator, Spark acknowledges—like Hardy, Forster, and
Woolf—that Arnold’s mentorship would only be possible if culture could be completely
separate from one’s social experience, which it ultimately cannot be. Although she argues
effectively in The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie that traditional culture is too far removed
from modern social problems, she still has faith in culture, a culture that—thankfully—
cannot be transmitted in the way Arnold had imagined for his culture. For Spark, as for
Forster, increased educational opportunity is not necessarily anathema to culture, since
culture can be manifested and reinvented in ways Eliot could not imagine. By
acknowledging that cultural transmission is no longer the main consideration when the
culture itself has lost significance, Spark sees the opportunity to rethink what culture can
be and from where it can come.
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Epilogue: Transfiguring Culture

In “Does Culture Matter” (1940), the essay in which Forster questions whether
culture can be handed down, he reflects on the idea of culture in crisis. Like Amis and
Eliot, Forster studies the effects of the postwar education boon, only he rejects the “more
is worse” elitism and proposes instead that the diffusion of culture has finally removed
the impediments to cultural transmission:
Cultivated people are a drop of ink in the ocean. They mix easily and even
genially with other drops, for those exclusive days are over when cultivated
people made only cultivated friends, and became tongue-tied or terror-struck in
the presence of anyone whose make-up was different from their own. Culture,
thank goodness, is no longer a social asset, it can no longer be employed either as
a barrier against the mob or as a ladder into the aristocracy. This is one of the last
few improvements that have occurred in England since the last war.1
Even though he would mourn in Howards End the loss of a traditional culture, Forster
here makes it clear that such “loss” has also the potential to bring enormous gain. The
diffusion of culture is to its benefit, not its terminal detriment.
To illustrate that gain, though, he must ask the same question Amis does: “what
have we got worth passing on?”2 His answer looks back at the problems of culture I have
identified throughout this project: he first imagines the ways in which culture has become
the material transmission Woolf implicates: “What we have got is (roughly speaking) a
little knowledge about books, pictures, tunes, runes, and a little skill in their
interpretation. Seated beside our gas-fires and beneath our electric-bulbs, we inherit a
tradition which has lasted for about three thousand years.” He goes on to identify the
1

E.M. Forster, “Does Culture Matter?” in Two Cheers for Democracy (New York: Harcourt, Brace &
World, Inc., 1951), 104.

2

Forster, “Does Culture Matter?” 104.

242

privileged past from which culture emerged and, as does Hardy, Forster associates this
privilege with cultural capital: “In the past, culture has been paid for by the ruling classes;
they often did not know why they paid, by they paid, much as they went to church; it was
the proper thing to do, it was a form of social snobbery, and so the artists sneaked a meal,
the author got a sinecure, and the work of creation went on.”3 He concludes with the
shortcomings of culture Spark reveals in The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie: “Today, people
are coming to the top who are, in some ways, more clear-sighted and honest than the
ruling classes of the past, and they refuse to pay for what they don’t want; judging by the
noises through the floor, our neighbour in the flat above doesn’t want books, pictures,
tunes, runes, anyhow doesn’t want the sorts which we recommend.”4 Using Forster’s
overview, it is clear that each of the novels in this project is a kind of locus for culture
and its transmission, a piece of transmitted culture that creates a usefully generative
tension. Forster reminds us that it is the reader’s responsibility to respond the particular
engagement with culture that the author offers—and that this action is in and of itself a
form of cultural transmission.
An author weighted down by a lengthy literary tradition, Forster looks to the
possible reader and asks, “Ought we to bother him?” Ought high culture be handed to
those who might not seem to want or appreciate it? To make culture worth passing on,
Forster suggests that the problem in transmitting culture had come from trying to transmit
culture as it had always been. If one tries to transmit the same old version of traditional
culture, the effect is meddlesome, “like a maiden-aunt.” “Our arms, as it were, full of
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parcels,” Forster claims, alluding to how an author might try to transmit cultural artifacts
culled from ancient to modern times: “I was given these specially to hand on to you…
Sophocles, Velasquez, Henry James… I’m afraid they’re a little heavy, but you’ll get to
love them in time, and if you don’t take them off my hands I don’t know who will…
please… please… they’re really important, they’re culture.”5 If one focuses too much on
passing down Arnold’s “the best which has been thought and said in the world,” then
culture will, in the end, never be able to be transmitted at all. Culture in Arnold’s
construct is ultimately too limited, too removed from the society it was intended to
benefit. Unable to be the restorative force Arnold imagined, culture could not be
transmitted in the ways he suggested. Authors must come to terms with the
intransmissibility of a particular cultural tradition.
In “The Desegregation of Art,” Spark agrees with Forster and concludes that the
“masterpieces of the past” should not be the lone litmus test of culture.6 Instead she
encourages “the special calling of arts and letters,” believing that “Literature infiltrates
and should fertilize our mind. It is not a special department set aside for the entertainment
and delight of the sophisticated minority.”7 Here, literature is poised definitively as the
new transmitter of culture. Not in the sense that Leavis would have it, however. Whereas
Leavis wanted a literary curriculum that would preserve past culture in traditional ways,
Spark imagines a literature that constantly reexamines what culture is. While she would
not agree with Arnold’s version of culture as a classical curriculum, she, too, insists that
5

Forster, “Does Culture Matter?” 104-5.

6

Muriel Spark, “The Desegregation of Art,” in Critical Essays on Muriel Spark, ed. Joseph Hynes (New
York: G.K. Hall & Co., 1992), 33.

7

Spark, “The Desegregation of Art,” 34.
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culture should aim to reach everyone. Her version, as did Leavis’s, includes special
attention to arts and letters, but her position is more inclusive. In agreement with the
cultural studies movement that had gained popularity in the sixties, she includes
journalism, speeches, and any form of writing that responds in a meaningful way to the
same social inequalities that culture could not account for in its restricted earlier
iterations.8 In a refutation of Amis’s “more is worse,” Spark exclaims: “We are living in
times when there are fewer great artists, fewer great writers, but more and better art,
better and more lively, and a greater volume of writing.”9 In this sense, Hardy’s,
Forster’s, and Woolf’s novels ensure some form of cultural transmission even—and
especially— as they explore its limitations.
Forster and Spark both believed in the power of the author to continue to transmit
culture, and they relocate cultural transmission from the old institutions and into the texts
themselves. Filling The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie with her own re-writings of “The
Lady of Shallott” and the poets who comprise Hugh Carruthers, Spark, in a postmodern
gesture, reappropriates the canon for new and individual purposes. Miss Brodie, too,
inspires her girls to write their own version of her story. Even Sandy Stranger, who
ultimately betrays Miss Brodie, succeeds in adapting Miss Brodie to her own life. When
she writes The Transfiguration of the Commonplace, Sandy writes her own version of
culture, an invitation to “transfigure” the “common currency” of words so that they might
“fertilize our mind[s].”10 Removed from the isolation of Miss Brodie’s confining culture,

8

For an explanation of the notion of “culture as text,” a central tenet of cultural studies, see the introduction
to Catherine Gallagher and Stephen Greenblatt’s Practicing the New Historicism (2001).

9

Spark, The Desegregation of Art, 33.

10

Spark, The Desegregation of Art, 33-4.
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Sandy is finally able to relate in meaningful ways to the world around her: contemplating
salvation outside St. Giles’ Cathedral or the Tolbooth, “[a]ll she was conscious of now
was that some quality of life peculiar to Edinburgh and nowhere else had been going on
unbeknownst to her all the time, and however undesirable it might be she felt deprived of
it; however undesirable, she desired to know what it was, and to cease to be protected
from it by enlightened people” (115). No longer the entitlement of the enlightened,
culture can look even to the commonplace, for culture is now that which is transfigured
rather than transmitted.
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